MUHAMMAD ASIF, J.- Through the instant Writ Petition, the Petitioner, Allied Bank Limited has challenged the order dated 06.03.2025 (the "impugned order"), passed by the Full Bench of the National Industrial Relations Commission, Islamabad ("Respondent No.1"), whereby the Petitioner's appeal was dismissed solely on the technical ground that it had been signed by only one attorney of the bank instead of two. The petitioner seeks the setting aside of the said order with a direction to Respondent No.1 to decide the appeal on merits in accordance with law.
2. The facts, as stated by the Petitioner, are that Respondent No.3, Mian Muhammad, while employed with Petitioner, submitted educational certificates, which were later confirmed to be fake, as per a verification letter issued by the University of Karachi. Consequently, his services were terminated on 09.05.2009. Aggrieved by the termination, Respondent No.3 initially filed a grievance petition before the Labour Court, which was later taken up by Single Bench, NIRC ("Respondent No.2") after the promulgation of the Industrial Relations Act, 2012 and, vide order dated 17.04.2024, Respondent No.2 allowed the grievance petition and ordered reinstatement of Respondent No.3 with back benefits. The Petitioner, being aggrieved, preferred an appeal before Respondent No.1.
However, during the hearing on 06.03.2025, Respondent No.3 raised a technical objection that the appeal was signed by only one attorney of the bank. Without addressing the merits of the case, Respondent No.1 dismissed the appeal on this ground alone, prompting the petitioner to invoke this Court's constitutional jurisdiction under Article 199 of the Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973 ("the Constitution").
3. Learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that the impugned order is legally unsustainable, as it is based solely on a hyper-technical ground, i.e. that the appeal was signed by only one attorney of the Bank. He contended that such an objection, even if assumed to be correct, amounts to a procedural irregularity, which is curable and does not affect the maintainability or competency of the appeal. It was submitted that the Hon'ble Supreme Court has repeatedly held that procedural defects should not defeat substantive rights, and that judicial and quasi-judicial forums are bound to decide matters on merits rather than on technicalities. Learned counsel further argued that the impugned order reflects a mechanical and non-speaking approach adopted by Respondent No.1, which did not even afford an opportunity to the Petitioner to rectify the alleged defect. He submitted that the Respondent No.1 ought to have exercised its discretion judiciously, especially when no prejudice was caused to the opposing party. It was urged that the dismissal of the appeal on such a flimsy ground amounts to denial of access to justice and violates the Petitioner's right to a fair hearing under Article 10-A of the Constitution. It was further contended that the appeal was otherwise complete in form and substance, and the person, who signed it was in fact duly authorized to do so, though even if there had been any deficiency in this regard, it could have been rectified by filing a fresh authorization or affidavit. Learned counsel also argued that the Commission was not functus officio and retained full authority to seek clarification or amendment in pleadings, and its failure to do so reflect arbitrariness and non-application of judicial mind.
Lastly, learned counsel contended that the Respondent No.1 has acted in a discriminatory manner by adopting an inconsistent approach in similar matters where procedural irregularities were condoned. He emphasized that the Petitioner had a vested right to have the appeal adjudicated on merits and that the Respondent No.1's refusal to exercise its jurisdiction amounts to a failure to act in accordance with law. Lastly, he prayed for acceptance of this petition.
4. Conversely, learned counsel for Respondent No.3 supported the impugned order, contending that the same has been passed in accordance with law and does not warrant interference by this Court. He argued that the requirement of due authorization and proper execution of pleadings, especially in the case of corporate litigants such as banks, is a mandatory procedural obligation.
According to him, the appeal filed before Respondent No.1 lacked proper authorization under the relevant rules of the bank and was, therefore, defective ab initio. He further argued that the failure of the Petitioner to comply with such fundamental procedural requirements demonstrated a lack of diligence and could not be brushed aside as a curable defect. It was contended that the Petitioner had ample opportunity to rectify the defect prior to the hearing, but failed to do so, and that objections relating to maintainability and procedural irregularities can be taken at any stage of the proceedings, including during final arguments. Additionally, the learned counsel submitted that the writ petition raises disputed questions of fact regarding internal authorization processes and is, therefore, not maintainable under Article 199 of the Constitution. He argued that the Petitioner had neither pleaded nor produced any resolution or documentary evidence showing that the person, who signed the appeal was duly authorized. He lastly submitted that the Respondent No.1 acted within the bounds of its jurisdiction and that no jurisdictional defect or legal infirmity has been pointed out that would justify interference by this Court in the exercise of its constitutional jurisdiction. He, therefore, prayed for dismissal of the instant writ petition.
5. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties at length and examined the available record with their able assistance.
