' ZAKAULLAH LODHI, ACTG. C. J.-The petitioners and respondents Nos. 1 to 13 are heirs of Late Sardar Mehrullah Khan; after whose death some of his agricultural land, was mutated in the names of the respondents Nos. 1 to 13 by the revenue authorities. The petitioners took exception to such mutation on the ground that they alone were the rightful owners of these lands and requested for the correction of the revenue records. Initially the matter was brought before the Collector Chagai, who dismissed their application on 29th November, 1979. Later on the appeal submitted to the Commissioner was dismissed on 22nd June, 1980, and the revision also suffered the same fate on 22nd September, 1980.
2. Thereafter the petitioners filed a suit for declaration under section 42 of the Specific Relief Act, 1877 (hereinafter referred to as the Act of 1877) in the Court of Senior Civil Judge, Quetta seeking declaration as to their title and consequent upon it the directions for the correction of entries accordingly. An application under Order XXXIX, rules 1 and 2, C. P. C. Was also filed alongwith the suit. The respondents in their rejoinder inter alia challenged the competency of the suit on the ground that the case was triable under the Civil Procedure (Special Provisions) Ordinance, 1968 (hereinafter referred to as the "Ordinance I of 1968"). However, the Senior Civil Judge vide order dated 15th July, 1981, dismissed the suit and also rejected the said application on another ground, that is that section 172 of the West Pakistan Land Revenue Act, 1967 (hereinafter referred to as the "Act of 1967") constituted bar to the maintainability of a suit challenging the action of the revenue authorities. Aggrieved by this order, the petitioners filed separate appeals to the District Judge, Quetta against the order of the dismissal of the suit and the application; the vide common order dated 23rd December, 1981, set aside the order of the Senior Civil Judge, Quetta holding that the suit was maintainable but directed the return of the plaint on the ground that the same lay before the Deputy Commissioner under the Ordinance I of 1968. He treated the appeal filed against the order of rejection of the application as infructuous. The petitioners have come up to this Court against such orders of the District Judge, Quetta by these separate revision petitions, one challenging the order of the return of the plair and the other, orders passed on appeal against the rejection of the said application. As the two petitions arise out of the same suit, they shall be disposed of by this common order.
3. Mr. Basharatullah, learned counsel for the petitioners contended that-
(i) the order of the Senior Civil Judge, Quetta was patently illegal as section 172 of the Act of 1967, did not create bar to the filing of the suit under the Act of 1877 to challenge the action of the revenue authorities; (ii)that section 42 of the Act of 1877, which confers a right upon an aggrieved person to seek declaration with regard to his status, title or right, refers to a Court, in which the suits were required to be filed; therefore, a Tribunal under the Ordinance I of 1968 which was not a Court, was not competent to bear such suits; and
(iii) that without prejudice to the foregoing ground, if such a suit was filed under the Ordinance I of 1968, the same revenue authorities would dispose it of which had passed the impugned orders earlier as revenue Courts; and such a situation would lead to anomaly, and hardship.
4. The first contention raised by the learned counsel hardly needs much discussion as the order of the Senior Civil Judge, Quetta to the effect that section 172 of the Act of 1967, constituted bar to the filing of suits to challenge the action of the revenue authorities, has since been set aside by the District Judge, Quetta. In order to clarify the legal position suffice it to say that section 53 of the Act of 1967, itself creates a right in favour of an aggrieved person to approach the civil Court for declaration of his right under section 42 of the Act of 1877. The scope of section 172 of the Act of 1967, is entirely different. It only excludes the civil Courts from taking in hand the functions assigned to the revenue Courts, as also the questioning of their methodology adopted for the discharge of such functions. The function of the Revenue Courts is to prepare the revenue records in the light of the evidence with regard to one's title or interest, but the finality is attached to the orders of the civil Courts who shall determine such rights if any dispute arose in that regard. The view of the Senior.
Civil Judge was erroneous and was rightly set aside by the District Judge.
5. The next ground is crucial to clinch the issue; as such, we propose to deal with it in detail. Act of 1867 by Chapter VI, section 42, confers a right upon an aggrieved person to seek declaration from a Court of law with regard to his status, right or title to a character both in rem and personam. It reads as under:- "42. Discretion of Court as to declaration of status of right.-Any person entitled to any legal character, or to any right as to any property, may institute a suit against any person denying, or interested to deny, his title to such character or right, and the Court may in its discretion make therein a declaration that he is so entitled, and the plaintiff need not in such suit for any further relief................"
