1. ' This appeal under section 15 (4) of the West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance, 1959 is directed against the order of III Additional District Judge, Karachi dated 28th February, 1979 whereby he reversed the findings of Rent Controller and granted ejectment of the appellant on the ground of personal and bona fide requirement.
2. ' The application for ejectment was filed by the respondent on the sole ground that it was required by the respondent for her personal and bona fide needs and for the needs of her children and that two of her sons were going to be married and their marriages are being postponed/withheld on account of shortage of accommodation. In the written statement filed on behalf of the appellant the personal and bona fide requirement of the respondent was denied generally but there was no specific denial with regard to the allegation that two of the sons of respondent were going to be married but their marriages were withheld or postponed on account of shortage of accommodation. In support of her case the respondent examined her husband/attorney and another witness Mohammad Siddiq. While the appellant appeared as his own witness. The Rent Controller after hearing the parties rejected the application of the respondent on the ground that the present accommodation with the respondent/landlady was sufficient for her requirement as the landlady's family consisted of only four members whereas the present accommodation of the landlady consisted of three rooms. However, on appeal the first appellate Court did not agree with the conclusion of the Rent Controller and found that the landlady had succeeded in making out a case for personal and bona fide requirement for herself as well as for her two sons who were going to be married and he accordingly reversed the findings of the Rent Controller and granted the ejectment application.
3. ' The learned counsel for the appellant contended before me that the respondent/landlady did not disclose in her application before the Rent Controller that she was occupying first floor of the said building in which the opponent is the tenant. This according to the learned counsel amounted to concealment of fact which casts serious doubt as to her bona fides. It is next contended by the learned counsel that in the present . Circumstances of the case where it was admitted by the attorney of landlady that the two sons for whose marriages the extra accommodation is needed are in America it was incumbent for the respondent to have examined these two sons in support of the case set up by the landlady. It was contended that the evidence on record did not disclose a bona fide requirement by the landlady and therefore the reversal of the findings by the first appellate Court was based on insufficient reasoning.
4. The findings arrived at by the first appellate Court on a question of fact is normally binding in the second appeal. However, if such finding is based on no evidence or has proceeded on misreading of evidence or is otherwise perverse the second appellate Court is entitled to interfere with such findings. The learned counsel for the appellant contends that the finding given by the first appellate Court that the sons of the respondent/landlady were temporarily residing in States is a finding based on no evidence at all. It is contended that the statement made in cross-examination by the witness produced by the respondent/landlady in evidence to the effect that the respondent's sons are temporarily residing in America could not be taken in consideration as firstly it was stated in cross-examination and secondly it was so stated by the witness voluntarily. In support of his above contentions the learned counsel for the appellant has relied upon the case of Abdul Majid v. Anwar Ali, Soofi Mohammad Yasin v. Dr. A. A. Khan and Mohammad Idrees v.
5. Ziauddin. In Abdul Majid's case it was found by the Court that the landlord prior to the institution of the ejectment case on an earlier occasion had got vacated a residential portion and the shop from another tenant on the pretext of his personal use but instead of occupying it himself he again rented it out to some other person. It was also found in that case that the landlord owned another house in his occupation which he did not mention in his application and there was no allegation that the house occupied by the landlord was not suitable or sufficient for his needs. It was in this context, the learned Single Judge in that case came to the conclusion that the application of the landlord for personal and bona fide requirement was not made in good faith. In Soofi Mohammad Yasin's case decided by a learned Single Judge of this Court the tenant had alleged that the two daughters for whose benefit the premises was allegedly required by the landlord were not willing to join the father in the proposed expansion of business and it was in that context held in the case that the non-examination of the two daughters for whose benefit the premises was required on the ground of personal and bona fide requirement was fatal to the case of the landlord. In Mohammad Idrees's case the learned Single Judge doubted the bona fides of the landlord on the ground that immediately prior to the institution of the application on the ground of personal and bona fide requirement the landlord has sold another premises in his occupation and it was not explained in the evidence before the Controller as to why this house which was sold by the landlord was not used for the purposes of accommodating the visitors of landlord which was the ground for seeking extra accommodation in that case. None of the cases referred by the learned counsel lays down as a rule that in all cases where the landlord seeks eviction of a tenant on the ground that it is required for bona fide needs of his children, such children of the landlord must be examined in the case to establish such requirement. Whether examination of the son of the landlord for whose benefit the application is filed is necessary or not in a given case depends entirely on the circumstances of that case and no hard and fast rule can be laid down in that regard. In the case before me the landlady has specifically alleged that the extra accommodation was required by her in connection with the marriages of her two sons which is likely to take place but was deferred/withheld on account of shortage of accommodation. This specific allegation in the1 2 3 application was not denied by the appellant in his written statement. In the cross-examination the suggestion given to the applicant witness that the marriages of her two sons are not going to be held was denied and the matter was not further pursued in cross-examination. The admitted position on record is that the present accommodation in occupation of the landlords consisted of only three rooms and this fact was admitted by the appellant. It was however, asserted that the accommodation in occupation of the respondent was sufficient for his requirement. It was sought to suggest in the cross-examination that the total number of the family members of the respondent was four and therefore the accommodation in occupation of the landlord was sufficient to meet his requirement. Even if it be accepted that the present number of the respondent's family consisted of only four members it is not shown that the findings arrived at by the first appellate Court that the present accommodation in occupation of the landlady is not sufficient is based upon any misreading of evidence. The reasoning given by the first appellate Court in reversing-the finding of the Rent Controller are neither contrary to the evidence on record nor are they based upon misreading of the evidence or perverse appreciation of the evidence. The fact that it is possible to take another view of the evidence after reassessing the same in II Appeal is not sufficient ground for setting aside the finding on the question of fact recorded by the first appellate Court. The first appellate Court believed the evidence led by respondent/landlady that she required the premises for the marriages of her two sons and that present accommodation with her was insufficient to meet the needs and requirements of her family members. This finding arrived at by the first appellate Court cannot be said to be suffering from such infirmity as would attract interference by the second appellate Court with this finding of the fact. I accordingly find no merits in this appeal which is dismissed but will make no order as to costs. The appellant is allowed four months' time to vacate the premises subject to condition that he shall continue to deposit monthly rent in Court in accordance with the order of the Rent Controller. NLR 1980 Civil 158 PLD 1976 Kar. 1231 PLD 1981 Kar. 345