Dr. Khurshid Iobal, J.-
1. In the aftermath of a full fledged trial in case FIR No.425, dated 04.10.2012, registered under sections 302, 324, 34 PPC at Shah Qabool Police Station, Peshawar, Umar Daraz alias Muhammad Umar ("the appellant") was adjudged guilty of committing double murder by the Court of learned Additional Sessions Judge-X, Peshawar ("the trial Court") vide judgment dated 30.05.2023 ("the impugned judgment"), leading to his conviction and sentence under section 302(b) PPC to life imprisonment and making him liable to the payment of rupees three hundred thousand within the meaning of section 544-A Cr.P.C., or to suffer six months of S.I. in default of its payment, with the benefit under section 382-B Cr.P.C. being extended to him. However, the appellant was acquitted by the trial Court for the charge under section 324 PPC, holding that the prosecution failed to prove it.
2. Now, the appellant stands before this Court in this criminal appeal, challenging the findings handed down by the trial court as to his conviction, while the brother of the deceased Muhammad Yaseen has filed Criminal Revision Petition No.174-P/2023, seeking enhancement of the appellant's sentence from life imprisonment to the normal penalty of death under section 302(b) PPC. Since both these matters have arisen out of the impugned judgment, therefore, we propose to decide their fate through this single opinion.
3. The root facts leading to the matters before us lie in the report lodged by the complainant Qaiser Adnan (deceased then injured), in the Casualty Room of the Lady Reading Hospital (LRH), Peshawar, on 04.10.2012 at 17:45 hours. According to the report, on the fateful day, the complainant, along with Muhammad Yaseen (deceased) and Noor Rahman (eyewitness), was present at Mohallah Jogan Shah. At about 16:15 hours, Muhammad Umar, Noor Ahmad Shah, and an unknown culprit, armed with firearms, approached the spot due to a dispute over money and immediately started firing at the complainant party with their respective weapons, intending to cause their qatl- i-amd. As a result, the complainant and Muhammad Yaseen were hit, while Noor Rahman luckily escaped unhurt. Post-occurrence, the accused fled from the scene, while the relatives of the complainant party arrived at the spot and shifted the complainant and Muhammad Yaseen, in injured condition, to LRH for medical treatment. However, Muhammad Yaseen succumbed to his injuries in the trauma room before the report was made, while the complainant Qaiser Adnan subsequently succumbed to his injuries on 12.10.2012.
4. After the completion of the investigation, a report (challan) under section 173 Cr.P.C. was submitted against the accused. Notably, Noor Ahmad Shah was arrested, tried, and adjudged guilty, resulting in his conviction and sentence to imprisonment for life, while the appellant was declared a proclaimed offender by the learned Additional Sessions Judge-X, Peshawar, vide judgment dated 07.10.2016. Pertinently, this decision was appealed before this Court. However, during the pendency of the appeal, the convict Noor Ahmad Shah passed away, and his appeal stood abated by virtue of an order dated 21.04.2022, passed by this Court in Cr.A No.635-P/2016.
Later, the appellant was also arrested, tried, and adjudged guilty, resulting in his conviction and sentence as aforesaid. Hence, this appeal and the revision.
5. Arguments heard. Record perused.
6. Perusal of the record reveals that the edifice of the prosecution case rests on the dying declaration of the deceased then injured Qaiser Adnan, the ocular testimony furnished by the eyewitness Noor Rahman as PW-10, circumstantial evidence, such as the recovery of crime empties and bloodstained earth from the crime scene, medical evidence, and the abscondence of the appellant. Since the deceased then injured sustained firearm injuries during the incident, a fact that firmly established his presence at the spot beyond any doubt, therefore, we shall first examine the dying declaration.
