1. K. HOSSAIN, J.--The petitioner in this writ petition has challenged the order of requisition dated 21- 11-63 passed by the Additional Deputy Commissioner, Khulna in L. A. Case No, 9 of 1962-63.
2. The facts giving rise to the writ petition as appear from the affidavits of the parties are that on 21- 11-63 the order of requisition for the purpose of acquisition was passed of 2.89 acres of land belonging to the petitioner along with other lands belonging to different person of Mouza Gilatala P.
3. S. Phultala, Khulna. The notice under section 5 (3) of the Act for acquisition of the property was also served on the petitioner on 9-5.64. The actual possession of this property was taken from the petitioner on 24-6.68. The petitioner has in the mean time received 75 % of the compensation for the land and full compensation for structures. The purpose of requisition was for Rehabilitation Zone of the displaced persons who will be displaced for other development projects of the Khulna Development Authority. The petitioner once raised objection against compensation only with regard to the building which was ultimately allowed by the Secretary, Revenue Department some time in July 1966. The petitioner thereafter in 1968, again made a revisional application before the Secretary, Revenue Department against the order of requisition and acquisition but it was rejected on 6-4-68 and thereafter the petitioner has challenged the order of requisition in this Court. It may be noted that the requisition and acquisition are for the Khulna Development Authority and the Provincial Government have approved the proposal after the passing of the order of requisition.
4. There are however the prior two sanctions given by the Land Allocation Committee.
5. Mr. Wahab, the learned Advocate for the petitioner has contended that the order of requisition was passed by the Additional Deputy Commissioner on 21-11-63 and admittedly the approval was given by the Provincial Government after the passing of the order of requisition and as under the proviso to section 3 of the East Bengal (Emergency) Requisition of Property Act, 1948 (hereinafter called the Act) the approval of the proposal by the Provincial Government is necessary before proceedings under the Act are started, the approval after the order of requisition is not the compliance with the law giving validity to the order of requisition. Mr. Moinul Huq the learned Advocate for the Khulna Development Authority has urged that the proceedings for the requisition and acquisition started before the Act was amended introducing the provision for approval and so no approval was necessary and in any event the Government by giving the approval have ratified the proposal for requisition and acquisition of the project and so the order of requisition is valid. He has also contended that the petitioner is guilty of laches and also precluded from any relief on ground of acquiescence. There is much substance in the contentions of the learned Advocate for the respondents. Mr. Wahab the learned Advocate for the petitioner has referred to a decision reported in 15 D L R 87 where it has been held with regard to the order of requisition and acquisition for Chittagong Development Authority regarding proviso to section 3 of the Act before its amendment in 1963 that as the Provincial Government did not give any approval to the proposal for requisitioning of the property on behalf of C. D. A., the impugned order was invalid. The relevant passage may be quoted :- "The proposal for starting proceedings with a view to requisition property for any project or scheme of the C. D. A. must receive the approval of the Provincial Government before such proceedings can be started under the East Benga (Emergency) Requisition of Property Act, 1948." Upon a proper reading of the said decision it appears that it does not support the contention of the learned Advocate for the petitioner; it rather supports the contention of Moinul Huq, the learned Advocate for the respondent.
6. According to the said decision the proposal for requisition for C. D. A. will require the approval of the Provincial Government before the proceedings for requisition are started. It may be stated that between the proposal and the passing of the order of requisition there may be some steps or stages taken or passed and so as a necessary corrolary it follows that when the proposal was sent to the Deputy Commissioner by the Khulna Development Authority, if the requirement of the law did not provide for such approval, subsequent amendment in the progress of the requisition proceeding but before the passing of the actual order of requisition will not invalidate the order of requisition for want of such approval in view of the fact that such approval was not necessary for the initiation of this requisition proceeding. Apart from this there are certain distinguishing features in the present case. First, approval has in fact been given, though after the passing of the order of requisition, and it cannot be said that the amendment of the Act in August 1963, during the pendency of this requisition proceedings started in February 1963, will invalidate the proceedings for want of prior approval of this proposal. The approval by the Provincial Government can be taken as ratification in the particular facts of this case. The other facts are that the petitioner has allowed the order of requisition passed on 21-11-63 go unchallenged till 1968 and has permitted the Authority to take possession of the land in implementation of the impugned order. The petitioner has also received without objection substantial part of compensation money. In the meantime the notice under section 5 of the Act for acquisition of the land has been served on the petitioner on 9- 5-64.
7. It may be stated that from the reading of section 3 it appears that the Deputy Commissioner or Additional Deputy Commissioner has jurisdiction to pass the order of requisition and so the illegality alleged, if at all, is an irregularity in procedure and in view of the fact of delay and laches on the part of the petitioner in moving this Court as also the acquiescence on his part in .accepting substantial part of compensation money' without protest. will preclude the petitioner from getting any relief under Article 98 of the late Constitution of 1962.
8. The application therefore fails and the rule is discharged without any order as to costs. SIDDIKY, C. J.--I agree