' House bearing No, S. W. III/79-S-4, Krishan Nagar, Lahore, was transferred to Mahmood Ullah Khan, petitioner, and a P. T.
0. Was issued in his name on 24th October, 1960. Mst. Kaniz Fatima Shaifta, respondent, who was occupying a portion of it, litigated the matter but without success. In an ejectment petition brought by Mahmood Ullah, Mst. Shaifta was directed to be ejected by the Controller's order dated 2nd March, 1967. An application for execution of this ejectment order was filed on 11th March, 1974. Mst.
Shaifta whose objection to the execution was dismissed on 5th December, 1979 brought an appeal before the Additional District Judge but the same was dismissed on 14th February, 1981 for the reason that it had not been accompanied by a copy of the decree. A warrant of possession was accordingly issued and executed on 16th February, 1981.
2. In the meantime the house was resumed on 10th June, 1975 on account of default in payment of the price, which lead to another round of litigation before the settlement authorities in the course of which the portion in possession of Mst. Shaifta was transferred in her name on 11th January, 1979.
This transfer in her name was challenged by Mahmood Ullah Khan through Writ Petition No, 434-R of 1979, which is pending but in that writ petition an order was made on 16th July, 1979 for maintenance of status quo. Mst. Shaifta also brought a Writ Petition No, 297-R of 1979 seeking transfer of the entire house in her favour. In that petition also an order for maintenance of status quo was passed on 25th March, 1979, Yet another Writ Petition bearing No, 139-R of 1979 was filed by one Mst. Basharat Begum which is also pending.
' Mst. Shaifta, on the strength of the transfer of the portion of the property made in her favour on 11th January, 1979 applied on 22nd February, 1981 before the executing Court for restoration of the property from which she had been ejected in execution of the Controller's order. Her application was accepted and an order was passed for restitution of her possession on 26th February, 1981.
Mahmood Ullah Khan brought an appeal but the same was dismissed by the Additional District Judge, Lahore, on 8th March, 1981. Against this order he has filed the present revision petition.
4. It has been noted in para. 2 of the admitting note dated 11th March, 1981 that "According to the learned counsel this ejectment order was affirmed up to the level of the Supreme Court in 1973".
Learned counsel for the respondent pointed out that this was a misrepresentation of fact by learned counsel for the petitioner because what had gone upto the Supreme Court was the matter on the Settlement side and not the ejectment matter. Learned counsel for the petitioner was unable to refute it.
5. As already mentioned, petitioner Mahmood Ullah Khan had by Writ Petition No, 734-R of 1979, challenged the order dated 11th January, 1979 whereby the Administrator, Residual Properties, Lahore, had transferred the portion in occupation of Mst. Shaifta in her favour. In that writ petition he had also challenged the order of resumption of the property dated 10th June, 1975. While admitting the writ petition, the learned Judge passed the following order on 16th July, 1979 :--
6. "Status quo meanwhile subject to notice.
The term "status quo" is wide enough to cover Mst. Shaifta's possession of the property transferred in her favour. Her eviction from that portion was, therefore, in violation of this interim order.
7. In her own Writ Petition No, 297-R of 1979, in which she had asked for the transfer of the entire property in her favour, an order had been made on 25th March, 1979 "status quo shall be maintained meanwhile. Status quo will obviously cover not only her occupation but also ,B her title under the disposal of the writ petition. It is contended that her writ petition was directed against the Administrator, Residual Properties, Lahore, as he is the only respondent and as such the order of status quo can bind him only and not the executing Court or any other party. If the order of status quo protects her status in regard to a portion of the property. It can hardly be argued that in a rent matter wherein also the question of her status had been involved, she can be ejected in spite of the order for the maintenance of status quo. In fact, the final shape of the execution proceeding in the rent matter will depend on the outcome of this and the other Writ Petitions No, 734-R of 1979 and No, 139-R of 1979.
7. Her eviction, therefore, from the portion in her possession on 16th February, 1981 was in violation of the aforesaid subsisting orders for maintenance of status quo and as such she was entitled to the restitution of her possession. The impugned order dated 8th March, 1981, therefore, calls for no interference. The revision petition is dismissed with costs.