7. There is no denial of the fact that a dying declaration, being the statement of a person, who is no longer alive to assist the Court in ascertaining the facts constituting the crime of which he was a victim, is recognized by the law. Article 46 of the Qanun-e-Shahadat Order, 1984, delves into the concept of dying declarations, particularly in cases involving persons, who are dead or cannot be found. A dying declaration is admissible, even without an oath being administered to the dying declarant and/or the opportunity of cross-examination afforded to the person against whom such statement is made. Its admissibility is rooted in the principles of necessity and the belief that the dying person will always tell truth and only truth. The necessity arises in cases where the victim is the sole eyewitness of the crime, and the exclusion of their statement might hinder the pursuit of justice.
8. Dying declarations hold significant weight under the administration of criminal justice, but their acceptance hinges on specific criteria and conditions as set forth by the higher courts of the country. For instance, a Division Bench of this Court in Siraj v. Asmat Ullah and another (PLD 2012 Peshawar 1), ruled that in order to believe a dying declaration and record a conviction on its basis, the following conditions must be established by the prosecution:
(i) That the dying man was in full senses, conscious and alert to the surroundings, was fully oriented in space and time and was able to make a coherent speech;
(ii) that the dying declaration otherwise rings true and is sound in substance to be relied upon;
(iii) that it is free from promptness given by the outside quarter;
(iv) that the victim/dying man was in a position to identify his culprit, and
(v) that the doctor present at the occasion shall give a fitness certificate about the condition of the dying man.
9. Where it is recorded and established with due adherence to its requirements as aforesaid, the dying declaration retains full value. Here, it is pertinent to state that in earlier days, the dying declaration was regarded with honour, and there was a belief that a dying person would not tell a lie. The higher courts had, therefore, consistently ruled that such a statement could safely be relied upon without looking for independent corroboration. However, with the passage of time and the change being noticed in the trend of societal values, the need for independent corroboration arose, leading to a shift in the viewpoint of the higher courts. For instance, the Supreme Court in late 1970s passed a landmark judgment in Tawaib Khan and another v. The State (PLD 1970 SC 13), holding that dying declarations have sanctity under law, but no rigid rule could be laid down that person under immediate apprehension of death would utter nothing, but truth and that dying declaration, like the statement of an interested witness, requires close scrutiny. Later, in 2011, the Supreme Court handed yet another authoritative judgment in Tahir Khan v. The State (2011 SCMR 646), wherein it was held:
12. It is thus absolutely clear from the principles laid down by this Court that a dying declaration is a weaker type of evidence, which needs corroboration and that conviction can be based on the basis of such a declaration when fully corroborated by the other reliable evidence. Thus the facts and circumstances of each case have to be kept in view and also the credibility, reliability and acceptability of such a declaration by the Court.
10. Furthermore, there is yet another reason why it is unsafe to convict an accused person solely on the basis of a dying declaration without corroboration. This is because such a statement lacks an oath and is not subjected to cross-examination, so much so, the maker might be in a state of emotional distress, potentially drawing upon their imagination during the declaration. Therefore, as a precautionary measure, emphasis is placed on corroborating the dying declaration before considering it as substantive evidence in the criminal administration of justice.
11. We now turn back to the facts of the case. We find that the dying declaration was recorded by Gul Shahzada, S.I. (PW-09). In his testimony, the witness candidly admitted that he did not obtain a certificate from the Doctor regarding the complainant's ability to speak at the time of taking down his report. Similarly, Dr. Shafiullah, CMO, who examined the deceased then injured and furnished the MLC report Ex.PW-13/1, admitted in his cross-examination that he did not provide any certificate about the victim's alertness regarding surroundings, orientation in time and space, or capability to make a lucid statement. Although, both the scribe and the Doctor unanimously stated that the deceased then injured was conscious and capable of speaking, however, this alone is not sufficient to conclusively establish his ability to speak at the time of making the report. Rather, the Court must go beyond such assertions and independently scrutinize the entire record to reach a just conclusion as to whether the deceased then injured was indeed capable of making the statement.