Reading the above, it is manifest that a person is entitled to file a suit in the civil Court to seek declaration with regard to a status or right to which he considers himself entitled, but the same is being denied to him by his opponents. This section covers all kinds of rights, whether they were personal or impersonal in character. The debatable question is only with regard to the forum in which the suit was to be filed, and it has arisen because in this part of the country, besides the Code of Civil Procedure a special system of adjudication of civil disputes also exists. Such system is provided by the Ordinance I of 1968 which is a procedural law and supercedes the Code in all matters which are amenable to its jurisdiction. It excludes both, the Code and the Evidence Act and provides a system of decision of cases through the members to be appointed by the Deputy Commissioner who give their opinion in the matter to the Deputy Commissioner who in turn is the Final authority to decide the case. Appeals and revisions are also provided but they too lie to the revenue authorities, as such, this system is akin to the "Jirga Trials under the F. C. R. 1901, since repealed. As said above section 42 refers to a Court and such phrase indicates the normal law forums which follow the procedure of the Code of Civil Procedure and the Evidence Act, The Code itself does not define the word "Court" though it uses it so frequently. But while using this word, it means the forum created by civil Courts Ordinance which follows its procedure and the Evidence Act. Such are the normal Courts of law which are responsible to impart justice in the country and they do not include such forums as have been created on account of expediency to try cases by simpler and summary procedures under special laws such as 'Rent Controller" under the West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance, Labour Courts or Tribunal under the Industrial Relations Ordinance, Election Tribunals under the Election Laws and so on. This phrase also does not accommodate within its ambit such forums which have a procedure different than that of the Code. That is why such special forums are invariably called Tribunals etc. In contradiction to the Courts of law. Even if the word "Court" is used for them, it is used in common place meanings or in general sense of the term and not in strict legal parlance. The question for determination as to which forum is a Court and which is not a Court, is mainly dependant on the manner and method in which proceedings are regulated before it. This process naturally embraces the procedural laws, which bind it in its functions and determine its course of action. The evidence being the deciding factor in all kinds of disputes, it is also pertinent to see whether such form follows the Evidence Act or not. It may be mentioned here that the Evidence Act by virtue of the definition describes sush forums as "Court" which follow its tenets. But it is only relevant for the purpose of the Evidence Act.
Ordinarily the decision of a dispute by an arbitrator and a conciliatory body etc. May be termed as decision by a Court but that is not so because such forums are not bound by any law with regard to procedure and evidence as such, they only settle the disputed but do not administer justice according to law, and are not, therefore, Courts. Hence, the Courts are such organs of the State which follow legally prescribed scientific methodology as to procedure and evidence in arriving at just and fair conclusions.
' It would be advantageous to examine the definition of Courts and to start with, dictionary meanings may be seen first. Then we would advert to the question whether Tribunal under Ordinance I of 1968, was or was not a Court and to the other question, namely whether all kinds of cases were amenable to its jurisdiction or some particular cases alone shall lie before it.
6. Mr. Basharatullah, learned counsel for the petitioners submitted that the forum created by the special laws were not Courts. On the other hand, Mr. Muqim Ansari, learned counsel for the respondents Nos. 1 to 13 and Mr. Munawar Ahmed Mirza learned Advocate-General, appearing on Court notice, were of the view that the phrase "Court" used in section 42 of the Act of 1877 did not mean a Court which was creation of the civil Courts Ordinance and followed the procedure of C. P.
C. And the Evidence Act, say; a normal Court of law. They argued that by the term "Court", such forum was meant which enjoyed judicial powers to receive pleadings, record evidence and pass decrees capable of enforcement, and since the tribunal and the Deputy Commissioner, combinedly perform these functions and the decrees passed by them were legally enforceable, therefore, they too were Courts. Mr. Ansari relied upon the definition of the "Court" as given in the Evidence Act. This definition includes all Judges and Magistrates who were legally authorised to take evidence. Apparantly this definition is relatable to the field occupied by the Evidence Act, but it does not mean that any forum which is authorised to record the evidence in any manner whatsoever shall become a Court. Only these Courts which record, discern and appreciate evidence in confirmity with the Evidence Act are Courts and that too for the purpose of the Evidence Act, not generally. This argument does not hold the field.
