MUHAMMAD IRSHAD KHAN (MEMBER).-The appellant after his retire merit from the Army in 1967 joined the West Pakistan Agricultural Develop merit Corporation as Director, Project and Co- ordination. The said Corporation was dissolved by the West Pakistan Agricultural Development Corporation Dissolution Order, 1972 (P. O. 5 of 1972) and it was provided by section 4 (b) thereof that the officers and employees of the Corporation were to be transferred either to the provinces or to the Central Government or other Authorities on the same terms and conditions as applicable to them at the time of promulgation of the said Presidential Order. The services of the appellant were accordingly transferred to the Central Government where he was first appointed as Officer on Special Duty in the Ministry of Food, Agriculture and Rural Development and then by Notification dated the 21st June, 1973, he was granted tire status of Joint Secretary in the Central Government.
By yet another Notification dated the 9th September, 1975, the appellant's salary was fixed in Grade-20. On 12-2-1978 when he was serving as Joint Secretary, Local Government and Rural Developer Division, a notification was issued whereby he was retired with effect from the forenoon of the 28th February, 1978, on expiry of fourteen days' notice commencing on the 14th February, 1978 This notification was, however, superseded by another notification dated the 30th April, 1978, whereby the appellant was granted leave on average pay for six months and eight days, with effect from 28-2-1978 to 4-9-1978 followed by leave on half average pay for 5 months and 22 days, with effect from 5-9-1978 to 26-2-1979 and it was further ordered that he on expiry of this leave, shall cease to be in Government Service with effect from 27-2-1979. According to the appellant he submitted a review petition to the respondent, Cabinet Secretariat, Establishment Division, against the imposition of major penalty of compulsory retirement from service but no action whatever was taken on that review petition. The appellant waited till 17-11-1930 when he again; submitted a review petition agitating against his wrong retirement from service. He was, however, informed vide Establishment Division letter dated 19-12-1981 that the review petition mentioned in his letter dated 17-11-1980 was not received in the Establish--ment Division and that the notification of the retirement of the appellant was not issued under Government Servants (Efficiency and Discipline)
Rules, 1973, as a result of any disciplinary ,action. It was also added therein that the position regarding appellants retirement and retirement benefits had already been explained to him vide departments D. O. Dated 24-2-1980. The appellant then filed the present appeal on 24-1-1982 before this Tribunal.
2. We have heard the learned counsel for both the parties and perused the record of the case placed before us by the Departmental Representative The learned counsel for the appellant attacked the impugned order on a number of grounds. While the learned counsel for the respondent contesting the case also on merit, raised a preliminary objection that the appeal is barred by limitation. This preliminary objection is to be considered first. The stand of the appellant is that he first submitted a review petition through registered post on 16-12-1978., which remained un-responded, therefore, he sent a reminder on the 17th November, 1981, to which he received a reply dated 19-12-1981, from the Establishment Division on 25-12-1981. The stand of the appellant is that since he received the final order on 25-12-1981 and filed the present appeal on 24-1-1982, the same is within time.
It is, however, significant that the appellant's alleged review petition dated the 16th December, 1978, submitted after more than seven months from the issue of revised notification of his (the appellant's) retirement was addressed to the Secretary, Establishment Division and the first and last paras. Of the same read as under :- "I have been given to understand that a review of premature retire--ment ordered by the present Government is underway. In this connection I would like to invite the attention to my case also, as f was retired, suddenly, on 13th February, 1978 without any prior notice.
I hope that, in view of the foregoing, the Review Board will find my case fit for sympathetic consideration. I would also request a personal hearing by the Board."
3. A bare perusal of the above contents of the appellant's review petition would show that the same was submitted for the consideration of the Review Board. While legally the appellant could submit a review petition/representation to the President (not the Establishment Secretary) within one month of the date on which he received the revised notification dated the 30th April, 1978, which he failed to do. The present appeal is, therefore, clearly barred by proviso (a) to subsection (1) of section 4 of the Service Tribunals Act, 1973. Again, the Section Officer of the Establish--ment Division's D.O, dated the 9th December, 1981, received by the appellant on 25-12-1981. By no stretch of imagination, can be considered a final order of the departmental authority but the same is doubtlessly a reply to a letter of the appellant dated 17-11-1980 addressed to Mr. Maqbool Ahmad Sheikh, Joint Secretary, Establishment Division. Therefore, the plea of the appellant that time for filing the present appeal started running from 25-12-1981, is devoid of any substance and is accordingly repelled.
4. It may be added that on receipt of the objections filed by the respondent in the instant appeal the appellant submitted an application for condonation of delay mainly on the ground that the appellant was not obliged to challenge the said order within any specific period of limitation because the same being against the principle of natural justice and without lawful authority was coram non judice. The contention is simply miscon--ceived and unfounded. It is by now a well- settled legal position that eve if an order of an Administrative Authority is null and void, unless an order of quashment thereof is obtained from a competent forum there is no means of establishing its nullity. It enjoys a presumption of validity, and will have to be obeyed unless a Court invalidates it. In other words every unlawful administrative act, however invalid, is merely voidable. In this connection a well-known passage of Lord Radcliffe is reproduced below :- "An order, even if not made in good faith, is still an act capable of legal consequences. It bears no brand of invalidity upon its forehead. Unless the necessary proceedings are taken at law to establish the cause of invalidity and to get it quashed or otherwise upset, it will remain as effective for its ostensible purpose as the most impeccable of orders."
The above position is more true where; the 'brand of invalidity' is plain for there also the order can effectively be resisted in law only by obtaining the decision from a competent forum. Corroborating it Lord Diplock says that :- "it leads to confusion to use such term as "voidable", "voidable ab initio" "void ' or "a nullity" as descriptive of the status of subordi--nate legislation alleged to be ultra vires for patent or for latent defects, before its validity has been pronaunced on by a Court of competent jurisdiction."
It is thus clear that every administrative action or order would be presumed to be valid unless the presumption was rebutted in competent legal proceedings by a party entitled to sue, and according to Lord Diplock "there might be no one entitled to sue, for example if a statutory time limit had expired. In that case the order would have to stand." There is thus no escape from holding that the plea raised by the appellant for condonation of delay has no merits whatsoever. Such an inordinate and inexcusable delay is not condonable. Therefore, the application for condonation of delay is also rejected.
5. In view of the foregoing discussion the appeal is dismissed as incompetent and also as time- barred. There shall be no order as to costs.