12. If we examine the record, it reveals that the deceased then injured sustained a cluster of six firearm entry wounds on the outer right side of the chest and the right side of the abdomen, each measuring 1x1 cm, within an area of 6 to 9 cm, along with three firearm exit wounds on the left lower chest, each measuring 2x3 cm, located 2 cm above the costal margin and 8 cm from the midline, and 4 cm apart. He also sustained three firearm exit wounds on the left lower abdomen, the left lumbar area, and the midline area, each measuring 3x4 cm, with a total wound size of 6x7 cm. In his cross-examination, the doctor admitted that he did not record the pulse rate or blood pressure of the deceased then injured. He also admitted it correct that in cases involving exit wounds, the bleeding is more profuse. He further conceded that generally, profuse bleeding leads to hypovolemic shock. While the witness did not mention the fact of the exit wounds in the MLC Ex.PW- 13/1, which were subsequently noted in the PM report Ex.PW-11/1, he initially stated to have examined the victim at 05:20 p.m. but later added that in cases of exit wounds, the condition of a patient would definitely be more serious. This indicates that since the deceased, then injured, sustained not only entry wounds but also exit wounds as mentioned in the PM report, and since the doctor categorically stated that he examined the victim 20 to 25 minutes prior to the report being made, he remained unaware of whether the victim's condition had deteriorated after those 25 minutes, by which time the matter was reported at 05:45 p.m. Notably, the examination of the victim prior to the report constitutes yet another discrepancy, which we shall discuss in the succeeding lines.
13. No doubt, the deceased then injured remained alive for eight days, during which the post- operative notes of the Doctor reveal that he complained of various health issues during his stay in the hospital. This, to the trial court, was sufficient to hold that the deceased then injured was fully capable of speaking. However, in our view, the Court, while examining the ability of a dying declarant to speak at the time of making the statement, should not be swayed by the duration for which the injured remained alive or the subsequent complaints he made regarding his health.
Rather, the decisive point in cases based on a dying declaration is whether the injured, at the time of recording the declaration or making the report, was not only conscious, but also capable of speaking. The focus must remain on the initial moment of making the dying declaration, rather than the post-report period, for two primary reasons. Firstly, the contents of the FIR are predicated on the first information communicated by the dying declarant within the meaning of section 154 Cr.P.C. Secondly, there is a possibility that the declarant, who remained alive for a considerable period, as in this case, might have been able to speak at a later stage, and not at the initial stage.
14. Considering the medical condition of the victim vis--vis the number of injuries he sustained in the incident, the scribe was required to obtain, and the Doctor was also obligated to provide, a certificate affirming that the deceased then injured was conscious in time and place and capable of speaking at the time of making the report. However, in the absence of such a crucial piece of evidence, it cannot be definitively held that the victim was conscious and capable of speaking under the compelling circumstances. The omission to secure or render a certificate regarding the victim's consciousness and capability to speak has consistently been held detrimental to the prosecution case in numerous pronouncements, and the present case is no exception. In this regard, the cases of Imtiaz Khan v. State (2020 PCrLJ Note 175 Peshawar) and Basheer v. Abid (2018 YLR Note 112 Peshawar) can be referred. Furthermore, the Supreme Court, in Mst. Ghulam Zohra and another v. Malik Muhammad Sadiq and another (1997 SCMR 449), addressed a similar issue in the following manner: In the face of this medical evidence, the learned Judges of the High Court rightly observed that it was the duty of the Police Officer to have obtained a certificate from the Doctor before recording the statement of the injured that he was in a fit condition to give the statement. Such a certificate admittedly was not obtained and no reasonable explanation for this omission was given by the Police Officer. In the circumstances, fitness of the injured to make the statement Exh.14 remained doubtful and the High Court rightly so held.
