ABDUL HAYEE KURESHI, C. J.-The present appeal under section 3 of the Law Reforms Ordinance, 1972; has been filed by M. Maroof Ali, working in the National Cement Industries Limited: Karachi, to challenge an order of a learned Single Judge .Of the erstwhile High Court of Sind and Baluchistan in Constitutional Petition No. 258;1975, whereby proceedings in a complaint case filed by the appellant against respondents Muhammad Akram and Choudhry Muhammad Younus, before the Labour Court at Karachi, were quashed. We have heard Mr. Shanshah Hussain for appellant M.
Maroof and Mr. Noor Muhammad for the respondents Muhammad Akram and Choudhry Muhammad Younus. The third respondent, namely, Sind Labour Court 11, has not contested this appeal nor did they put in any appearance before the single Judge. For the sake of convenience appel--lant M. Maroof is hereinafter referred to as the complainant and respondents Muhammad Akram and Choudhry Muhammad Younus are hereinafter referred to as the accused.
2. The brief facts of the case are that the complainant is an employee of National Cement Industries Limited, Karachi, whereas the two accused are serving in the capacity of officers in the same cement industry. On 24th April, 1973, a Work Council was established in the factory in pursuance of the provisions of section 24 of the Industrial Relations Ordinance (I. R. O.), By rule 61 framed under the I. R. O. Such work council has to hold at least one meeting every month and such meeting had to be covered by the accused persons. Meetings were held on 30th April, 1973 and 20th May, 1973, but thereafter, such meetings were not held so that a complaint was filed against the accused persons by the complainant for contravention of rule 65 of the I. R. O. Rules. The two accused persons appeared before the Labour Court that was seized of the case and raised a preliminary objection as to the maintainability of the complaint itself for the reasons that the complaint had not been filed or the authorization for the filing thereof had not been given by the Registrar. Such objection was overruled by the Labour Court so that the constitutional jurisdiction of this Court was invoked by a petition under Article 199 of the Constitution. This petition was heard by a learned single Judge who allowed the same holding that the complaint was incompe--tent for the reason of the same not having been filed by the Registrar of Trade Unions nor had he authorised for filing the same.
3. Aggrieved by such order of the learned Single Judge the appellant has filed the present appeal under section 3 of the Law Reforms Ordinance, 1972. The main contention raised by the appellant is that section 13 (b) of the I. R. O., 1969, only provides for the Registrar. Lodging a complaint against a Trade Union for any alleged offence or ay unfair practice or violation of any of the provisions of the Ordinance, but the vesting of such powers in the Registrar do not mean or imply that such a complaint cannot on filed by any other person or an aggrieved party. On the other hand, the respondents have challenged the maintainability of this appeal on the premises that a High Court appeal under section 3 of the Law Reforms Ordinance, 1972, is not maintainable and is by terms of statute directly excluded. We have heard Mr. Shahanshah Hussain for the appellant and Mr. Noor Muhammad for the respondents.
4. The first point that we propose to consider is in regard to maintain--ability of the appeal. The Law Reforms Ordinance, 1972, was promulgated on 14th April, 1972. Section 3 of the said Ordinance provided against entertainment of any appeal under. The provisions of any Letters Patent, as applicable to a High Court. The pending appeals were however saved. Section 3 of this Ordinance was amended by the Law Reforms (Amend--ment) Ordinance, 1972 on 10th August, 1972 and again by another Ordinance bearing the same title promulgated on 12th September, 1972. For a third time an amendment was made by Law Reforms (Amendment) Act VI of 1975, which received the assent on 17th January, 1975. After these vissititutes section 3 of the Law Reforms, Ordinance 1972, stood and has Continued to stand in the following form :-- "3. Appeal to High Court in certain cases.-(1) An appeal shall be to a Bench of two or more Judges of a High Court from a decree passed or final order made by a Single Judge of that Court in the exercise of its original civil jurisdiction.
(2) An appeal shall also lie to a Bench of two or more Judges of a High Court from an order made by Single Judge of that Court under clause (2) of Article 201 of the Interim . Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, not being an order made under sub--paragraph (i) of paragraph (6) of the clause: Provided that the appeal referred to in this subsection shall not be available or competent if the application brought before the High Court under Article 201 arises out of any proceedings in which the law applicable provided, for at least one appeal' or one revision or one review to any Court, tribunal or authority against the original order.
(3) No appeal shall lie under subsection (1) or subsection (2) from an interlocutory order which does not dispose of the entire case before the Court.
