SAHIBZADA ASADULLAH, J.- By invoking the extraordinary constitutional jurisdiction of this Court under Article 199 of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973, the petitioner prays for the issuance of an appropriate writ, inter alia, in the following terms: "It is, therefore, respectfully prayed that by accepting this writ petition, the judgments and orders dated 22.06.2024, 10.07.2024 & 10.09.2024 passed by the respondents No.2, 3, 7 & 8 may be declared illegal, without lawful authority and of no legal effect And consequently a writ may be issued to the respondents to immediately provide attested copies to the petitioner Or any other order deemed appropriate in the matter, may kindly be passed."
2. The facts, as set forth in the narrative, reveal that the petitioner submitted an application before the Chairman, Executive Committee, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Bar Council, seeking provision of the attested Enrollment Form along with the complete file pertaining to Mubarak Zeb, Advocate, who was appointed as Additional District and Sessions Judge (BS-20) vide Notification No. 233-J, dated 24th May 2024. The Committee afforded an opportunity of hearing to the petitioner regarding his claim/application and, thereafter, dismissed the same through the impugned order dated 22.06.2024, which reads as under: - "The matter has been discussed in detail by all the learned members of the Executive Committee, out of which Mr. Noor Alam Kha and Mr. Ahmed Farooq khattak are personally while Mr. Haq Nawaz Shangla, Mr. Ilyas Khan, and Syed Mubashir Shah virtually attended the meeting.
Mr. Ahmad Farooq Khatak and Mr. Noor Alam Khan are of the opinion that the request made by the applicant is a genuine one as the personal file of a lawyer is a public document and has supported the stance of the applicant where-as the other three members namely Mr. Haq Nawaz Khan Shangla, Mr. Muhammad Ilyas Khan and Syed Mubashir Shah have given their-in opinion stating therein that the personal file of an advocate is not a public document as it pertains to the personal bio-data of an advocate but, the same can be produced before any legal and competent forum on the request or order. They further stressed that by giving such like copy of a personal file of an advocate would be a Gateway, open to all the lawyers who have their personal garages and it would become uncontrollable situation for the Bar Council In view of the above the applicant's application is regretted with proportion of 3 and 2 but the committee mutually agreed that applicant may require any record pertains to a lawyer through a competent legal forum or authority, where up on the Bar Council would provide the record to the above said forums."
Aggrieved by the findings of the Executive Committee, the petitioner approached the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Right to Information Commission and submitted an application to the Public Information Officer of the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Bar Council; however, the said application also did not find favour and was consequently dismissed vide impugned order dated 10.07.2024, the relevant portion of which reads as follows: - "From the above ratio, it is clearly manifested that the right to information is one of the fundamental rights, the language of Article 19-A of the Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973 is so clear and further has liberally and positively been interpreted by the superior courts and such right cannot be denied, abridged, impaired, restricted or curtailed by any legislative instrument however the subject information sought is whether of the public importance and is subject to the reasonable restrictions imposed by law. In this case, the information sought pertains to the enrollment/ personal file of a third party (Mubarik Zeb Advocate). The perusal of both the applications submitted by the Petitioner would reveal that no such allegation of forgery or submission of fake documents or any other such allegation prejudicial to the code of conduct of the advocate has been levelled by the Petitioner neither the personal file is a matter of public importance. The Khyber Pakhtunkbwa Bar Council is the custodian of the records of its members appearing on the roll, unfathomably the demand of the Petitioner for the provision of enrollment personal file is unreasonable, unwarranted and does not come within the ambit of Article 19-A of the Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973.
As the right of third party is involved against whom subject information has been sought by the Petitioner, in absence of any allegation of his disability to remain as Advocate or otherwise; However the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Bar Council does not enjoy such immunity in other matters. when there is allegation of misuse of funds or other such maladministration or information which relates to public importance or such other information relating to the cases of code of conduct or professional misconduct or other misconduct of any advocate. Therefore, the provision of Article 19-A of the Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973 could sparingly be exercised in such other matters as discussed above but not in the present case and the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Bar Council is not bound to provide enrollment/ personal file of any advocate to any third party. Thus in my humble opinion the Petitioner is not entitled for the subject information hence the application of the Petitioner is regretted with the reservations above."
It is pertinent to mention that, in the impugned order, it was observed that the appropriate remedy against the decision rendered by the Executive Committee of the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Bar Council was to approach the Pakistan Bar Council, in terms of Section 13(2) of the Legal Practitioners and Bar Councils Act, 1973.
