DECISION This appeal is directed against a decision of the learned Third Labour Court, given on 12th December, 1981, dismissing the grievance petition of the appellant workman who had challenged the orders of the respondent company dated 25th April, 1981, terminating his services with immediate effect during the period of probation. On the 4round that his services were no longer required
2. It appears that the appellant was a permanent workman of the respondent company since 1st August, 1968. He is said to have bean elected as the President of the C. B. A. In the respondent mills.
On 16th May, 1.980 an agreement was arrived at between the respondent establishment and the C.
B. A. Therein clause 24 of the said settlement provided for arbitra--tion of a dispute relating to the terms of the settlement by the Director, Labour Welfare. Two days later, i.e. On 18th May, 1980, there was fresh agreement between the parties .According to which the appellant and another workman by name Muhammad 'Yaqoob, were to be employed as workers with effect from the date of joining their duties. The agreement further provided that if probationary period of three months was found satisfactory they would be confirmed after probation and benefits of old service would be given to them but they would not .Be entitled to wages for the period that they did not work in the factory.
The agreement also covered the case of third workman, Barkhurdar with whom we are not concerned in this appeal. It appears that pursuant to this agreement the appellant submitted an application for appointment to the respondent company and the letter by order, dated 24th June, 1980, appointed the appel--lant as worker in the Spinning (Weaving) Department on the terms and conditions specified in the letter of appointment. One of the terms and conditions of this appointment was that the appellant's services were liable to be terminate without any notice pr pay in lieu thereof during his probationary period. By order, dated 31st August, 1980, the services of the appellant were terminated by the company during tile period of leis probation on the ground that his services were no longer required, The ease of the appellant was espoused by the workers' union and they took the matter to the Director, Labour Welfare, as it was their cast that the termination of services of the appellant was in violation of clause 24 of the settlement arrived at between company and the union. The Director Labour, by the order, dated 26th January, 1981, upheld -the contention of the union that the services of the appellant could not be terminated and directed the management to re-employ the appellant and another co-worker whose services likewise had been terminated by the management. Again in pursuance of the said award of the Director, the company issued a fresh order of appoint--ment, dated 28th January, 1981, in respect of the appellant appointing him as worker in the Spinning Department on the terms and conditions stated in the appointment order including the provision that the services of the appel--lant were liable to be terminated without notice or pay in lieu thereof during the probationary period of three months. Finally, by letter, dated 25th April, 1981, during the probationary period of three months of the appellant the services of the appellant were terminated by the company.
3. The appellant served a grievance notice on the company. It is common ground that this notice was given by the appellant to the respon--dent company on 2nd May, 1981. No reply to this notice appears to have been vouchsafed by the company to the appellant. The letter, accordingly, approached the Director Labour Welfare, through the workers' union to issue necessary directions to the company. The Director, by his order, dated 13th May, 10,
1. Took the view that by his order, dated 204 January,, 1981, he had ordere6 the company to re-employ the appellant and hence the termi--nation of the -appellant's services, in accordance with the letter of fresh appointment was valid and proper. The respondent, thereupon, served a fresh grievance notice, dated 30th May, 1981, on the respondent company and appended the copy of the order of the Director with his notice. As respondent company refused to give redress to the appellant the letter filed a grievance petition before the learned Labour Court
4. The learned Labour Court has dismissed the appellant's grievance petition on two grounds. The first ground was that as the grievance petition was filed more than two and a half months of the service' of the first grievance notice, dated 2nd May, 1981, it was time-barred and not maintainable. Its second ground was that the learned Director was appointed as an` Arbitrator in respect of matters covered by the settlement arrived at on 16th June, 1980, the Director was not competent to act as an Arbitrator ,or give an award in respect of this matter.
5. I have heard Mr. Ali Amjad, the learned counsel for the appellant, and Mr. Syed Zamirul Hasan, who appeared for the respondent company. It was sought to be argued by Mr. Ali Amjad that the essential requirement of the law is the service of the grievance notice upon the employer within three months of the cause of grievance having arisen but this did not exclude the service upon the employer of more than one grievance notice provided that the subsequent grievance notice is, served upon the employer within the statutory period of three months, particularly if the subsequent grievance notice was necessitated on account of new or additional factors and circumstances. The learned counsel very fairly conceded that the case of the appellant was different from that of a workman whose services had been terminated and who had filed an appeal provided by law, as in such case it Would. Be the appellate order which would hold the field and would supersede the original order of termination of services. In the instant case there was no statutory requirement for reference of the disputes for the Arbitration of the Director. The original settlement arrived at on 16th June, 1980 made no reference either to the termination of services of the. Appellant or the reference of his case to the Director. The subsequent agreement, dated 18th June, 1980, merely provided for appointment of the appellant and two other Workmen on probationary, period of three months and if their work during the period of probation was found to be satisfactory or they were to be confirmed and given the benefits of old service but not wages for the period that they were not employed with the respondent company. It is, thus, clear that the agreement envisages the fresh appointment of the appellant with the additional right that if his work during the period of probation was found satisfactory, he would be entitled to the benefits of his past services minus wages for the period that he was not employed in the respondent company. Strong support to this view is lent by the applications made by the appellant for appointment 'in the company and the letters of his appointment which specifically provide that he would undergo probationary period of three months and during this period his services could be terminated without notice. It is, thus, clear that the right claimed by the appellant, based upon the so-called award of the Director was -not a right which was guaranteed or secured to him tinder clause (1) of section 25-A, I. R. O: The non-compliance of the award of the Director, therefore, did not give rise to fresh cause of grievance to the appellant. The period of limitation for the filing of the grievance petition, in the instant case, accordingly commenced from service of the first grievance notice, dated 2nd May, 1980. As admittedly the grievance petition was not filed within the period of limitation of the service of the notice the grievance petition is time-barred and not maintainable, as rightly held by the learned Labour Court
6. I am not inclined to agree with the proposition of Mr. Ali Amjad that more than one grievance notice can be served by the workman upon the employer so long as these grievance notices are given within the statutory period of three months. In the case of M. Ghiasuddin v. Chairman, Karachi Port Trust (1978 PLC 350), my learned predecessor has held that two grievance notices argil not envisaged by section 25-A, I. R. O., and that limitation runs from -the date of reply of first notice.
This view was endorsed by the High Court in the, 4 case reported as S. W. H. Jafri v. Muhammad Saleem Shaikh (1979 PLC 431).
7. Mr. Syed Zamirul Hasan also assailed the view taken by the learned Labour Court that the direction in the award, dated 31st January, 1981 to the respondent company to re-employ the appellant meant not fresh employment but continuance of his old service employment. In support of his view Mr. Zamirul Hasan invited my attention to the decision of their Lordships of the Supreme Court in the case of Pakistan International Airlines Corporation v: Labour Appellate Tribunal (1980 PLC 795). Their Lordships while interpreting Standing Order 14, which provides for re- employment of retrenched workmen cons--trued the word "re-employment" for the purposes of the said Standing Order, B as fresh employment and not reinstatement. I am, therefore, inclined to agree with the objection of Mr. Syed Zamirul Hasan particularly when the agreement for the appointment of the appellant specifically provided that he would be kept on probation for three months, that during the period of his probation his services could be terminated at any time and that during the period that he was not employed with the respondent Company he would not b;, entitled to wages. Furthermore, pursuant to this agreement, the respondent had been given a letter of appointment the terms whereof he had agreed to and appended his signature to the same. This order of appointment clearly provided that the services of the appellant could be terminated at any time during the period of his probation.
8. For all these reasons I am of the opinion that there is no merit in this appeal and would, accordingly, dismisses the same.