(4) Nothing contained in this Ordinance shall be construed as affecting--
(a) any appeal under the provisions of the Letters Patent applicable to a High Court or under section 102 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), which was pending immediately before the commencement-of this Ordinance ; or
(b) any appeal or petition for leave to appeal from a decree, judgment or order of a Single .Judge of a High Court made to the Supreme Court before the commencement of the Law Reforms (Amendment) Ordinance, 1972."
5. The present appeal was filed in 1976 and, therefore, the maintain--ability will be determined in accordance with the provisions of section 3 of the Law Reforms Ordinance, 1972, as it stands after successive amendments ending the amendment made by Act No. VI of 1975. Subsection (2) of section 3 of this Ordinance provides for pan appeal to a Bench of two or more Judges of a High Court from an order made by a Single Judge of that Court under clause (2) of Article 201.Of the Interim Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan (corresponding to Article 199 of the Constitution of Pakistan, 1973) if the proceedings which have given rise to the constitutional petition were concerning the application of such law which did not provide for an appeal or revision or review to any Court, Tribunal or Authority against the order that was sought to he challenged by way of a constitutional petition. To put it in other words, if the order that is sought to be challenged.
Has been passed in pursuance of a law which had provided for a further remedy at the administrative or departmental level by way of an appeal or revision or review, a High Court appeal would be barred.
6. In the present case, the proceedings by way of constitutional petition arose out of an. Order of the Labour Court taking cognizance of a complaint against the two accused at the instance of the complainant.
A Labour Court has the power to try an offence under the I.R.0. Or any other offences the jurisdiction to try which may have been conferred upon or assigned to a Labour Court by order under the I. R. O. Or any other law. Such power vests in a Labour Court by virtue of clause (c) of subsection (5) of section 35 of 1. R. O. Under subsection (3) of section 36 of I. R. O. a Labour. Court shall for the purposes of trying an offence have the same powers as are vested in a First Class Magistrate, specially empowered under section 30 of the Criminal Procedure Code. This provision also provides that for the purpose of appeal from a sentence passed by a Labour Court the said Court shall be deemed to be a Court of Sessions under the Criminal Procedure Code so.
That an appeal would lie before the High Court in case an accused is convicted or equated. Again subsection (4) of section 37 of I. R. O. Provides that all decisions of a Labour Court , other than awards, and sentences referred to in subsection (3) of section 36 of I. R. O. Shall be final and shall not be called in que55tion in any manner by or before any Court or other authority. On a plain heading of these provisions it would be -clear that the only remedy provided by the I. R. O. In cases arising out of prosecutions before a Labour Court is by way of an appeal in a case where a sentence is passed by a Labour Court' and no more.
7. The order that was sought to be challenged before the learned Single Judge was one of taking cognizance on a complaint and admittedly the case has not-yet proceeded so that there is rip order sentencing the two accused. It would seem clear that the scheme of sections 35, 36 and 37 of the I. R. O. Not only by implication but even specifically bars an appeal, review observation against, aw-order of taking cognizance: This being so, the present High Court, appeal was maintainable. We are fortified in our view by, some decided cases which we propose to refer to and disposes in the, succeeding paragraph.
8. In the case of Mirza Ashfiq Hussain v. Additional Settlement. Commissioner, Lahore (PLD 1977 Lah.
684) a Division Bench examined' the scope of section 3 of the Law Reforms Ordinance and observed that intra-Court appeal was not maintainable when the original order giving the cause of grievance was appealable or revisable or reviewable. In this case however, this appeal was held to be maintainable because at the time the impugned order had been passed at "the departmental level no remedy 'by way of appeal or review was available.
9. At the time of arguments it was virtually conceded before us that the order 'taking cognizance of a complaint was not subject to an appeal, revision or review. There is no doubt, that such an order would not be subject to an appeal or review. The question still is whether such an order is revisable. -1n such a situation Mr. Justice Muhammad Afzal Cheema, while, a Judge of the Lahore High Court had in the case of Muhammad Ismail v. Mian Aijaz Ahmed (PLD 1971 Lah. 30), considered the question of an order passed by an Industrial Court in pursuance of the West Pakistan Industrial Disputes Ordinance IV of 1968, Such Ordinance also contained somewhat similar provisions as are contained in the I. R. O. 1969. In regard to prosecutions and the jurisdiction of the revisional Court.
Under the said Ordinance an Industrial Court was deemed to be a Court of Sessions as contemplated by the Criminal Procedure Code. The learned Judge came to the conclusion that the West Pakistan Industrial Disputes Ordinance had created special provisions and, therefore, the general provisions contained in section 5(2) of the Criminal Procedure Code would not be applicable. What is more that subsection (4) of section 37 of the I. R. O. 1969, clearly states that all the decisions of the Labour Courts shall be final and shall not be called in question in any manner by or before any Court of other authority. The only jurisdiction that is sought to be conceded in favour of the maintainability of an appeal is mentioned in subsection (6) of section 38 of the Ordinance which provides for an appeal as the instance of a person convicted or sentenced by Labour Appellate Tribunal before the High Court.