7. The Black's Law Dictionary defines the "Court" as "an organ of the Government belonging to the judicial Department, whose function is the application of the laws to controversies brought before it and the public administration of justice".
' This definition finds support from White Country v. Gwin (1), Bta-dley v. Town of Bloomfield (2). With reference to some other case-law it further defines the "Court" as a "body in the Government to which the administration of justice is delegated". Proceeding further it also says that the word "Court" is often applied in circumstances otherwise than in technical sense and is applied to various tribunals not judicial in their character, and includes Jury as well in the definition of the "Court." This explanation amply clarifies that although in strict sense Courts are such bodies or organs of the Government which apply laws to controversies and administer justice by pressing into service the prescribed rules of procedure and Evidence, but at times this term is loosely applied to such forums also which are not the Courts stricto senso. So it does not mean that all forums responsible for the settlement of various kinds of disputes created from time to time under different laws are all Courts by dint of their function.
In Words and Phrases Legally Defined by Butterworths, Vol. I, p. 367 the word "Court" has been defined as a Department entrusted with the G administration of justice and it also includes in its definition the Parliament. Parliament is included because it passed verdict in impeachment proceedings. Otherwise, parliament would not fall into the category of the Court. Similarly Jury is included in the term Court and Mr. Ansari on this premises argued that alike Jury a Tribunal could also be called Court. It is a fallacy to say so. Jury in the Anglo Saxson system is the Judge of facts but in the Tribunals under Ordinance I of 1968, it is only a recommendatory body and its verdict is in no way binding upon the Deputy Commissioner over and above this, Deputy Commissioner is not a judicial Officer but an executive authority. That makes all the difference. The "Shorter, Oxford English Dictionary" also defines the Court as a forum for the decision of causes and here also decision means decision in the fashion I have referred heretofore.
' It is thus manifest that although the term "Court" is at times ,used for quasi-judicial or administrative tribunals also but on this premises it cannot be inferred that such forums should be equated with the "Court" of law. Therefore, in our opinion "Courts" are such organs of the State which administer justice strictly in accordance with law, meaning thereby that while applying laws to the controversies, they follow certain rules with regard to procedures and evidence and are not left altogether unguided and uncontrolled to act on their whims and fancies as in the case of the Ordinance I of 1968, which although a procedural law, nullifies all laws and all doctrines hitherto universally considered necessary for the imparting of justice. The Tribunal under the Ordinance I of 1968 is one such forum which is not bound by any law of procedure or Evidence and like the Jirga under the erstwhile F. C. R , it may or may not even record evidence; and if recorded, the applicability or otherwise of the same has no criterions. It all depends on the whims of the tribunal to deny or allow any kind of evidence. {{FOOT NOTE}}
(1) 136 Ind. 562=36 N E 237=22 L R A 402 (2) 85 N J Law 506.89 A 1009 {{FOOT NOTE}} It is free to pass a verdict on personal knowledge, belief or hearsay. The Deputy Commissioner who passes final order in proceedings under the Ordinance I of 1968, on the recommendations of the tribunal stands on the same footings as the Deputy Commissioner under the F. C. R. Both the Deputy Commissioner, and the Commissioner who heard revisions, against the Deputy Commissioner's orders in F. C. R. Were held not to be the Courts or functionaries of the judiciary in Summandar and 17 others v. Crown (1). The reasons are obvious namely the executive authorities, who decided litigation without the guidance of any law were not supposed to be administering justice, though they decided disputes between the parties. They were administrative tribunals whose aims were patently different than that of the Courts of law. Following paragraph from the observations of Mr. Justice Akram, J. (as he then was) is of benefit and may be reproduced:- "An order of the above nature cannot be regarded as having been made judicially by a Court of law. The Deputy Commissioner and the Commissioner in this respect appear to have been mentioned in the Regulation merely as persona designata and not as judiciary. The conviction and the sentence in question, therefore, cannot be treated as made in the course of performance of the normal duty of administration of justice in a litis contestatio."
' Likewise, the Rent Controller, who is creation of a special law and is not bound to act like the ordinary civil Courts, has been regarded Persona Designata and not a Court [See Rais Ahmed v.
