' Khan Zaman Khan, the appellant had filed a suit for pre-emption of land purchased by Muhammad Nawaz. There was an objection by the vendee that he was an affected person of the Chashma Barrage, therefore, the land purchased by nim was not pre-emptible. This contention was brought to a preliminary issue to the effect whether the defendant is an affected person of Chashma Barrage and with what effect ? Under this issue the parties were allowed to lead evidence. The respondent produced a certificate issued by the Commissioner whereby he was declared an affected person and the suit was ultimately dismissed on this point that the land purchased by an affected person was not pre-emptible. An appeal was made which also failed.
Therefore, this second appeal.
2. The learned counsel for the appellant has contended that the jamabandi which he has produced in this appeal shows that the land was banjar jadid and as such it cannot be termed as an agricultural land as defined in the Punjab Alienation of Land Act. I have perused the copy of the jamabandi attached and find that the land is shown as banjar jadeed but there is a note in Column No, 4 that it is under self-cultivation and possession of the owners, whereas a part of it is in possession of Muhammad Azam, a tenant who is liable to share the batai as given in Khatauni No, 6 which shows that the land is not meant for any other purpose than for agricultural purposes.
Whether or not the land is agricultural in nature, is a question which has not been specifically alleged in the plaint or the replication to show that the pre-emptor had a right to file a suit.
3. The second submission made by the learned counsel is that the vendee did not lead evidence to show that the land was brought by him under cultivation because in this way he could rebut the strong presumption attached to the jamabandis. As already observed jamabandi does not show per se that the land is not susceptible to agriculture or it had never been brought under cultivation.
The entries, as they are, show than it was banjar jadeed meaning thereby that it is not cultivated for some time but there is no evidence that the land was put to use other than the agricultural purpose. The jamabandi which is placed on record relates to the year 1970-71. It is not shown as to what was position A of the land at the time when the sale took place and when the suit was instituted. It is shown by the appellant himself in para. 'C' of his grounds of appeal that the respondent had mentioned in his written statement that he has made the land fit for agriculture.
That means that the nature of the property is not such which would raise a presumption that it was not cultivable at all. Anyhow the best evidence for the purpose of the present position of the land was the khasra girdawari which could show whether this land was brought to agriculture and since when. As it has not been done, it cannot be said that the land was not fit for agriculture or it did not have the character of an agricultural land.
4. It is next contended that the learned trial Court framed six issues. Out of them it decided one issue about the status of the respondent that he was an affected person of the Chashma Barrage.
He said that out of the issues one issue could not be set apart and decided. This action taken by the learned trial Court did not make the B trial illegal in any manner. If the Court considers that a suit can be disposed of on one issue, it is within its jurisdiction to invite evidence on that issue alone and leave the others. Therefore, this is not a ground which would make the judgment of learned trial Court a nullity in law.
5. It is also contended that onus of the issue decided by the learned WO court was on the respondent but he failed to discharge it. I fail to agree with the learned counsel on this objection. In the first instance there is no question of onus in appeals, secondly, simply by proving the certificate Exh. D 1 he has discharged his part of the onus and then it was for the appellant to prove that the certificate was either false or that the character of the land was other than the agricultural one. In second appeals such objections do not find favour because they relate to procedure which do not affect the parties in any way especially in relation to their rights.
6. No other point has been raised. There is no merit in the appeal which is dismissed in limine.