MUHAMMAD AFZAL ZULLAH, J.-Leave to appeal has been sought from judgment of the Lahore High Court dated 7-7-1980 : whereby a constitutional petition arising out of the disposal of an urban property under the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1958, was dismissed.
2. A residential house was in occupation/possession of Khuda Bakbsh petitioner and Muhammad Yaqoob respondent. Each filed N. C. H. Form in connection with its transfer. The petitioner, through, an association, made arrangement with one Abdul Jabbar permitting him to seek its transfer in the latter's name. A P. T. O. Was issued of the entire house firstly to Muhammad Yaqoob respondent on 8-7-1960 but later on, on 23-7-1960 another P. T. O. Was issued (for the transfer of the same house) to the said Abdul Jabbar. The Deputy Settlement Commissioner on realization of the aforementioned mistake after obtaining permission to review maintained the P. T. O. Issued to Muhammad Yaqoob as "genuine" so has it been put by the learned counsel for the petitioner. An Additional Settlement Com--missioner on appeal found Muhammad Yaqub to be a local and by his order dated 11-10-1962, transferred the whole house to the petitioner. Yaqub's revision was dismissed on 20-10-1962 but his Writ Petition (No. 355/R of 1963) was allowed by the High Court on 11-11-1962 with an order of remand to the Settlement Commissioner for consideration of the question; whether the petitioner in view of his having earlier surrendered his rights to seek transfer in favour of Abdul Jabbar, had any locus standi to file an appeal against the order of transfer in favour of Yaqub ; whether the latter was not a displaced person. The Settlement Commissioner by his order dated 25-5-1972 instead of deciding the case himself remanded the matter to the Deputy Settlement Commissioner for examination of all the questions relatable to the locus standi of the parties as also the other questions regarding disposal of the house under the relevant law. Both the parties accepted this remand order and appeared before the Deputy Settlement Commissioner; who vide his order dated 4-8-1975 divided the house and transferred one so divided unit to the petitioner and the other to Yaqub respondent on their respective N. C. H. Forms. The petitioner then filed Writ Petition No. 919-R of 1975 which was admitted on 3-9-1975 for consideration of the question whether the Deputy Settlement Commissioner had not travelled beyond the scope of the order of remand passed by the High Court on 11-11-1965. At the time of bearing of the writ petition, this point was not urged. Four other contentions having been raised they did not find favour with the learned Judge hearing the petition, who dismissed it on 7-7-1980. The petitioner thus feeling aggrieve--ed, has sought leave to appeal.
3. He has reiterated the point on which the writ petition was admitted in the High Court, namely, that the Deputy Settlement Commissioner had no jurisdiction to divide the property because this was beyond the scope of the remand order passed by the High Court.
4. After hearing the learned counsel at some length, we have not been' able to find any substance in this petition. The petitioner in reality had lost his locus standi when even before the transfer of the property he had surren--dered, in favour of Abdul Jabbar, his right to seek the transfer of the property. The High Court could have dismissed the writ petition on this ground alone, Even if this aspect is ignored, the petitioner accepted the remand order passed by the Settlement Commissioner on 25-5-1972 wherein all the question relatable to the transfer of the house which would obviously include the, question of its divisibility, were opened for consideration by the Deputy Settlement Commissioner. Thus, it would not be correct to say that the Deputy Settlement Commissioner had no jurisdiction to decide the matter on the basis of divisibility of the house into two units. The property was in possession of more than one person the Deputy Settlement Commissioner was competent to divide it. The order besides being lawful is also well reasoned. In our view, there is no infirmity legal or otherwise which could be a ground for interference by this Court. This petition accordingly is dismissed.