MUHAMMAD IJAZ KHAN, J.-. Through this writ petition, petitioner has challenged the order and judgment of the learned Rent Controller, Mardan dated 27.09.2023, whereby the petition of the present petitioner for restraining the respondent/ landlord from dispossessing him from the rented premises was dismissed, and it was directed that due to expiry of the tenancy agreement, petitioner is bound to vacate the rented premises within 45 days, and order and judgment of the learned Additional District Judge-III, Mardan dated 14.03.2024, whereby the appeal filed by the present petitioner has also been dismissed.
2. Precisely, the facts leading to the filing of the instant petition are that the present petitioner, being a tenant, filed a petition before the worthy Rent Controller for issuance of direction to the respondent /landlord not to eject him from the rented premises, in which respondent/landlord was summoned, and who submitted his reply, where his stance was that since the tenancy agreement has already been expired, therefore, petitioner/ tenant is liable to be evicted. The worthy Rent Controller, without framing of any issues and without recording any evidence in support thereof, straightaway passed the impugned order and judgment, whereby the present petitioner then tenant was directed to vacate the rented premises within 45 days vide one of the impugned order dated 27.09.2023. Petitioner being aggrieved of the aforesaid order and judgment, preferred an appeal to the Court of District Judge-III, Mardan, however, his appeal was also dismissed vide second impugned order and judgment dated 14.03.2024, which order and judgment have now been challenged by the petitioner before this Court through the instant petition.
3. Arguments of both the learned counsel for the parties were heard and record perused.
4. The record would show that it was the present petitioner, being a tenant, who filed an application before the worthy Rent Controller for restraining respondent/landlord not to dispossess him from the rented premises, however, when the respondent/landlord was summoned, he submitted his written reply, whereby he pleaded that since the tenancy agreement between the parties has already been expired, therefore, the petitioner being tenant is liable to eviction, which plea of the respondent/ landlord prevailed with the learned Rent Controller and thereby dismissed the application/petition of the petitioner and directed him to vacate the premises.
5. In order to address the controversy involved in this petition, it would be relevant to first reproduce section 13:- "13. Eviction of tenant.- (1) A tenant in possession of a building or rented land shall not be evicted therefrom in execution of a decree passed before or after the commencement of this Ordinance, or otherwise, and whether before or after the termination of the tenancy, except in accordance with the provisions of this section.
(2) A landlord who seeks to evict his tenant shall apply to the Controller for a direction in that behalf. if the Controller, after giving the tenant a reasonable opportunity of showing cause against the application, is satisfied that (i)---- (ii)---- (a)--- (b)....
(iii)---- (iv)---- (v)---- [(vi)---- Provided that the Controller may give the tenant a reasonable time for putting the landlord in possession of the building or rented land and may extend such time so as not to exceed four months in the aggregate.
(3) (a) A landlord may apply to the Controller for an order directing the tenant to put the landlord in possession
(i) .....
(a)---- (b)---- (c)----
(ii) in the case of a non-residential building or a scheduled building or rented land, if
(a) he requires it in good faith for his own use or for the use of any of his [...] children;
(b) he or his said child is not occupying in the same urban area in which such building is situated for the purpose of his business any other such building or rented land, as the case may be, suitable for his needs at the time; and
(c) he has not vacated such a building or rented land without sufficient cause after the commencement of this Ordinance, in the said urban area: Provided that where the tenancy is for a specified period agreed upon between the landlord and the tenant the landlord shall not be entitled to apply under this sub-section before the expiry of such period:"
The aforesaid provisions of law unmistakably show that a tenant in possession of a rented premises could not be evicted unless the landlord applies to the Controller for issuance of necessary direction in that behalf. It also stipulates the grounds on which a tenant could be evicted, which grounds, amongst others, include default in payment of rent, subletting, using the building for an unauthorized purpose or for personal need etc. Though expiry of the agreement has not been shown as one of the ground in sub-section (2) or sub-section (3) of section 13 of ibid Ordinance, however, as per proviso to sub-section (3) clause (c), a landlord will not be entitled to apply for the eviction of a tenant before the expiry of tenancy period.
6. In view of the above, when we confronted learned counsel representing the respondent/ landlord with the provision of section 13 of the Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance, 1959, to the effect that as to whether, in absence of any application by the landlord for the eviction of the petitioner/tenant, an eviction order of the tenant could be passed. He was also confronted that when respondent/landlord has not applied to the Rent Controller for the eviction of the petitioner/tenant on any ground as find mention in section 13 of ibid Ordinance, then whether a favourable order could be passed in his favour and further that as to whether expiry of an agreement could be taken as a ground in the reply for the eviction of a tenant or not. He was thereafter unable to give any satisfactory answer and rightly so as if the respondent/landlord was interested in the eviction of the petitioner then as per the mandate of section 13 of the Ordinance, he was required to have apply to the Rent Controller for eviction of the petitioner/tenant and as such, any plea taken in the written statement qua the expiry of the agreement would not be sufficient for evicting the petitioner/ tenant. It may be reiterated that when the law requires the landlord to apply and such right has not been conferred on a landlord to agitate the plea of eviction of the tenant in the written reply, then the procedure as adopted by the worthy Rent Controller is totally alien to the law and as such, it could not be allowed to prevail. It may also be reiterated that when the law requires something to be done in a particular manner, then it must be carried out/done in that manner or else the same would not carry any legal sanctity. In this respect, reliance can be placed on a case[1], wherein Supreme Court of Pakistan has held that where the law prescribes a thing to be done in a particular manner following a particular procedure, it shall be done in the same manner following the provisions of law without deviating from the prescribed procedure, and where a power is given to do a certain thing in a certain way the thing must be done in that way or not at all. It is a fundamental canon of interpretation and understanding that the statute should be read in its mundane, natural and grammatical meaning in order to give effect with proper construction.
