' This S. A. O. Is directed against the order of appellate authority whereby it dismissed the appeal after upholding the order of Rent Controller. The eviction was ordered on the ground of personal need of the landlady.
2. Brief facts of the case are that the landlady in this case filed an eviction application in the Court of a Rent Controller at Sheikhupura for the eviction of the appellant in respect of her shop premises.
The Rent Controller framed two issues. One related to bona fide personal requirement of the landlady and other related to damage caused to property by impairing its value. The issue of personal requirement was decided in favour of the landlady whereas issue regarding damage to the property was decided in favour of the tenant.
2-A. The tenant thereupon filed an appeal which came up for bearing before a learned Additional District Judge who after hearing the parties upheld the findings of Rent Controller on issue regarding personal need of the landlady ; hence this appeal.
3. Learned counsel appearing in support of this appeal has argued that the orders of Rent Tribunals were without jurisdiction inasmuch as they did not appreciate the difference between personal bona fide need of the landlady and of his male children and that of the husband of landlady.
According to him, the requirement of husband was not contemplated by the Rent Restriction Ordinance which confined itself to the landlord or landlady's own requirement. He submits that the entire evidence led in this case went to show that the premises in dispute was not required by the landlady for herself but for her husband. In this view of the matter, it is stated that the purpose or the need of landlady's husband fell outside the purview of Rent Restriction Ordinance. The supplemental argument of the learned counsel is that in respect of nonresidential building, the landlord could ask for eviction of his tenant only it was proved that the landlord was not in occupation of any other premises suitable for his or for her own requirement in the same urban area. According to the learned counsel, there were two other shops in the possession of the landlady, but this fact has not been disclosed in the plaint, but was admitted only during the cross- examination. This condition precedent, therefore, having not been fulfilled by the landlady there arose no question of eviction under section 13 of the Rent Restriction Ordinance.
4. The next contention of the learned counsel for the appellant is that some inferences ought to have been drawn against respondent-landlady on the basis of fact that the present application was a second application the previous eviction application filed by the landlady on the same ground having been dismissed.
' In so far as this ground is concerned, learned counsel for the respondent says that the previous application was not decided on merits but only through compromise and thus it would not stand in the way of second application on merits,
5. There is ample authority for the view provided by the decision of the Supreme Court In re : Abdul Salam Akhtar v. Dr. Na/am Parvez that eviction of a tenant sought by a landlord on ground of personal need could include the need of those dependent on him including the needs of the family members. In this case, the need of a disabled brother was considered to be a legitimate desire of the landlord to occupy his own premises. It was argued before the Supreme Court that the need of a brother was not covered by the provisions of the West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance, 1959. It was thus argued that the words own occupation" had not been defined but they have to be interpreted in a restricted manner so as to be confined to the personal requirement of the individual landlord alone. His own needs could not include the needs of his family members. The Supreme Court repelling the argument held that their Lordships were unable to agree for the personal needs of the landlord would include the needs of those dependent on him and in that case even the personal need of the landlord was there in addition to the need of the brother. It could not therefore be said that the eviction was required only for the need of the brother.
Reference may also be made to the decision of the Supreme Court in te : Abdul Haq v. Mst. Zubaida Khatoon and 10 others. This illustrative judgment is more aptly applicable to this case because in this precedent case the legislative intent in so far as female owners were concerned was examined. It was thus ruled that a female owner could claim ejectment on the ground that she herself wanted to set up a business. Reference may also be made to a decision of this Court In re : Muhammad Anwar v. Surraya Bano. In this case it was held that a landlady's claim that she would conduct business in the premises through her husband and son did not mean that business would be of husband and son exclusively. Lastly, I think in view of the enunciation of law by the Supreme Court in re : Ghulam Mohyuddin v. Mst. Nazir Bibi, there is no scope left for interference in this second appeal. In the precedent case, the Supreme Court had been pleased to hold that requirement of a shop by landlady for the business of her husband who had been evicted from another shop and thereafter was doing his business in other rented shop was held to be quite genuine and perfectly bona fide need of the landlady. The Supreme Court therefore refused to grant leave to appeal against the concurrent findings of Rent Tribunals.
6. In the present case also, I am not inclined to differ with the concurrent findings of the two Courts below. It has come on the record that the husband of the respondent was doing Pheri work and had become sick and was unable to undertake that vocation. The landlady therefore wanted her husband to carry on business in the shop and earn livelihood for the family. This in my view will be a good faith and bona fide requirement of the landlady and cannot be said to be a matter beyond the purview of the Rent Restriction Ordinance. The learned Additional District Judge has also rightly1 2 3 4 pointed out that in case the landlady did not occupy the premises, there were ample safeguards provided to the tenant by the Ordinance.
7. The factual contention of the appellant as regards the respondent being in possession of another shop has been found against him by the learned Additional District Judge. I have not been persuaded to take a different view. In so far as the question of previous eviction application is concerned, it was not pressed on a compromise and thus there being no previous adjudication on merits the present eviction application would not be barred.
8. I therefore see no justification to interfere with the concurrent findings and decisions of the two Courts below. This provides the reasons for the short order dated 14th March, 1983 dismissing the appeal with costs. 1976 SCM R 52 1969 SC MR 222 PLD 1979 Note 69 at p. 47 1981 SCM R 715