In addition, it is an established fact, based on the recovery from the spot of three crime empties of .30mm bore and three of 12mm bore, that firearms of each of these bores were used in the commission of the offence. In today's era, it is not unreasonable to assert that almost every individual in society is familiar with these types of weapons by name, if not by their bore. Despite this common phenomenon, the victim mentioned in the FIR that the assailants were armed with "Aslaha Atisheen", without specifying the name of the firearms, let alone their bores, even though the firing was made at the complainant party from a short distance of about 20 paces, that too, in a broad daylight. Though, the eyewitness endorsed the report and conceded in his cross- examination that he could differentiate between pistols and guns, however, he too failed to specify the names of the weapons used in perpetrating the offence. The omission, in the attending circumstances, to explicitly mention the specific names of the weapons as pistols, rather than the vague term "Aslaha Atisheen", casts doubt on the victim's ability to speak and the eyewitness's presence at the crime scene. This discrepancy has consistently been held detrimental to the prosecution case in a number of pronouncements. In this regard, reference can well be made to Sahib Shah v. State (2024 PCrLJ 396 Peshawar), Mansoor Khan v. State (2023 YLR 1305 Peshawar), Bakht Nawas v. State (2020 YLR 1685 Peshawar), Faqir Said v. State (2020 YLR 1169 Peshawar), and Riaz v. Aman Ullah (2018 PCrLJN 131 Peshawar).
16. Next is the ocular testimony furnished by the eyewitness Noor Rahman as PW-10. It is imperative to mention that the victim unequivocally stated in the report Ex.PW-6/1 that he, along with the deceased Muhammad Yaseen and the eyewitness Noor Rahman, was present in Mohallah Jogan Shah, when at about 16:15 hours, accused Muhammad Umar, Noor Ahmad Shah, and an unknown culprit, armed with firearms, approached the spot and immediately opened fire at them due to a dispute over money. As a result, both the complainant and Muhammad Yaseen were hit, with the latter succumbing to his injuries in the trauma room of the LRH, while the former breathed his last eight days after the incident. If this report is juxtaposed with the testimony of the eyewitness (PW- 10), several major contradictions and improvements will be noted.
17. For instance, it is nowhere mentioned in the report Ex.PW-6/1 that with whom, out of the complainant party, the accused had a money dispute. However, the eyewitness categorically stated that the dispute over money was between him and the accused. The eyewitness also stated that he had no relationship with either of the deceased, as they were merely his neighbors. If this was the case, the question remains as to why the culprits spared the eyewitness and killed both the deceased, a question that the prosecution has failed to answer convincingly. Notably, the eyewitness was all alone and at the mercy of three armed assailants, yet he did not receive a single injury despite being simultaneously fired at by three assailants from a short distance of about 28 paces. The witness stated that he remained standing in his place and did not seek shelter. His escape unhurt, in the attending circumstances, raises reasonable doubts qua his presence at the spot, especially when three shots were fired at him from a 12mm bore pistol.
18. It is clearly mentioned in the FIR that the deceased and the eyewitness were present in Mohallah Jogan Shah when the occurrence took place. However, the eyewitness claimed that by that time, all the three were sitting in his scrap shop, a place which does not even find mention in the site plan Ex.PB. Moreover, the report is completely silent regarding the purpose of the presence of all the three at the stated time and place. Even the inter se distance between the eyewitness and the deceased suggests otherwise.
19. As already noted, it is mentioned in the FIR that upon reaching at the spot, the culprits immediately started firing at the complainant party, a fact implying that no altercation took place prior to the occurrence. However, the eyewitness remained steadfast in asserting that it was after an oral altercation between him and the accused that the occurrence subsequently took place.
20. The report Ex.PW-6/1 in unequivocal terms states that Muhammad Yaseen, after being shot at the spot, was shifted to the LRH, where he succumbed to his injuries in the trauma room.
Notwithstanding this fact, the eyewitness claimed that after being fired at by the assailants, Muhammad Yaseen died on the spot. In view of this, his testimony is not only contrary to the facts apparent on the record, but also self-contradictory, because the report Ex.PW-6/1, which was seconded by him, mentions otherwise.