If the language of the statute is plain and instantly recognizable then there should be no question of its construction or interpretation by the Court. A construction which diminishes the statute to a futility has to be avoided rather it should be construed as a workable instrument. It is the foremost sense of duty of the Court to figure out the intention of the legislature through word for word meaning and if it admits only one meaning, no further interpretation is required except that meaning which should be put into effect. In this regard, further reliance could be placed on various cases, the details of which are mentioned at the footnote[2].
7. It was also noted with great pain that the present petitioner, being a tenant in his petition, has raised many factual aspects like payment of the pagri amount and other grounds for restraining the respondent/landlord from dispossessing him, however, the learned Rent Controller without framing of issues and recording of evidence has considered the reply of the respondent/landlord as a gospel truth for all legal and practical purposes and as such, has passed a summary judgment for the eviction of the petitioner/tenant, which order under no canon of justice could be sustained.
8. It is also well-settled that this Court in its constitutional jurisdiction could only interfere in the orders of special tribunals or special courts if they have improperly exercised their jurisdiction or if their judgments are the result of illegal exercise of jurisdiction vested in them or where the fora below lack jurisdiction and as in the present case, the fora below have neither exercised their jurisdiction in a proper manner nor in legal and lawful manner, therefore, this Court in its constitutional jurisdiction could interfere in their orders/judgments. In a case[3], the Supreme Court of Pakistan has held that in normal circumstances, the High Court is not supposed to interfere with a finding of fact recorded by a tribunal of special jurisdiction in respect of matters exclusively within its competence, unless there has been a serious misreading or mis-appreciation of the evidence on the part of the said tribunal, or there has been failure on its part to take into consideration material facts or to apply the statutory law or any principle or rule of law as laid down by the superior Courts. Similar view was also followed by the Sindh High Court in case[4], where it was held that Courts below, in its original and appellate jurisdiction are competent to draw inference, while delivering the judgment and it is not open to interference in Constitutional jurisdiction, unless and until miscarriage of justice is established by the party in the Constitutional petition, thus, High Court would not normally interfere in judgment and decree passed by Court of competent jurisdiction for the reason that it was within their exclusive jurisdiction, to believe and disbelieve the evidence, it is worth to add that no Constitutional petition lies when evidence in the case has been properly appreciated and analyzed. In another case[5], the Supreme Court has held that the High Courts must not exercise their constitutional jurisdiction in order to interfere with the discretion exercised by lower Courts unless the same suffers from jurisdictional, factual or legal errors. In other words, such interference would be justified in cases where the impugned order has been passed without "jurisdiction or is based on misreading or non-reading of evidence, or is not in accordance with the law. If none of these errors is present, the High Courts must not exercise their constitutional jurisdiction to interfere with the findings of lower Courts merely because it reached a different conclusion as to the controversy than the latter.
9. In view of the above discussions and expositions of law on the subject, this petition is allowed and consequently, the impugned order and judgment of the worthy Rent Controller, Mardan dated 27.09.2023, and that of appeal Court dated 14.03.2024 are set aside and as result thereof, the petition No. 67/RC of 2023 filed by the present petitioner shall be deemed pending before the worthy Rent Controller, Mardan, who shall frame the issues, record the evidence of the parties and thereafter, decide the fate of the petition in accordance with law.
Parties are directed to appear before the worthy Rent Controller, Mardan, on 18.09.2025.
1. "Messrs. TRI-STAR INDUSTRIES (PVT.) LIMITED vs TRISA BURSTENFABRIK AG TRIENGEN and another' (2023 SCMR 1502)
2. "JEEHAND vs The STATE through Prosecutor General Balochistan" (2025 SCMR 923), "SECRETARY, MINISTRY OF FINANCE, FINANCE DIVISION, GOVERNMENT OF PAKISTAN and others vs MUHAMMAD ANWAR" (2025 SCMR 153), "NADIR KHAN vs QADIR HUSSAIN and others" (2024 SCMR 770), "NOMAN MANSOOR alias NOM! and another vs The STATE and others" (PLD 2024 Supreme Court 805), "ATTAULLAH KHAN vs. ALI AZAM AFRIDI and others" (2023 PLC (C.S) 182) and "AJM1R SHAH. EX-SEPOY vs the INSPECTOR-GENERAL, FRONTIER CORPS KHYBER PAKHTUNKHWA and another" (2020 SCMR 2129).
3. "Mst. Mahmooda ReCIUM and another vs. Tai Din" (1992 SCMR 809)
4. "Muhammad lqbal vs. Mst. Zahidan and 2 others" (2013 CLC 1780)
5. "Amjad Khan vs. Muhammad Irshad (deceased) through LRs" (2020 SCMR 2155)