6. From the perusal of the impugned order, it is evident that the appeal filed by the Petitioner was not adjudicated on its merits, but was dismissed solely on the ground that it was signed by only one attorney of the Bank, whereas, according to the objection raised by Respondent No.3, it ought to have been signed by two. It is an admitted position that the issue of authorization was neither raised at the initial stage of filing nor pointed out by the Respondent No.1's office. Moreover, no opportunity was afforded to the Petitioner to rectify the alleged procedural defect. The Commission, being a quasi-judicial body vested with the power to regulate its own procedure, was not divested of the jurisdiction to allow correction or supplementation of such formal requirements.
7. The distinction between procedural irregularities and jurisdictional defects is well recognized in law. Procedural lapses, such as deficiencies in the manner of signing or verifying pleadings, do not, per se, vitiate legal proceedings unless such irregularities result in demonstrable prejudice or impinge upon the fundamental jurisdiction of the adjudicating forum. In the instant matter, there is neither any averment that the memorandum of appeal was devoid of material facts or was instituted mala fide, nor any contention that the person who executed the same was de jure or de facto unauthorized. The record does not show that the single attorney who signed the appeal lacked the authority to do so, nor was any inquiry conducted in that regard. The defect, being purely technical and rectifiable in nature, ought to have been remedied through appropriate procedural means rather than resorting to outright dismissal. It is a cardinal principle of jurisprudence that the ends of justice are better served when matters are adjudicated upon their merits rather than being dismissed on hyper-technical grounds. The Superior Courts of this country have, in a number of judgments, underscored this jurisprudential approach. The Hon'ble Supreme Court of Pakistan in (PLD 1989 SC 532), held that a party should not be denied a relief on account of technicalities in the procedural law as the same is formed for the purpose of regulating the legal proceedings through their design extended and design of foster the cause of justice than to defeat it. Subsequently, the aforesaid judgment was also considered in (1993 SCMR 363) and followed the same principle.
8. Likewise, the Hon'ble Supreme Court of Pakistan, in the case of S.D.O/A.M. Hasht Nagri Sub- Division, PESCO, Peshawar and others Vs Khawazan Zad reported as (PLD 2023 SC 174) held as under: "9. Having examined the scope of the above-cited rules of procedure contained in the C.P.C., we must reiterate the principle, which is by now well settled, that 'the proper place of procedure in any system of administration of justice is to help and not to thwart the grant to the people of their rights... Any system, which by giving effect to the form and not to the substance defeats substantive rights, is defective to that extent. The courts, thus, always lean in favour of adjudicating the matters on merits rather than stifling the proceedings on procedural formalities.
The rules of procedure are meant to facilitate the court proceedings for enforcing the rights of litigants, not to trap them in procedural technicalities for frustrating their rights. They are the tools to advance the cause of justice and cannot be used to cause the miscarriage of justice. The ultimate object of securing the ends of justice, therefore, outweighs the insistence on strict adherence to such rules. The same is the purpose of the rules of procedure discussed above. Any defect or omission in signing and verifying, or presenting, a pleading (plaint or written statement) or a memorandum of appeal or revision petition does not affect the merits of the case or the jurisdiction of the court and is therefore taken to be such an irregularity which can be cured at any stage of the proceedings. Likewise, any defect in the authority of a person to sign and verify a pleading filed in a suit by Institute or defend such a suit by presenting that pleading to the court, or in signing by or against a corporation, or to or filing of a memorandum of appeal or revision petition by a corporation, can also be cured at any stage of the proceedings.
10. It is for this reason that section 99, C.P.C. provides inter alia that no decree is to be reversed nor is any case to be remanded in appeal on account of any error, defect or irregularity in any proceedings in the suit that has not affected the merits of the case or the jurisdiction of the court.
Similarly, it is not every irregularity in the exercise of its jurisdiction by a lower court that calls for interference in revisional jurisdiction under section 115(1)(c), C.P.C. but only the material irregularity, and the material irregularity is that which affects the merits of the case or the jurisdiction of the court.
11. In the present case, we have noted that the power of attorney (wakalat nama) filed in the present petition is only for petitioner No. 5, PESCO, and not for other petitioners, i.e., the employees of the PESCO, SDO/AM, XEN/DM, etc. The present case relates to the ownership and possession of the suit property on which petitioner No.5, PESCO has its Complaint Centre. The employees of PSCO have no claim as to any right, title or interest in the suit property. They are, thus, neither necessary nor proper party in the case and have wrongly been impleaded. The misjoinder of parties is, however, such an error that does not affect the merits of the case or the jurisdiction of the court as provided in section 99, C.P.C., and is a procedural error which can be cured by striking out the names of such parties under Rule 10 of Order I, C.P.C. at any stage of the proceedings of the case, including the appellate or revisional stage. 12 We, therefore, strike out the names of petitioners Nos. 1 to 413 not only from the present petition but also in the proceedings throughout (suit, appeal and revision), for correction of the record of the case.
