1. K. HUSSAIN, J.--Both the above-numbered petitions have been heard together as the common question of law is involved in them and this Judgment will dispose of both the cases.
2. The petitioner in both the petitions is Messrs Gammon (East Pakistan) Limited. The facts in Petition No. 367 of 19.69 are that two complaint cases were filed before the Second Labour Court, East Pakistan one by Ahmed Ali, Supervisor as the other by Abdul Mannan, a Labour Sareng of the Company: The services of both the workers were terminated and against that termination they went to the Labour Court claiming tote benefit under section 19 of the East Pakistan Employment of Labour (Standing Orders) Act, 1965 (hereinafter referred to as the Act. One of the respondents in Petition No. 368 of 1969 is one Mohd. Raja. Mean Choudhury who is a Site Supervisor and whose services were also terminated. He also went to the Labour Court claiming the termination benefit under section 19 of the Act. All the three employees of the petitioner-Company were granted the benefit under section 19 of the Act. The petitioner-- Company has moved these petitions against the two decisions of the Second Labour Court, East Pakistan, Chittagong.
3. Mr. Mustafa Kamal, the learned Advocate, appearing on behalf of the petitioner-Company has raised one question of law before us in this Court. His contention is that by notifica--tion published in the Dacca Gazette on the 20th of March 1969, the Government of East Pakistan has reconstituted the Labour Courts and according to the learned Advocate for the petitioner, it is the 3rd Labour Court which has the jurisdiction to hear a dispute of this nature. His further contention is that since by the said notification the previous notification dated the 7th of July 1964 had been superseded on and from the 20th March 1969, the 2nd Labour Court has ceased to have its jurisdiction over the matter and, as such the awards given by the Labour Court on 25-7-69 in one case and on 21-7-69 in another case were made at a time when it had no jurisdiction to hear these cases. The contention of the learned Advocate cannot be upheld in view of the fact that by section 9 of the East Pakistan Labour Disputes Act, 1965, the Provincial Government had been given power to constitute and to determine the area of the Labour Courts. So far as the jurisdiction of the Labour Court is concerned, it is given under section 6 of the Act. Therefore, the constitution or the reconstitution of the territorial area will not affect:- pending proceeding. In both these petitions the casks befog, the learned Labour Court were initiated at a time when it had jurisdiction to hear these matters; by a subsequent notification the adjustment of the territorial jurisdiction of the Labour Court will not affect the pending proceeding as the Provincial Government can neither confer nor take away the jurisdiction given to a Labour Court, by the Act itself nor by such notification the Government has purported to act as such. Therefore, this contention of the learned Advocate cannot be entertained and hence it is rejected.
4. The, next contention of the learned Advocate for the peti--tioner is that since by notification published in the Gazette of 20th March 1969, the previous notification of 7th July 1964 was being superseded without any saving clause, all pending procee--dings on and from that date become non est or in other words cease to have any legal effect. In support of his contention he wants to draw an analogy of a repeal of an Act without providing for a saving clause. The analogy cannot be applied in a case of notification in view of the fact that one is a legislative function of the legislative and the other is a delegated function exercised by the Provincial Government under the delegated authority of the Act itself. In this view of the fact, the analogy sought to be drawn by the learned Advocate cannot be entertained. Further, there is nothing in the notification which takes away the jurisdiction of an existing proceeding. In any view of the matter, this contention of the learned Advocate also fails.
5. The result, therefore, is that these two Rules are discharged but without any order as to costs.
6. The orders of stay are vacated.
7. SIDDIKY, C. J.-I agree.