SARDAR MUHAMMAD IQBAL, J.-The petitioner is a partner--ship firm owning an "Ara Machine" and engaged in the production of casings, battens and round blocks for domestic electric wiring. A notice under section 28 of the Sales Tax Act, 1951, was served on the petitioner to submit the return.
The Sales Tax Officer by his order, dated the 29th of June 1965 observing that the return had not been filed with respect to the quarter ending the 30th June 1959 proceeded under subsection (4) of section 10 and held that the petitioner's taxable sale for that period was Rs. 22,500.00. The Sales Tax Officer by another order of the same date determined the taxable sale of the petitioner for the year 1959-60 at Rs. 90,000.00 and the firm was held liable to pay sales tax of Rs. 18,000.00 at the rate of twenty per cent. Yet by another order of the same date, the Sales Tax officer assessed the liability of the petitioner on taxable sales for the year 1960-61, ending 30th June 1961, at Rs. 90,000.00, and it was asked to pay Rs. 18,000.00 at the rate of twenty per cent. The Sales Tax Officer by another order dated the 30th June 1966 fixed the taxable turn-over of the petitioner for the assessment year 1961- 62 at Rs. 73,500.00 and determined the sales tax liability of the petitioner at Rs. 14,700.00. The three appeals preferred under section 14 of the Act by the petitioner for the period ending 30th June 1959, and for the years 1959-60 and 1960-61 were accepted by the Appellate Assistant Commissioner by his order dated the 14th of March 1966. He held that the petitioner had not been served with any notice by the Sales Tax Officer as required by section 28 of the Act, and the assessment for the period ending the 30th June 1959, therefore, was invalid. He cancelled the assessment for the charge year 1959-60 by observing that the total sales of the petitioner were of Rs. 1,02,000.00 and that he being entitled to exemption of Rs. 83,572.00 in respect of the items which were exempt from sales tax, the petitioner was not liable to pay any tax on the balance amount of Rs. 18,000.00 which was below the prescribed taxable limit of Rs. 36,000.00. He also accepted the appeal for the charge year 1960-61 by holding that the taxable turnover did not exceed the taxable limit of Rs. 36,000.00.
The petitioner had also preferred an appeal against the order dated the 30th June 1966 of the Sales Tax Officer for the assess--ment year 1961-62, which was accepted by the Appellate Assistant Commissioner by his order dated the 28th September 1966 and he held that the petitioner was not liable to be assessed for the reason that the alleged manufacture of casing and battens dealt in by the petitioner was a product of a saw-mill and as such exempt from the levy of sales tax by virtue of item No. 37 of the Ministry of Finance (Revenue Division) Notification (Sales Tax) No. 9 dated the 27th June 1951 as amended by Notification No. SRO-50(R), dated the 1st July 1960. The orders of the Appellate Assistant Commissioner were challenged through departmental appeals filed under section 15 of the Act before the Appellate Tribunal. The Appellate Tribunal decided the appeals in respect of the assessment years ending 30th June 1959 and for the year 1959-60 by a single order dated the 15th January 1970 and the appeals for the assessment years 1960-61 and 1961-62 by another order of the same date.
2. The petitioner has filed this petition under Article 98 of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1962, read with the Provisional Constitution Order, 1969, with the prayer that the orders of the Appellate Tribunal be declared to be without lawful authority, and that the orders passed by the Appellate Assistant Commissioner be given effect to with an injunctive relief that the petitioner is not liable to pay any sales tax for the period in question.
3. The Appellate Tribunal in dealing with the order of the Appellate Assistant Commissioner in respect of the quarter ending the 30th June 1959 held that he committed an error of law in holding that notice as required by section 28 of the Act had not been issued to the petitioner because the assessm ent year 1959-60 was a year of 15 months commencing 1st April 1959 to the 30th June 1960.
In this view of the matter, it was held that the notice issued under section 28 for the year 1959-60 was also a notice in respect of the quarter ending the 30th June 1959. It was further held that the Sales Tax Officer should have made an assessment for the entire year commencing 1st April 1959 to 30th June 1960. The Sales Tax Officer was directed to make a fresh assessment for the said period.
The Appellate Tribunal also accepted the appeals for the assessment years 1960-61 and 1961-62 by observing that the Appellate Assistant Commissioner for giving the petitioner exemption of the sales price of the locally purchased casings had relied on an affidavit filed by the petitioner- assessee before him which was not done before the Sales Tax Officer. It was further held that the Appellate Assistant Commissioner had also not given any indication as to why he had thought that the not taxable turnover for the charge year 1960-61 could not exceed the said taxable limit of Rs.
36,000.00. The Tribunal also set aside the order of the Sales Tax Officer for the said period by observing that the Sales Tax Officer had not clearly stated as to why he had "allowed the assessee- respondent's claim for exemption only to the extent of sum of Rs. 30,000." In accepting the appeal for the year 1961-62 it was observed that the Appellate Assistant Commissioner had based his order with regard to the aforesaid assessment year, on the discussion in respect of the assessment year 1960-61 and that for the reasons recorded by it the order of the Appellate Assistant Commissioner merited t9 be set aside.
4. A writ petition under Article 98 of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1962, is competent only if an order is one without lawful authority. An order passed by an authority, if it is without jurisdiction, can be challenged through a writ petition notwithstanding that a right of appeal is available against that order. It was so held in Tariq Transport Co., Lahore v. Sargodha- Bhera Bus Service (PLD 1958 SC (Pak.) 437), S. A. Haroon v. Collector of Customs, Karachi (PLD 1959 SC (Pak.) 177), Nagina Silk Mill v. Income-tax Officer (PLD 1963 SC 322) and Fazal Din v.