21. The eyewitness further stated that after receiving injuries, he took Muhammad Yaseen to the hospital, while Qaiser Adnan was shifted to the hospital by the people of the locality. The witness claimed that the two were separately shifted to the hospital. Nonetheless, when the scribe (PW-10) was cross-examined, he negated this fact, stating that the two were brought to the hospital together. Although, it is mentioned in the report that both the deceased were shifted to the hospital in injured conditions by their relatives, however, the eyewitness denied this, stating that those were the people of the locality who shifted them to the hospital. While the eyewitness categorically stated that the distance between the spot and the hospital could be covered on foot within 15 minutes, the report was still lodged at 17:45 hours, although the occurrence had taken place at 16:15 hours. Notably, no plausible explanation has been furnished for this delay.
22. While Muhammad Yaseen was being taken to the hospital, blood was oozing from his wounds, the eyewitness stated, adding that his clothes were also smeared with that blood. Yet, neither did the witness take pain to hand over those clothes to the I.O., nor did the I.O. bring this fact on the record, let alone taking into possession those clothes and dispatching them to the FSL for chemical analysis. This is despite the fact that the witness accompanied the I.O. from the hospital to the spot.
23. The afore-noted facts and circumstances of the case leave no ambiguity in the mind that the eyewitness failed to establish his presence at the spot at the fateful time. Therefore, when the eyewitness failed to establish his presence at the fateful time, and when the collected evidence is also not of the standard that could reasonably link the appellant to the commission of the offence, the benefit accrued will go in favour of the appellant. In observing so, we are fortified by the judgment of the Apex Court in case titled Khalid Mehmood and another Vs The State and another (2021 SCMR 810), wherein it was held that: All the circumstances highlighted above lead us to a definite conclusion that the presence of eye-witnesses at the place of occurrence at the relevant time is not above board and prosecution has failed to prove its case against the petitioner beyond reasonable doubt.
Therefore, the instant jail petition is converted into an appeal and the same is hereby allowed.
The conviction and sentence of appellant Khalid Mehmood is set aside. He is acquitted of the charge framed against him. He is behind the bars and is ordered to be released forthwith, if not required to be detained in any other case.
24. Similarly, in case titled Najaf Ali shah Vs the State (2021 SCMR 736), it is held that: The same view was reiterated in Abdul Jabbar v. State (2010 SCMR 129) when this court observed that once a single loophole is observed in a case presented by the prosecution, such as conflict in the ocular account and medical evidence or presence of eye-witnesses being doubtful, the benefit of such loophole/lacuna in the prosecution case automatically goes in favour of an accused.
25. Another important aspect of the case is that on the same date, at 16:30 hours, the accused Noor Ahmad Shah (since dead) had also lodged a report regarding the injuries he allegedly sustained in the incident. This report was initially reduced into the shape of Daily Diary No.08, dated 04.10.2012, which subsequently led to the registration of FIR No.427, dated 08.10.2012, under sections 324 / 34 PPC, at the same police station. His MLC reveals that the nature of his injuries was firearm. The eyewitness also admitted it correct that the accused Noor Ahmad Shah was injured and that it was he who charged the complainant party for the injuries he sustained in the incident. If we take into consideration the contents of the captioned FIR No.427, the MLC, and the admission of the eyewitness, even for a limited purpose, in juxtaposition with the afore-noted factual background of the case, it can be safely concluded that the complainant party of this case concealed the real facts, and this, in fact, was a case of open gunfight between the parties. Notably, the accused Noor Ahmad Shah also concealed in his report the fatal wounds sustained by Qaiser Adnan and Muhammad Yaseen. Therefore, it has been established that both the parties attributed the role of assault to the adversarial party while concealing the real facts and attempting to cover up their own role in causing injuries to members of the rival party. It has also been established that the case indeed was of cross version. However, the question fundamental to the fate of the case as to which party was the aggressor and which was aggressed upon remained unanswered, as the factum of sustaining the firearm injuries by both sides was concealed. The effect of concealing the real facts pertaining to the injuries sustained by the adversarial party has, on numerous occasions, been considered in favour of the accused. The latest being the case of Niaz v. State (2024 PCr.LJ 1473 Quetta), can well be referred to in this case.
