On 13th December, 1980, a memorandum of settlement, effective for 23 months from 12th December, 1980 to 11th January, 1982, was arrived at between the Hashmi Can Company, to which I will refer for the sake of bravity as the company, and Hashmi Can Company Employees' Union, the collective bargaining agent in the company, to which I will refer as the union. Paragraph 6 of the memorandum of settlement is related to staff transport. It reads as follows :- "Staff Transport.-In lieu of total existing transport facility, company agrees to pay Rs. 250 per month to all Factory and Office Staff as soon as a change is made out positively by 1st April, 1980. However, female employees and. Drivers because of their nature of duties, will continue to be provided the existing Transport facilities but will not be entitled to the Transport Allowance."
2. It is the case of the union that the company discontinued trans--port facility to the drivers with effect from 1st June, 1981 and on the matter being brought to the notice of the union by the drivers, the union first took up the matter with the company but as negotiation with the company failed, the union made an application to the learned IInd Labour Court for a direction to the company to provide transport to the driver of the company, as agreed in the settlement preliminary objection was raised to the maintainability of the application under section 34,
1. R. O. It was contended by the company that the scope of section 34 was limited to the enforcement of rights guaranteed to the collective bargaining agent under any law, agreement or settlement, and that these rights could not possibly extend to the rights of individual workmen. The preliminary objection, however, was rejected by the learned Labour Court which has sought support for its view on the decision of a Division Bench of the Karachi High Court in the case reported as 1qbal Ahmad v. IInd Sind Labour Court (1980 PLC 316).
3. The record and the proceedings in the case were requisitioned from the learned Hod Labour Court in the exercise of the suo motu powers of revision of this Tribunal to examine the legality, correctness and propriety of the above order, which was passed on 27th January, 1982
4. I have heard Mr. Mahmood Ghani for the Company and Mr. Nayab Naqvi, who represented the union. It was contended by Mr. Mahmood Ghani that the scope of section 34, I.R.O., was limited to the enforcement of rights guaranteed or secured to the collective bargaining agent or the employer and that those rights would include the collective rights of all the workmen but not the rights of individual workers as in the instant case. It was submitted by Mr. Mahmood Ghani that the total number of workmen in the company was over 1000, while the number of drivers was only 7, and hence this was clearly a matter of individual grievance falling under section 25-A, I. R. O. On the other hand, it wits argued by Mr. Nayab Naqvi that the collective bargaining agent under section 34, I. R. O., could espouse the cause of workmen generally of any class of them. He further submitted that since the provision in the settlement related to the transport of staff, the collective bargaining agent under section 34, I.R.O., could espouse the cause of the drivers who were illegally deprived of their settlement rights of transport. Mr. Nayab Naqvi relied upon the decisions reported as Chamber of Commerce and Industries, Karachi v. Presiding Officer, Sind Labour Court No. 111 (1979 PLC 179) and Iqbal Ahmad v. IInd Sind Labour Court Karachi while Mr. Mahmood Ghani relied upon the decision reported as Sooraj Ghee Industries Ltd. v. President Sooraj Ghee Workers' Union (1979 PLC 45), Sind Alkalies Ltd. v. Workers' Union (PLD 1979 Kar. 473) ; Nishat Industries Ltd. v.
Nishat Industries Employees' Union (1980 PLC 939) and Crescent Jute Products Ltd. Gojranwala v.
Workers' Union (1982 PLC 483). He also relied upon the decision of the Division Bench of the Karachi High Court in the case of Iqbal Ahmad v. IInd Sind Labour Court Karachi and submitted that the said decision supported his contention that the collective bargaining agent under section 34, 1.R.0., could espouse the collective cause of the workmen but not the cause of individual workmen.
5. I have at some length discussed the above rulings as well as other rulings on the scope of section 34, I.R.O., and the entitlement of the collective bargaining agent under the said section to espouse the cause of workmen in the case of Messrs Arag Industries Ltd. v. Habib Textile Mills Labour Union and others, decided on 21st April, 1982, and have pointed out in that decision that although there appear to be 2 views as to the scope of section 34, one that its application is strictly limited to the rights of collective bargaining agent itself as distinct from the rights of the workers.
And the other, which is the preponderant view, that has been taken by a Division Bench of our own High Court, I had in the above decision, respectfully followed the latter view. According to that view, the collective bargaining agent can espouse the common cause of workmen but not the cause of individual workmen. In the instant case, the application under section 34, I.R.O., by the collective bargaining agent concerns only 7 drivers out of a total work-force of over 1000. The application thus seems to espouse the grievance of 7 individual workmen which is not permitted under section 34, I.R.O.
6. I am accordingly of opinion that the application by the union under section 34, I.R.O., is not maintainable. I would, therefore, in the exercise of the suo motu powers of revision vested in this Tribunal set aside the impugned order of the learned Labour Court , dated 27th January, 1982, and reject the application under section 34, I.R.O., 1969, made by the union.