After dismissal of the application by the Vice Chairman, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Bar Council, the petitioner preferred a complaint under Section 23 of the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Right to Information Act, 2013, before the Chief Information Commissioner. The respondents to the complaint were put on notice and directed to submit their reply, and upon receipt thereof, the complaint was also dismissed through order dated 10.09.2024. Hence, the petitioner has approached this Court through the instant constitutional petition seeking the desired relief.
3. Respondents Nos. 2 to 6 were put on notice to submit their comments in response to the writ petition, whereupon they filed their respective replies and opposed the issuance of the writ sought by the petitioner.
4. The learned counsel representing the respondents raised a preliminary objection, contending that, in view of the availability of an alternate remedy under the law, the petitioner's writ petition is not maintainable. It was submitted that the petitioner has already filed an appeal before the Chairman, Appellate Committee for Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, Pakistan Bar Council, for redressal of his grievance; therefore, on this sole ground, the writ petition is liable to be dismissed. The learned counsel further submitted that, in light of the judgments reported as 2020 SCM R 631 and 2021 SCMR 421, the Bar Council and its committees are not amenable to the constitutional jurisdiction of this Court, and accordingly, prayed for dismissal of the writ petition. Conversely, the petitioner argued that Section 2 of the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Right to Information Act, 2013, does not expressly exclude the Bar Council from the definition of a "public body," nor does it grant any immunity to the record maintained by it. It was further contended that respondents Nos. 2 and acted illegally, unlawfully, and unconstitutionally, in utter disregard of the relevant legal provisions. The petitioner asserted that the record maintained by respondents Nos. 2 and 3 is of public importance and that Article 19A of the Constitution guarantees to every citizen the fundamental right of access to information in all matters of public importance. In support of his contentions, the petitioner placed reliance on the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court reported as PLD 2024 Supreme Court 192, wherein it was held that, although the Right of Access to Information Act applies only to public bodies as defined therein, excluding the Supreme Court, the apex Court is not exempt from the purview of Article 19A of the Constitution, and information of public importance can be sought thereunder. The petitioner argued that the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Bar Council is likewise not excluded from the ambit of Article 19A, which stipulates that access to information shall be subject only to regulation and reasonable restrictions imposed by law; however, no such law imposes a bar in the instant matter. Lastly, while conceding that an appeal under Section 13(2) of the Legal Practitioners and Bar Councils Act, 1973, is pending before the Chairman, Appellate Committee of the Pakistan Bar Council, the petitioner submitted that the pendency of such appeal does not debar him from invoking the constitutional jurisdiction of this Court under Article 199(c) of the Constitution, particularly when the right to information is a fundamental right.
5. We have heard the respective submissions advanced by the learned counsel for the parties and have given due consideration to the arguments so proffered, as well as examined the available record with thoughtful attention.
6. The record reveals that the petitioner's application seeking the provision of various documents pertaining to Mubarak Zeb, Advocate, are the First Intimation Form (Bar Council No.10-3455), Second Intimation Form, Character Certificate annexed with the above-referred forms signed by a senior advocate, High Court Enrollment Form, and the list of 20 cases along with Wakalatnamajat annexed with the High Court Enrollment Form, was dismissed by the Executive Committee vide impugned order dated 22.06.2024. Following the dismissal, the petitioner invoked the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Right to Information Act, 2013, by submitting an application to the Public Information Officer. The Executive Committee entrusted the matter to respondent No. 2, being the designated Public Information Officer, who regretted the request. The petitioner, thereafter, lodged a complaint under Section 23 of the Act, 2013, before the Chief Information Commissioner, which too met the same fate and was dismissed. Consequently, the petitioner has approached this Court through the instant writ petition seeking the desired relief. It is pertinent to note that the petitioner's appeal against the Executive Committee's order dated 22.06.2024 is pending adjudication before the Chairman, Appellate Committee, Pakistan Bar Council. Admittedly, Section 13(2) of the Legal Practitioners and Bar Councils Act, 1973, provides for an alternate remedy, which the petitioner has already availed by filing an appeal.