Mian Abdul Jabbar and another (2)1. It was reiterated in this case with emphasis that they held such position because "they were not bound by any particular procedure; nature and extent of inquiry was left to be determined by Rent Controller so much so that they could pass decree without evidence in cases of compromise etc. And were also not bound to record a compromise".
Again in Messrs Ahmed Brothers v. Muhammad Hassan Khan (3), it was held that as the Compensation Commissioner who was not bound to record evidence, while deciding disputes with regard to compensation, was a special forum created by a special law and did not, therefore, function like a Court. Here as well, the emphasis is on the same criterion i. e.; whether or not, a functionary under a particular law, was bound by a procedure as to the regulation of the proceedings as also the Evidence Act, if it was not, it was not equitable with a 'Court". On the other hand, in Des Dewan v. Major Nazir Beg and others (4), the Border Area Committee, created under the West Pakistan Border Area Regulation, 1959, was held to be a Court within the meaning of the section 3 of the Evidence Act, as it was authorised to record and use the evidence following the principles of the Evidence Act. The distincation can well be seen. Similarly in Chargul v. The Commissioner, F. C. R. Quetta and another (5), the view was that the functionaries under the F. C. R.
Were quasi-judicial and not judicial authorities.
On the authority of Hari Cha ran Kundu v. Kaushi Charan Dey (6), it was attempted to be argued by Mr. Ansari that since the evidence was recorded and assessed in the cases under the Ordinance I of 1968, also, therefore, it had essential attributes of a Court of law. It is fallacious to equate a Court following a law in the matter of evidence with a forum {{FOOT NOTE}}
(1) PLD 1954 FC 228 (2) PLD 1972 Lab. 711
(3) PLD 1965 Kar. 83 (4) PLD 1970 Lah. 790
(5) PLD 1962 Quetta 15 (6) AIR 1940 Cal. 286 {{FOOT NOTE}} simply examining witnesses but not hound in any manner to accept an, admissible piece of evidence or to reject an inadmissible evidence. Then the case cited by him has definite reference to the Courts following the Evidence Act and for that matter they were to be regarded as "Courts" for the purposes of that Act. In proceedings under the Ordinance I of 1968, the Evidence Act is excluded, so there is no question of regarding the tribunal a Court even for the purposes of the Evidence Act.
8. In the light of above, we are of the view that the Courts are only such organs of the State which administer justice under the guidance o procedural laws as to the conduct of the proceedings as well as Evidence. Since such methodology helps the Court in administering justice in accordance with law, therefore, all other bodies which have a free hand in the matter of deciding disputes are not Courts.
9. Adverting to the section 42 of the Act of 1877 against it shall be seen that the right conferred upon a person by this provision of law is of great value and importance and it cannot be left in the hands of persons not judicially trained and incapicitated to impart justice strict sense. The functionaries under the Ordinance I of 1968, cannot be placed any higher than this. Furthermore since the purpose was that such disputes should be decided by Court alone, therefore, in section 42 of Act of 1877, we find no words to suggest of any other forum. This jurisdiction attains all the more importance when decisions of revenue authorities are under challenge.
We, therefore, hold that by dint of section 42 of the Act of 1877, all cases involving declaration of status, right, title or interest in rem or in persona???, shall not be triable by a tribunal under the Ordinance I of 1968 but by a normal Court of law.
10. Before parting with the case, we may refer that the scheme of the Ordinance I of 1968 also does not accommodate the idea that all kinds of civil disputes shall be covered by it. The preamble and section 3 make it clear that the Ordinance is meant for the settlement of "certain disputes". It is so because it excludes from its operation cases triable under special laws such as cases falling under the West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance, Industrial Relations Ordinance Election and services laws and so on, and further excludes case covered by Muslim Family Laws Ordinance and the Conciliation Courts Act. So the position that emerges in that only these disputes which are not directly covered by any special law shall be triable under the Ordinance I of 1968, while the rest of the metters shall be tried by the special or the regular Courts of law, as the case may be.
' In the result, we allow Civil Revision No, 1 of 1982 with no orders as to costs and set aside the orders of both the Courts below. The case shall proceed in the civil Court who will also hear and dispose of the application under Order XXXIX, rules 1 and 2, C. P. C. From which Civil Revision No, 2 of 1982 emanates, in accordance with law.