Commissioner (PLD 1968 Pesh.30). In the instant case, however, the impugned order is not challenged before us as one without jurisdiction. All that the learned counsel contends is that the Appellate Tribunal in passing the impugned orders has not acted in accordance with law and the same were, therefore, without lawful authority. He has challenged the orders on the grounds which are stated in paragraph 12 of the petition: They are all grounds raising questions of law, and if there is any ground S, which is not based on law, it cannot be taken notice of, for the reason that the High Court cannot entertain a petition under Article 98 against a finding of fact howsoever gross or inexcusable N the error may be. So far as the questions of law arising from the orders of the Appellate Tribunal are concerned, a complete scheme is provided for seeking remedy in respect of such questions in Chapter X of the Sales Tax Act, 1951. The assessee or the Commissioner within sixty days of the date on which he is served with notice of an order under subsection (6) of section 15 may, by application, require under section 17 of the Act the Appellate Tribunal to refer to the High Court any question of law arising out of such order. If a question of law arises out of its order, the Tribunal is under a statutory obligation to draw up a statement of the case and refer it to the High Court within ninety days of the receipt of such application. If, however, the Appellate Tribunal is of the opinion that no question of law arises and, therefore, refuses to state the case, the assessee or the Commissioner, as the case may be, has the right to apply to the High Court within six months from the date on which he is served with notice of the refusal. The High Court, if not satisfied of the correctness of the decision of the Appellate Tribunal, can ask the Appellate Tribunal to state the case and to refer to it. It is thus obvious that even when the Tribunal refuses to refer the case to the High Court, but the latter on an application of the Commissioner or the assessee comes to the conclusion that a question of law does arise, it cannot decide the question itself, but has to send the case back to the Tribunal for stating the case and then to refer to it. The High Court deals with the question of law arising from the order only on a reference made to it by the Tribunal. The, order of the High Court is appealable under proviso to section 17(7) to the Supreme Court.
5. The remedy provided under Article 98 is a discretionary remedy and where an aggrieved person has an adequate or suitable relief elsewhere, there is a bar for the High Court to entertain a petition. The Sales Tax Act not only provides an adequate remedy against the order of the Appellate Tribunal but contains a complete and effective scheme for correcting an error of law arising from the order of the Appellate Tribunal. In Raleigh Investment Co. Ltd. v. Governor-General- in-Council (PLD 1947 P C 19), it was held with reference to an assessment made under the Income- tax Act that if an assessee was dissatisfied with the decision on appeal, he could ask for a case to be stated on any question of law for the opinion of the High Court and if his request were refused, he could apply to the High Court for an order requiring a case to be stated and to be referred to the High Court. It was also observed: "It cannot be doubted that included in the questions of law which might be raised by a case stated is any question as to the validity of any taxing provision in the Income-tax Act to which effect has been given in the assessment under review. Any decision of the High Court upon that question of law can be reviewed on appeal. Effective and appropriate machinery is therefore provided by the Act itself for the review on grounds of law of any assessm ent. It is in that setting that section 67 has to be construed" and that "jurisdiction to question the assessm ent otherwise than by use of the machinery expressly provided by the Act would appear to be inconsistent with the statutory obligation to pay arising by virtue of the assessm ent." In Commissioner of Income-tax, West Punjab etc. v. Tribune Trust, Lahore (PLD 1947 P C 247), the Tribune Trust, Lahore, raised an objection in respect of the assessment for the year 1932- 33 on the ground that it was exempt from taxation by virtue of sec--petition 4(3)(i) of the Income- tax Act. This claim led to a reference to the High Court under section 66 of the Act. The High Court held on the 4th June 1935 that the income of the Trust was not exempt from tax. The Privy Council reversed the judgment of the High Court on the 13th June 1939 and held that the income in respect of which the Trust was assessed for the years in question was exempt from tax. The assessments for the years 1933-34 to' 1938-39 had, in the meantime, been completed in accordance with the judgment of the High Court delivered in June 1935. The Trust had also made payments in respect of these years. The Trust, relying on the judgment of the Privy Council, wrote to the Commissioner of Income-tax on the 30th of August 1939 that all the assessments for the years 1933-34 to 1938-39 be cancelled and the amount paid be refunded to it. The Commis--sioner refused to reopen the assessm ents, whereupon the Trust moved the High Court which directed the Commissioner to state the case for reference under section 66. The High Court decided inter alia the question "whether the assessm ents made subsequent to the years 1932-33 including the supplementary assessm ents for the year 1931-32 were a nullity in view of the decision of their Lordships of the Privy Council . . . . . ? The High Court held that the assessment in question was a nullity. The Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in appeal by the Commissioner of Income-tax held: "The assessm ents were duly made, as they were bound to be made, by the Income-tax Officer in the proper exercise of his duty. If this Board had otherwise decided the appeal which came before it in 1939, they would have stood unquestionable and un-questioned. It does not appear to their Lordships that they were a `nullity' in any other sense than that if they had been challenged in due time they might have been get aside. But the same thing is true of every assessment which is open to successful challenge and it is just because convenience of administration demands that the validity of an assessm ent shall be tested in a particular way, that the Income--tax provides that way . . ." It was further held by their Lordships that the "only remedies open to the tax-payer, whether in regard to appeal against the assessment or to claim for refund, are to be found within the four corners of the Act.
6. The petitioner has an adequate remedy provided in the Sales Tax Act against an order which may be defective due to an error of law and, therefore, he cannot invoke the jurisdiction under Article 98 of the Constitution. On this ground alone, we would refuse to entertain the petition. It is dismissed in limine.