However, the learned counsel for the petitioner has submitted that the right of access to information is a fundamental right, and in view of Article 199(1)(c) of the Constitution, this Court is vested with the authority to issue appropriate directions for the enforcement of fundamental rights, regardless of the pendency of alternate remedies or appeals before other forums. Undoubtedly, Article 199(1)(c) empowers this Court to make orders or issue directions to any person or authority, including any government functionary, within its territorial jurisdiction, for the enforcement of any fundamental right conferred by Chapter I of Part II of the Constitution. This Court would have considered the request of the petitioner favourable, had it been permissible under the law.
However, we are constrained to apply the settled principle of law, namely the Doctrine of Election, which carries both significance and purpose. Any deviation therefrom would not only undermine its underlying rationale but would also amount to circumventing established legal norms. The Doctrine of Election is not a novel proposition. It is a time-honored principle, deeply embedded in the jurisprudence of English Common Law, and draws its strength from the maxims of equity, estoppel, and judicial efficiency. Historically, equity courts discouraged litigants from engaging in 'forum shopping" a practice whereby a party attempts to try its luck before multiple forums in pursuit of a favourable decision. The evolution of the doctrine was primarily to curb such abuse of process, to prevent conflicting decisions, and to uphold the sanctity and dignity of judicial forums.
We are mindful of the fact that issues of such nature were traditionally addressed in the equity courts, leading to the crystallization of the principle expressed in the Latin maxim "qui approbat non reprobat"--he who accepts cannot reject. This doctrine continues to be recognized, respected, and applied in modern judicial discourse, both in constitutional and civil jurisprudence. While it is true that in certain circumstances constitutional petitions under Article 199 of the Constitution are entertained notwithstanding the existence of an alternate remedy, particularly where such remedy is either illusory or ineffective, the present case is distinguishable on the facts. Here, the petitioner himself approached the Pakistan Bar Council, a forum competent under the law to redress the grievance in question, and his appeal is admittedly sub judice before the said authority. Once the petitioner elected to pursue his remedy before the Pakistan Bar Council for the same relief, the maintainability of a subsequent application under the Right to Information Act, 2013, followed by the instant constitutional petition under Article 199, becomes highly questionable. It is a well-settled principle that where a matter is already pending adjudication before a competent authority, a parallel remedy for identical relief cannot be pursued simultaneously before a different forum. Even if the petitioner's application under the Right to Information Act had been declined, he could have invoked the constitutional jurisdiction of this Court in that regard. However, the sequence of events reflects otherwise his appeal before the Pakistan Bar Council preceded the said application. In such circumstances, Article 199(c) of the Constitution cannot be pressed into service as a tool to reopen a matter that is already pending adjudication before the competent forum. The peculiar aspect of the present case is that the petitioner has not only elected a forum for the redressal of his grievance but is also seeking identical relief before this Court, thereby engaging in forum shopping, a practice frowned upon by the superior judiciary. This Court has no hesitation in holding that litigants cannot be permitted to hop from one forum to another in search of a favourable outcome.
Reliance in this regard is placed on the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court reported as 2024 SCMR 518, titled Chief Executive Officer NPGCL, GENCO-III, TPS Muzaffargarh v. Khalid Umar Tariq Imran and others, wherein it was held as under: -
11. It is a well-settled proposition of law that when an aggrieved person intends to commence any legal action to enforce any right and or invoke a remedy to set right a wrong or to vindicate an injury, he has to elect and or choose from amongst the actions or remedies available under the law. The choice to initiate and pursue one out of the available concurrent or co-existent actions or remedy from a forum of competent jurisdiction vests with the aggrieved person. Once the choice is exercised and the election is made then the aggrieved person is prohibited from launching another proceeding to seek relief or remedy contrary to what could be claimed and or achieved by adopting other proceeding/ action and or remedy, which in legal parlance is recognized as doctrine of election, which doctrine is culled by the courts of law from the well- recognized principles of waiver and or abandonment of a known right, claim, privilege or relief as contained in Order II, rule (2), C.P.C., principles of estoppel as embodied in Article 114 of the Qanun-e-Shahadat Order 1984 and principles of res judicata as articulated in section 11, C.P.C. and its explanations.
7. In light of the foregoing, we are inclined to uphold and apply the Doctrine of Election, for it is only by adhering to such foundational principles that the finality and dignity of judicial and quasi- judicial proceedings can be preserved. Accordingly, the instant writ petition, being devoid of merit, is hereby dismissed. However, the petitioner shall be at liberty to pursue his remedy, if so advised, before the competent forum in accordance with law.