SABIT ULLAH KHAN, J.- Through the instant criminal appeal under Section 417 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898, the complainant has challenged the judgment dated 26.06.2024 rendered by the learned Additional Sessions Judge-I Buner at Daggar, whereby the accused Jehangir Khan son of Sartaj was acquitted in case FIR No.312 dated 18.09.2020, registered under section 302 of the Pakistan Penal Code, 1860 read with section 15 of the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Arms Act, 2013 at Police Station Nawagai, District Buner.
2. The facts giving rise to this case are that on 18.09.2020, Said Ayub Khan sustained firearm injuries while working in his maize fields located in Ghara, Mohalla Jam Jengai, at about 06:10 a.m. The firing allegedly emanated from southern side of the field and was attributed to unknown assailants.
He later succumbed to his injuries. The FIR was lodged by his brother Akbar Khan, who nominated Jehangeer Khan as the accused in his statement under section 164 Cr. PC.
3. Upon completion of the investigation, the prosecution submitted challan and formal charge was framed on 17.03.2021. The trial concluded in acquittal of the accused vide judgment dated 26.06.2024 prompting the filing of present appeal.
4. Arguments heard and record perused.
5. The postmortem and FSL reports confirmed that the deceased died due to firearm injuries.
However, there is no direct or circumstantial evidence linking the accused to the fatal incident.
Notably, the deceased survived for 108 days after the incident and, during his lifetime, did not implicate any person rather he specifically respected the incident against unknown assailants.
6. The statement of Akbar Khan, implicating the accused, was admittedly based on hearsay and devoid of first-hand knowledge. He conceded during cross examination that he was not present at the time of the occurrence. No corroborating eyewitnesses account or independent verification was presented.
7. The prosecution reliance on statements of Han Ullah and Suleman also failed to inspire confidence. Their statements were recorded nearly four months post-occurrence and both witnesses disowned their earlier recorded versions, citing coercion by police. These inconsistencies severely erode the probative value of their testimonies.
8. The prosecution introduced motive at a belated stage, which was not mentioned in the original FIR or initial investigation. No independent witnesses were produced regarding the recovery of the alleged weapon, further diminished the credibility of the prosecution case.
9. At the very heart of the criminal justice system lies the presumption of innocence a doctrine so deeply embedded in the fabric of jurisprudence that it forms the starting point of every criminal trial. This presumption is not merely procedural; it is substantive and enduring. Once an accused is acquitted by a competent Court after a full-fledged trial, that presumption of innocence is no longer theoretical it becomes a judicially recognized and fortified presumption. The resulting position of the accused, is protected by what the superior courts have consistently termed a "double presumption of innocence." The role of the appellate court in disturbing an acquittal is therefore heavily circumscribed. The law does not vest the appellate forum with the power to substitute its . opinion merely on the basis that it may have drawn a different inference from the evidence. The appellate court must tread cautiously and is only permitted to overturn an acquittal when the trial court's findings are shown_ to be manifestly perverse,_ legally unsustainable, or tainted by misreading or non-reading of material evidence. These principles have crystallized over time through a long line of precedents. The leading judgment of the apex Supreme Court of Pakistan in 2004 SCM R 249 and 2010 SCMR 491 remains the cornerstone for guidance on this issue.
10. It was categorically observed therein that once an accused has been acquitted, the presumption of innocence is reinforced and the burden on the appellant increases manifold. The Court further held that unless the findings of the trial court are wholly artificial, fanciful, or perverse, meaning not based on evidence or completely against the weight of evidence, the acquittal must be allowed to stand. It is not enough that a different view is possible; the very view taken by the trial court must be shown to be unreasonable to the point of causing a miscarriage of justice. Similarly, in PLD 1997 SC 408 and 2019 SCMR 129, the Supreme Court emphasized that the appellate court must refrain from interfering with an acquittal unless the trial court's findings are demonstrably arbitrary or based on conjecture. The judgment under appeal must be assessed not in isolation, but in the context of the entire evidence and the principles of a fair trial. Where the trial court has taken into account all relevant evidence, discussed contradictions and shortcomings in the prosecution's case, and has reached a plausible conclusion, the appellate court ought not to disturb the same lightly. The benefit of doubt is not a concession it is the legal right of every accused, as reiterated time and again by the superior courts.
11. The learned Trial Court was fully justified in extending this benefit to the accused when faced with inconclusive and inconsistent evidence., The finding of acquittal is, therefore, not only supported by law but is also based on fair appreciation of the entire record. It is settled law, as held in numerous judgments of the superior courts, that even if two conclusions are reasonably possible from the evidence, the one favoring the accused must be preferred. Reliance is placed on Khalid Mehmood alias Khaloo vs. The State, reported as 2022 SCMR 1148. The learned counsel for the appellant has made a valiant effort to invite our attention to certain isolated aspects of the case.
However, a piecemeal examination of the record does not suffice to warrant interference.
12. The learned Appellate Court does not function as a second fact-finding tribunal unless the impugned judgment shocks the judicial conscience or is reflective of such glaring errors that compel reversal in the interest of justice. In the absence of any such legal or factual infirmity, the judgment of the trial court is entitled to deference. It is also relevant to underscore that an acquittal carries a finality and sanctity which is not to be disturbed unless there is an urgent and unmistakable necessity to correct a wrong. The appellate court's role is not to re-try the accused, but to ensure that justice has been served in accordance with the law. In this case, the learned trial court has acted judiciously, has considered the entirety of the evidence, and has arrived at a conclusion that is not only reasonable but also legally sound. Further reliance is placed on cases titled, Amir Muhammad Khan vs. The State, reported as 2023 SCMR 566, Sarfaraz and another vs. The State, reported as 2023 SCMR 670, Kashif Ali alias Kalu vs. The State, reported as 2022 SCMR 1515, Tajammal Hussain Shah vs. The State and others, reported as 2022 SCMR 1567, Muhammad Sami Ullah vs. The State, reported as 2022 SCMR 998 and Sazhir Ahmed vs. The State and others, reported as 2023 SCMR 241.
13. In view of the foregoing, we find no legal infirmity in the impugned judgment. The prosecution miserably failed to establish its case beyond reasonable doubt, the appeal is accordingly d ism issed. Announced.