12. As regards the dismissal of the revision petition by the impugned judgment, we find that the High Court has knocked out the petitioner, PESCO, without touching upon the merits of the case, on a procedural technicality of not filing the resolution of the Board of Directors of PESCO, authorizing any of its officers to file the revision petition and to appoint a pleader for this purpose, and that too without providing any opportunity to present such a resolution. It is pertinent to mention here that the petitioner, PESCO, has submitted in this Court a resolution of its Board of Directors, dated 10.12.2015, whereby the General Manager (Finance)/Finance Director and Addl. DG (Legal)/Director Legal have been authorized to institute and defend cases in courts on behalf of PESCO, and the present petition has been filed by a pleader (AOR) duly appointed by the Director Legal of PESCO.
The High Court, if had any doubt about the authority of the pleader to file the revision petition, should have asked him to produce the resolution of the Board of Directors or Articles of Association, to show the authority of the officer appointing him as a pleader for PESCO to file the revision petition, and should have provided a reasonable opportunity for it. The impugned judgment passed without providing such an opportunity is not legally sustainable. The petition is, therefore, converted into an appeal and the same is allowed. The impugned judgment is set aside; the revision petition shall be deemed to be pending before the High Court, which shall be decided by the High Court on merits in accordance with law."
9. My view is further fortified by the decision given by the Hon'ble Supreme Court of Pakistan in the judgment reported as (2023 SCMR 236), wherein it was held as under: "11. Even otherwise, this Court in its pronouncement such as Rahat and Company v. Trading Corporation of Pakistan Statutory Corporation (2020 CLD 872 Supreme Court) has held that even in the absence of a Board Resolution, pleadings can, either expressly or impliedly, be subsequently ratified. The Court can, therefore, come to the conclusion that the Corporation had ratified the act of signing the pleadings by its Officer(s). As such, it is discernable from the said pronouncement of this Court that the absence of a Board Resolution is not an incurable defect and, in certain instances, is not even necessary if subsequently, the plaint/suit is ratified by a person competent and empowered to do so."
10. The Hon'ble Supreme Court of Pakistan in the case of Muhammad Anwar Khan and 5 others Vs. Chaudhry Riaz Ahmad and 5 others (PLD 2002 SC 491) while relying on an earlier judgment in case of Manager, Jammu & Kashmir State property in Pakistan Vs. Khuda Yar and another (PLD 1975 SC 678) had also held that mere technicality unless offering an un-surnountable hurdle, could not be allowed to defeat the ends of justice and that the trivial issue, according to opinion of Respondent No.1 that it was necessary that at least two persons should sign the memo of appeal instead of one, could have been allowed to be remedied by allowing the petitioner to get the appeal signed by another attorney. The lapse or irregularity was, therefore, technical in nature which was neither affecting competency of the person pursuing appeal or merits of the case and such defect could squarely be interpreted as mere illegality in the proceedings as per the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court of Pakistan in the case of SDO, PESCO supra
11. In addition, the impugned order reflects a failure to adhere to the constitutional guarantee of fair trial under Article 10-A of the Constitution. The right to a fair hearing entails the right to have one's case decided on merits by a competent forum, after affording an opportunity of being heard. A decision rendered without entering into the merits of the controversy, especially where serious allegations such as submission of forged documents are involved, amounts to a denial of due process. It is settled law that any order, which fails to consider the material issues and evidence is liable to be set aside for non-application of mind.
12. Moreover, judicial and quasi-judicial bodies are bound by the duty to act fairly, equitably, and justly. The dismissal of the appeal without issuing notice for rectification, or even calling upon the petitioner to furnish a second signature, appears to be not only hasty, but also disproportionate to the nature of the alleged irregularity. It is also pertinent to mention that where a party suffers serious consequences, such as affirmance of reinstatement with back benefits of an employee terminated for alleged submission of fake academic credentials, a higher standard of scrutiny and adjudication on merits is required.
13. The principle of access to justice, which flows from the constitutional scheme and has been recognized as a fundamental right, obliges courts and tribunals to adjudicate matters in substance rather than reject them on form. Where procedural lapses are curable and do not go to the root of jurisdiction, the interest of justice requires that litigants are afforded an opportunity to correct the record, especially in the absence of mala fides or deliberate concealment.
14. The record reveals that the appeal filed by the petitioner was otherwise complete in substance, and the objection regarding signatures could have been resolved through a simple directive from the Commission. Instead, the approach adopted reflects a non-speaking, mechanical disposal of the matter, which undermines the confidence of litigants in the fairness of quasi-judicial proceedings.
15. In view of the above discussion, the instant writ petition is allowed, the impugned order dated 06.03.2025, passed by the Respondent No.1, is hereby set-aside. Resultantly, the matter is remanded back to Respondent No.1 with the direction to decide the Petitioner's appeal strictly on merits, in accordance with law, and after affording proper opportunity of hearing to both parties.
The Respondent No.1 may, if deemed necessary, allow the petitioner to file an amended memorandum or furnish further clarification regarding the authorization of the signatory, without treating the appeal as incompetent or non-maintainable on this sole ground.