ABDUL KADIR SHAIKH, J.-While the respondent was employed as an Accountant with appellant- Company on a salary of Rs, 1,900 per mouth his services were terminated on 30-9-1971 on payment of one month salary in lieu of notice on the ground that after e a of East Pakistan where large number of branches of the appellant were located, the company was constrained to abolish senior posts, such as occupied by the respondent.
2. The respondent challenged the termination of his services in an application to the First Sind Labour Court, Karachi under section 34 of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969. The Labour Court overruled all the objections of the appellant-company by the order dated 23-7-1973 and awarded a sum of Rs. 32,300 to the respondent on account of gratuity for 30 years, and notice pay.
3. The appellant company preferred an appeal to the Sind Labour Appellate Tribunal which succeeded for the reason that according to the Tribunal, respondent was not a workman within the meaning of section 2(i) of the West Pakistan Industrial and Commercial Employment (Standing Orders) Ordinance, 1968.
4. The respondent then challenged the order, of the Labour Appellate Tribunal in a Writ Petition before the former Sind & Baluchistan High Court. The High Court set aside the order of the Appellate Tribunal on the ground that since the determination of the Labour Court on respon--dent's application was on an application under section 34 of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969 and it was in respect of a right to which respondent was entitled to under the law, .The said determination or judg--ment is deemed to be only -a "decision" and not an "award" and against such determination appeal to the Tribunal was not competent. It was submitted before the High Court on behalf of the appellant-company that the respondent being the Chief Accountant his duties were of supervisory nature, and he was not a workman within the meaning of the West Pakistan Industrial and Commercial Employment (Standing Orders) Ordinance and his application to the Labour Court was not competent. The High Court rejected this plea for the reason that the Labour Court had considered this question and gave the finding of fact that the respondent was not working in supervisory or managerial capacity, but was, in fact performing duties of clerical nature, and it was not for the High Court to re-examine this question in exercise of its constitutional jurisdiction.
5. Leave to appeal was granted by this Court in order to examine the correctness of the view of the High Court on the legal questions involved.
6. Mr. Suleman Kassam learned counsel for the appellant does not challenge the view of the High Court that the order passed by the Labour Court on respondent's application under section 34 of the Industrial Relations Ordinance was a "decision", and not an "award", and the appeal filed by the appellant was not competent. Learned counsel, however submits that the respondent being the Chief Accountant was not a workman within the meaning of the West Pakistan (Standing Orders)
Ordinance, and his application to the Labour Court was not competent.
7. This plea was raised before the High Court and was rejected for the reason that the finding of fact recorded by the Labour Court on this question was not open to further scrutiny by the High Court in exercise of its constitutional jurisdiction. The finding of the Labour Court in this behalf may be usefully reproduced hereunder : "I have carefully considered the evidence on record and the arguments filed by the learned representatives for the parties. In cross-examination the applicant categorically denies that he was a Chief Accoun--tant. He states that he maintained the accounts in his own hand. He denies that 4 or 5 accountants were under him. He admits that his salary was Rs. 1,900 per month. He further states that Usman Bhai was the Chief Accountant. Mr. Abdul Rehman, Director---cum- General Manager of the respondents in his cross-examination admits that the applicant was not a Chartered Accountant. He also admits that the appellant Abdul Sattar Pidha had no authority to appoint any one or to terminate the services of any of the employees. He further admits that bank cheques used to be signed by the General Manager and so also the debit vouchers.
From the cross-examination of the applicant and the admissions made by the respondent's witness, it is clear that the applicant had no authority either to appoint any one or to terminate the services of any of the employees besides he was not a chartered accountant. The respondent's witness had not clarified if Usman Bhai was Chief Accountant or not as disclosed by the applicant in his cross-examina--petition. It is true that the applicant was drawing a salary of Rs. 1,900 but it appears that he had earned that salary due to his long service by way of increments and promotions. Thus, his salary alone would not deprive him of the benefits which a workman is entitled to get under the labour laws prevailing at the time of his termination. I have read the definition of workman as given under section 2(vii) of I. R. O., 1969 as it stood at that time and come to the conclusion that the applicant's case falls under the said definition. The conten--petition of the respondents that the applicant was Chief Accountant and an executive officer remains unsubstantiated. There is nothing on record to show that the applicant was Chief Accountant and executive officer of the respondents. The applicant has disclosed in his cross---examination that he used to maintain accounts in his own hand. It clearly shows that he had to work himself and there was no one else under him. All these facts support the case of the applicant that he was a workman."
8. The question whether respondent who was designated as Chief, accountant was actually performing duties of supervisory nature, or other--wise, involves examination of the precise nature of duties he was perform--ing. Since the Labour Court recorded the finding of fact on the basis of the evidence produced by the parties in support of their respective position B taken on this question, the High Court very rightly refrained from under--taking a re-appraisal of the evidence for the reason that such a course was not warranted in proceedings for the exercise of the constitutional jurisdic--petition of the High Court. No exception can, therefore, be taken with the impugned judgment of the High Court.
9. The appeal is accordingly dismissed but we leave the parties to bear their own costs.
M. A. K.