26. In the above backdrop, it is obvious that the occurrence has not taken place in the mode and manner as alleged and presented. It is imperative to state that the consistent view of the higher courts is that in cases where major contradictions and discrepancies exist in the prosecution evidence, and it becomes evident that the incident did not occur as portrayed, then the benefit of doubt should be extended to the accused. The cases of Nawab Khan v. State (2024 YLR 457 Peshawar), Jawad v. The State and another (2020 YLR 1462), and Jalat Khan alias Jalo v. The State (2020 PCr.LJ 503) are, but few to refer in this regard. Additionally, the High Court of Balochistan unequivocally affirmed and reiterated the effect of such discrepancy on the prosecution case in Rafaat Shah v. The State (2022 PCr.LJ Note 39 Balochistan). The operative part reads as under: The mode and manner of the occurrence itself by the prosecution is not appealable to the prudent mined, therefore, it was highly unsafe to rely on the statement of both these witnesses to maintain conviction and sentence of the accused on a capital charge.
27. What never ceases to amaze us is the surface level claim of the prosecution that the victim Qaiser Adnan was sent to the Doctor after his injury sheet was prepared, followed by taking down his report Ex.PW-6/1. As per the FIR, the report was made at 17:45 hours. According to the scribe, it took some twenty minutes to prepare the injury sheet and take down the report, and it was only after carrying out this process, that the victim was sent to the Doctor for medical treatment. If we accept this stance of the prosecution as correct, then the time of examination of the victim must be at least after 17:45 hours. However, the MLC Ex.PW-13/1 reveals that the victim was brought before the Doctor and examined at 05:20 p.m. (17:20 hours), a time which is even prior to the time of the report. The timelines mentioned in the FIR, the injury sheet, and the inquest report, therefore, do not coincide with each other. Moreover, the examination of the victim before taking down his report suggests that the report was lodged after preliminary investigation, a procedural misstep that has consistently been deemed detrimental to the prosecution case. The principles laid down in Muhammad Zahir Shah v. Amin-ur Rehman (2023 YLR 2023 Peshawar), Sajid v. State (2023 PCrLJ 19 Peshawar), Muhammad Sheeraz v. State (2021 PCrLJN 26 Peshawar), and Naeem Gulzar v. State (2021 PCrLJ 1586 Lahore), underscore the potential adverse impact of such a lapse in the prosecution case.
28. As regards the medical evidence, it must be remembered that medical evidence is confirmatory in nature, which does not provide details of the actual assailants involved. It only offers details about the weapon used and the number and nature of injuries. Its value lies in being supporting evidence in a given case. As held by the Supreme Court in Aqil v. The State (2023 SCMR 831), the value and status of medical evidence are always corroborative in nature and, alone, are not sufficient to sustain the conviction of an accused. Notwithstanding the established principle on the value and status of medical evidence in criminal cases, the PM report Ex.PW-11/1 of the deceased Muhammad Yaseen reveals that the time between his death and injury was immediate, which contradicts the fact mentioned in the FIR that he succumbed to his injuries after being shifted to the trauma room in the hospital. Therefore, the conflict between the contents of the FIR and the medical evidence has damaged the instant case beyond repair. There is, and could be, no second opinion that once a single loophole is observed in the prosecution case--such as conflict between the ocular account and medical evidence or the presence of eyewitnesses being doubtful --its benefit would automatically go in favour of the accused. In holding so, we place reliance on what the Supreme Court held in Najaf Ali Shah v. The State (2021 SCMR 736). In this case, the august Court observed: The same view was reiterated in Abdul Jabbar v. State (2010 SCMR 129) when this court observed that once a single loophole is observed in a case presented by the prosecution, such as conflict in the ocular account and medical evidence or presence of eye-witnesses being doubtful, the benefit of such loophole/lacuna in the prosecution case automatically goes in favour of an accused.
