This appeal emanates from the decision dated 4-12-80 passed by the learned Presiding Officer, Labour Court No. 1, Lahore, whereby the grievance petition of the appellant for his re-instatement in service was dismissed.
2. The appellant was cashier in the respondent Bank. The allega--tions made against him were two fold. He made payment of Rs. 62,000 without being received a cheque for it. He made payment of Rs. 13,000 on 10-2-1973 and Rs. 21,000 on 27-2-1978 to Muhammad Tufail without getting any receipt from him. The entries of payment of the above--mentioned amounts were made in the relevant record. The plea of the appellant with regard to the payment of Rs. 62,000 was that the manager had given him direction in that respect.
8. The learned counsel for the appellant has argued that no suggestion was given to the appellant that the manager never directed him to pay the amount without a cheque. This is not the case of the bank that Muhammad Ali, Manager, did not ask the appellant to make the payment of Rs.
62,000. The Bank's case is that the appellant was not required by the bank to make payment of any amount without getting a cheque. He had to follow the rules and not verbal requests or orders of a manager. No body would commit a crime on the asking of a person and if he does so he is expected to know its consequences. So this is no defence that the appellant obeyed the orders of the manager. He was bound to obey legal and proper orders and not the orders which were manifestly illegal. Muhammad Ali Manager has not been spared and has been dismissed from employ--ment.
4. The other point argued by the learned counsel for the appellant is that the appellant was dismissed not on the allegation contained in the charge-sheet but on extraneous matter. In the dismissal order it is said that fraud and misappropriation had been proved but there is no such allegations in the charge-sheet. The dismissing authority has declared that the allegations entered in the charge-sheet amount to fraud and misappropriation and have been proved. Since the amount of Rs. 62,000 was paid without a valid cheque and amounts of Rs. 21,000 and Rs. 13,000 were paid without any valid receipt the employer presumed that the appellant had committed fraud and misappropriations. He did not say that there was a case of actual commission of fraud and misappropriation against him. Whatever has been said in the dismissal order did not in any manner prejudice the appellant. Obviously no one will take the responsibility of making payment of huge amounts without receiving cheques and receipts unless he has a share in the amount paid illegally. The acts done by the appellant actually create doubts that he had participated in the commission of actual fraud and misappropriation of money. The employer not being a legal- minded person, instead of using word doubt said that fraud and misappropriation had been proved. 1981 PLC 984 and PLD 1980 SC 310 are not germane to the facts of the present case.
5. The other point raised by the learned. Counsel for the appellant is that the Wage Commission award cannot be regarded as statutory rules and the requirements of section 1(4) (1) of the Standing Orders Ordinance, are not fulfilled with the result that Standing Orders Ordinance applies to nationalised banks. The line of argument of the learned counsel is that the were commission award has repeated the need of making service rules by the banks. This is true that it is so mentioned but this is with regard to the terms and conditions of service and not with regard to efficiency. And discipline rules. The efficiency and discipline rules are contained in paragraph 258 of the first Wage Commission Award which has neither been superseded nor repealed nor amended. If the intention had been that the banks should have their own efficiency and discipline rules paragraph 258 would not have been inserted in the first were commission award of 1975. Even if it be said that the intention is that the banks should have their own rules, since as yet no efficiency and disciplinary rules have been framed para, 258 applies and since by the inclusion of this para in the decisions which have been duly notified in the official Gazette it has got the character of statutory rules. The Standing Orders Ordinance, 1968.Is therefore not applicable.
Learned counsel has also argued that since Standing Orders Ordinance applies the charge-sheet having been served beyond the period of one month is time barred. The answer is plain that since Standing Orders Ordinance does not apply no question of charge-sheet being time barred arises.
6. The learned lower Court has wrongly held that the appellant is not workman under Standing Orders Ordinance. Since Standing Orders Ordinance does not apply it is not necessary that the appellant should be covered by the definition of workman given in section 2 (i) of the said Ordinance.
7. The learned counsel for the respondent has argued that since the appellant is not in service and no industrial dispute concerning .His dismissal ever arose he is not covered by the definition of workman give .In I. R. O., 1969. This argument is also without force. Dismissed on terminated person are covered by the definition of `workman' given in I.R.O., 1969. No doubt words `is employed are used in the definition but they do not necessarily mean that the person coming ]o the labour Court should be in service. Not only in section 2 (xxviii) of the I.R.Q. Present tense is used, but even in other enactments present tense is used such as section 2 (i) of Standing Orders Ordinance and section 2 of the Civil Servants Act of 1973. If the words "is employed" are interpreted to mean that only that person can seek remedy , from the Labour Courts who is in service the persons removed from service cannot have any remedy in any forum. But this is not the intention of Legislature that persons removed from service should not seek remedy of re-instatement from any forum. Very alarming consequences will follow if it be held that persons removed from service have no remedy.
The very purpose of the promulgation of Labour laws and constitution of Service Tribunals will be defeated. Since in ordinary Civil Courts there is no remedy and rule of master and servant applies therefore the necessity of the promul--gation of special laws and constitution of special tribunals was felt. If the intention had been that the rule of master and servant should apply in Labour cases also then there was no need of Labour Laws and the Labour Courts. I therefore overrule this objection.
As upshot of the discussion made above I do not find any force in the appeal and dismiss it.
Present appellant in person.