JUSTICE SHAH ABDUL RASHID (CHAIRMAN).-The appellant was served with a show-cause notice dated 8th April, 1979, and was removed from service on 11th August, 1979. His departmental appeal was rejected by the Deputy Inspector-General of Police on 24th February, 1980, whereafter he filed a revision petition before the Inspector-General of Police which too was rejected on 22nd July, 1980, and the rejection was communicated to the appellant by letter dated 24th August, 1980. The appellant's claim is that the order of rejection was received by him on 30th August, 1980, which version appears to be correct, as a period of six days, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, may be considered to be spent in transmission of the letter. In any case, the appellant filed the present appeal on 28th September, 1980, which on the facts just stated, is within time.
2. We have heard the learned counsel for Respondent No. 3, who alone contested the appeal. The learned counsel contended that the appellant should have come to the Tribunal direct after the dismissal of appeal, and should not have wasted his time in fruitless exercise of filing a revision petition before the Inspector-General of Police. Though apparently, the argument appears to be cogent, nevertheless when examined in the light of the proviso (a) to subsection (1) of section 4 of the Service Tribunals Act, 1973, read with rule 16.32 of the Police Rules, 1934, it would become clear that the appellant could not come to the Tribunal without making the revision petition, as provided for in the aforesaid rules. No doubt, section 4 of the Service Tribunals Act, 1973 does not specifically refer to "revision", nevertheless, in our opinion, the word "representation" is were enough to encompass every approach to an authority by whatever name it may be mentioned. Since there is a specific provision for filing a revision petition against the order of Deputy Inspector-General of Police to the Inspector-General of Police, there were grounds to raise objection against appellant's direct approach to the Tribunal if remedy provided for under rule 16.32 of the aforesaid Rules had not been exhausted. Since the appeal is within time from the date of reply to the revision petition, we are of the view that it is not hit by limitation. In any case, the appellant's bona fide delay resulting from filing the revision petition cannot be denied, and consequently even if there was any delay on account of filing the revision petition, that deserves to be condoned under section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1908 though we are of the opinion that the question of condoning the delay does not arise.
3. On facts, it appears that the appellant while employed as Head Constable deserted from duty on 22nd December, 1977, and remained absent, when a show-cause notice dated 8th April, 1979 was served on him. He furnished the explanation but the same having not been found satisfactory, he was removed from service on 11th August, 1979. The show-cause notice reveals that the proceedings against the appellant had been taken under rule 5(3) of the Sind Civil Servants (Efficiency and' Discipline) Rules, 1973, which provided a summary procedure for punishing, without going through the formality of inquiry into the charges. The appellant's case is that since he was an employee of the Pakistan Railways Police, the Sind Civil Servants (Efficiency and Discipline) Rules, 1973, did not apply to him, and that by omitting the procedure of inquiry laid down in the Police Rules, 1934, which are applicable in his case, he has been prejudiced in his defence.
4. We have already held in Appeal No. 48(x)/1979 (Muhammad Alam v. Inspector-General of Police, Pakistan Railways) that employees of Pakistan Railways Police not above the rank and past of Superintendent were then governed by the Punjab Police Rules, 1934, in view of section 19 of the Pakistan Railways Police Act, 1973, and that if the summary proceedings are taken against a Police officer under the Sind Civil Servants (Efficiency and Discipline) Rules, such proceedings are irregular and cannot be condoned, since the procedures provided for in the two sets of rules are quite different and the case of a person who is proceeded against under any rule providing for summary action is prejudiced by such procedure, para. 5 of the order in the aforesaid appeal explains the position, and we hereunder reproduce the same to elaborate the arguments :- "Pakistan Railways Police Act, 1973, which is identical in all terms with the Pakistan Railways Police Ordinance, 1976, in section 19 provides that the persons not above the rank or post of Superin-- tendent shall be governed by the Punjab Police Rules, 1934, with necessary modifications, which means adaptation necessitated by federalisation of the Railway Police. The appellant falls under that category and the proceedings against him could, in view of section 19 ibid, be taken only under the Punjab Police Rules, 1934. The Pakistan Railways Police Rules, 1980 have now repeated the same provision in rule 18. Had the Sind Civil Servants (Efficiency and Discipline) Rules been identical with the Punjab Police Rules, 1934, then perhaps we could condone the irregularity but since the procedure provided for in the two sets of rules is quite different, the cane of the appellant has been seriously prejudiced as summary procedure not contemplated by Punjab Police Rules, 1934, has been adopted against him. Since the proceedings from their very in--ception, were illegal the order of penalty imposed on the appellant cannot be upheld and is set aside. The appellant is re- instated into service. However, it is still open to the competent authority to decide itself whether fresh proceedings under the Punjab Rules, 1934, should or should not be initiated against the appellant."
5. In view of the above facts, we accept this appeal, set aside the order of removal of the appellant from service, and direct his reinstate--ment into service. However, it is still open to the competent authority to decide itself whether fresh proceedings under the Rules applicable in the case of the appellant should or should not be initiated against him. The question of consequential benefits, if any, should be considered by the competent authority when a decision is taken with regard to dropping the proceedings or taking the action afresh.
6. The appeal is accepted as above. However, there shall be no order as to costs.