29. The prosecution asserts a dispute over money as the motive that led to the incident. However, on the one hand, the contents of the FIR are vague to the extent that it does not specify with whom the assailants had the dispute over money. On the other hand, the eyewitness claimed that this dispute was between him and the assailants. However, at the same time, he admitted in his cross- examination that he had not shown anything in writing to the I.O. regarding this dispute, nor did the I.O. collect any evidence to that extent. Consequently, the prosecution failed to establish the motive, and in such circumstances, the burden falls on the prosecution. While the absence of a motive does not always decisively weaken the prosecution case, it is a legal obligation of the prosecution to prove what it alleges as the motive. In the present case, the motive served as the sole link between the parties, and the failure to establish it significantly weakens the very foundation of the prosecution case. We affirm that the prosecution did not succeed in establishing the motive, and it is the prosecution that must bear the consequences of this failure. In this context, guidance can be gleaned from the judgment the Supreme Court has rendered in Muhammad Akram alias Akrami Vs. The State (2019 SCMR 610). Its operative part reads as under: We are of the view that the motive set out by the prosecution remained far from being proved. It is well settled that when prosecution alleges something against an accused person and then fails to prove the same, the premium of such failure must go to an accused person. In this case as well, prosecution's failure to prove the motive set out by it certainly benefits the appellant.
30. Insofar as the abscondence is concerned, it revealed that undoubtedly, the appellant remained absconder for almost a decade without providing any plausible explanation. However, it is imperative to state that abscondence alone does not serve as a conclusive proof of guilt. While it can be considered as a corroborative piece of evidence, its weight is contingent on the prior establishment of an accused person's guilt through compelling evidence. As ruled by this Court in Rafaqat Ullah alias Paka v. Umar Fayaz (deceased) through brother Muhammad Riaz (2020 PCr.LJ 1361 Peshawar), when direct evidence falls short, abscondence as a piece of evidence becomes inconsequential. The present case is no exception to this principle.
31. Upon reappraisal of the evidence presented, it is abundantly clear that the prosecution case is riddled with material discrepancies, contradictions, and doubts. No substantive evidence exists to firmly link the appellant to the commission of the offence beyond any reasonable doubt. The failure of the prosecution to affirmatively prove the capability of the deceased then injured to talk at the time of the report, the substantial inconsistencies noted in the statement of the alleged eyewitness, the lack of evidence to corroborate the dying declaration allegedly made by the deceased then injured, and the absence of evidence to establish the alleged motive created serious dents and doubts in the prosecution case.
32. A fundamental principle of criminal jurisprudence dictates that any doubt that raises questions in the judicial mind must be resolved in favour of the accused, and the burden of proof invariably rests on the prosecution to establish its case beyond a reasonable doubt. Furthermore, numerous circumstances are not required to cast doubt upon the guilt of an accused, rather a solitary factor that creates a reasonable doubt in the mind of a prudent person is sufficient to benefit the accused. The approach of the Supreme Court of Pakistan on this proposition is quite rich.
Noteworthy precedents supporting this viewpoint, for instance, include, but not limited to Tariq Pervaiz v. The State (1995 SCMR 1345), Ayub Masih v. The State (PLD 2002 SC 1048), Maqsood Alam v. State (2024 SCMR 156), and Muhammad Riaz v. Khurram Shahzad (2024 SCMR 51).
33. For the reasons we have set out above, it is held that the prosecution has been unable to prove the charge against the appellant through direct, trustworthy, and compelling evidence beyond a reasonable doubt. Not being persuaded that there was any sound basis for adjudging the appellant guilty, we are unanimous to conclude that the trial Court has failed to properly appreciate the evidence presented and, thus, it erred while handing down the impugned judgment.
34. Consequently, we allow this appeal, set aside the impugned judgment, and acquit the appellant of the charges by extending him the benefit of doubt. He shall be immediately released, with the caveat that his detention is not otherwise required.
35. Since the instant criminal appeal ended in acquittal, the connected Criminal Revision Petition No.174-P/2023 turns infructuous and is, therefore, dismissed.
36. The foregoing are the reasons for our short order of even date.