Such is not the position in the present case.
10. We are very clearly of the view that the order taking cognizance on the complaint was not subject to any appeal, revised or revision and for such reason the present High Court Appeal is maintainable.
It. The next point requiring consideration. Is whether a complaint of the nature as was filed before the Labour Court by the complainant was competent at his instance. The learned Judge on a consideration of 1969, came to the conclusion that a complaint section 13 (b) of the I.R.O. 1969 came to the authority of the Registrar of this nature could be filed only by or. Under the authority of the Registrar of Trade Unions. Section 13 (b) of the I. R. O. Reads as follows :- "13. Powers and functions of Registrar.-The following shall be the powers and functions of the Registrar : -
(b) to lodge, or authorise any person to lodge. Complaints with the Labour Court or commission for action, including prosecution, against trade unions, employers, workers or other persons for any alleged offence or any unfair labour practices or violation of any provision of this Ordinance or for expanding the funds of a trade union in contravention of. The provisions of its constitution."
12. The learned Single Judge observed that since the Registrar could lodge a complaint, the complainant in this case could not legally file the present complaint. The attention of the learned Judge was drawn to a Division Bench judgment of this Court in Constitutional Petition No. 266/75, in which it was decided that even -- an individual was competent to lodge a complaint against the management in case of non--observance or contradiction of the provisions of the Ordinance or the rules. The learned Single Judge expressed that facts in that case were not on all fours with the facts of the present case.
13. It is a settled principle underlying criminal jurisprudence that the machinery of a criminal Court can beset m motion by any person unless the! Law specifically bars the filing of the complaint or imposing a clog in such behalf. The mere fact that law also provides for a particular authority having the power to prosecute would operate as an exclusion in regard to the institution of criminal proceedings at the instance of another person. The learned Single Judge does not seem to have adverted to such a principle. The point arose in the case of Hoot Khan and others v. National Industrial Relations Commission (PLD 1977 Kar. 145). The Division Bench examined the provisions of section 13 of the Industrial Relations Ordinance and recorded their conclusion in the following words :- "It was contended by' Mr. Obaidur Rehman's that inasmuch as the above section empowers the Registrar to lodge, or to authorise any person to lodge, complaints with a Labour Court or the N. I. R.
C., a complaint to the N.
1. R. C. Or the Labour Court , by a person not authorised by the Registrar of Trade Unions is not maintainable. We find force in this contention. Merely because the Registrar is empowered to lodge complaints or authorise any person to lodge a complaint, does not mean that no other person can institute proceedings or file a complaint before the N. I. R. C."
14. Mr. Noor Muhammad, the learned Advocate for the respondents has contended before us that in cases where law makes express mention in regard to functionaries for fulfillment of an object or the statute exclusion of every one else is implied. This doctrine cannot be considered to be of universal application and in not destructive of the fundamental principle that at least an aggrieved person has a right to invoke the jurisdiction under statute if he is affected by it. Additionally, Mr. Noor Muhammad has invited our attention to the provisions of section 39 of the West Pakistan Industrial Disputes Ordinance of 1968 which may broadly be termed as the enactment which is relatable to the I. R. O., 1969, in at least the objects. Under subsection (l) of section 39 of the previous Ordinance it was provided that no Court shall take cognizance of an offence. Punishable under that Ordinance except on a complaint made by or under the authority of the Provincial Government. Mr. Noor Muhammad would wish us to import that provision even in 1. R. O. Of 1969. We see no justification for it and we go to the extent of stating that if the Legislature intended exclusion of persons other than the Registrar as competent complainants it would have been more convenient and less cumbersome to have a plain provision in the nature of section 39 of the earlier Ordinance.
The omission of a provision parallel to section 39 of the West Pakistan Industrial Disputes Ordinance, 1968, in the latter, I. R. O. 1969 would on the contrary manifest an intention on the part of the Legislature to remove such clogs on initiation as had existed in the earlier Ordinance.
15. For all the above reasons we are of the view that the complaint before the Labour Court at the instance of the complainant/appellant was also maintainable.
16. Mr. Noor Muhammad did not raise any other point before us as no other point had been raised before the learned Single Judge. He would in any case be free to urge any other point in the present case before the Labour Court
17. We set aside the judgment of the learned Single Judge and allow this appeal with no order as to costs. The constitutional petition No. 258 of 1975 is dismissed.