Ch. Abdul Aziz, J. Through this single judgment, I intend to decide titled Election Appeals since all are tied with the common knot of similar facts and background in which the Returning Officers rejected the nomination papers of Hafiz Ammar Yasir (appellant) from three different constituencies of Talagang-cum-Chakwal through separate orders dated 30.12.2023.
2. The brief facts which formed basis of these appeals can be summarized to the effect that Hafiz Ammar Yasir (appellant) filed his nomination papers from NA-59, PP-22 and PP-23 of Talagang- cum-Chakwal before the respective Returning Officers; that during scrutiny process carried out under section 62 of the Elections Act-2017, the nomination papers of the appellant were rejected from all the three constituencies by the concerned Returning Officers through their separate orders dated 30.12.2023 which are impugned before this Tribunal.
3. It is contended on behalf of the appellant that the impugned orders are contrary to the law on the subject and facts of the case; that mere abscondence of a candidate cannot be made basis for the rejection of his nomination papers; that admittedly the appellant is in Saudi Arabia but he personally signed the nomination papers and their genuineness cannot be questioned; that the documents were taken to Saudi Arabia by one Wajid through Aeroplan who returned on the following day and deposited them with the Returning Officers; that the discrepancies, if any, in the nomination papers are of trivial nature thus ought to be ignored and that since the impugned orders suffer from perversity thus are to be set-aside.
4. On the other hand, the rejection of these appeals was strongly pressed on the grounds that the appellant is a fugitive from the process of law; that the nomination papers are not signed by him and even otherwise their attestation is improper and that since the orders of the Returning Officers are in accordance with the law on the subject thus are to be maintained.
5. Arguments heard and record perused.
6. The appellant Hafiz Ammar Yasir is aggrieved from the separate orders dated 30.12.2023 passed by the Returning Officers of NA-59, PP-22 and PP-23 Talagang-Chakwal. The circumspective perusal of the record reveals that the nomination papers of Hafiz Ammar Yasir (appellant) were mainly rejected on the following grounds:- i. Status of appellant as absconder in FIR No.157/23 of P.S Saddar Talagang. ii. Failure of appellant to mention exclusive account for each constituency. iii. Fictitious signatures of appellant on the nomination papers and their improper attestation. iv. Concealment of assets in the nomination papers.
7. In reference to the aforementioned objections, I have scanned the record with due diligence. In reference to the first objection, it is noticed that admittedly appellant is implicated as accused in a criminal case registered vide FIR No.157/23 of Police Station Saddar Talagang. In the aforementioned case the warrants of the appellant were issued on 27.6.2023 whereas the police obtained proclamation from the court on 31.07.2023 and the report under section 512 Cr.P.C was forwarded to court on 10.12.2023. During scrutiny process, though the Returning Officer provided an opportunity for the appearance of appellant in reference to objection raised upon the genuineness of his signatures on the nomination papers but he opted not to appear. Even during proceedings before this Tribunal, an opportunity was provided for the appearance of appellant though for the verification of his signatures on his nomination papers but he did not appear. The learned counsel candidly conceded that appellant has knowledge about the registration of FIR against him and about the proceedings carried out under section 87 Cr.P.C. The question of foremost importance arises that whether in the given circumstances the nomination papers of the appellant warrant acceptance so as to permit him for contesting elections. In my considered view it will be a mockery of the election process to let the appellant enter the parliament though he has demonstrated least respect towards the law and courts. No acceptable explanation is furnished by the learned counsel regarding non-surrendering of appellant before the process of law, even after gaining knowledge about his status as proclaimed offender. The case of appellant, in the given circumstances comes within the purview of Article 62 (1)(f) of the Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973 as not being sagacious and righteous. These two expressions were defined by the Supreme Court of Pakistan in the case reported as "Syed Mehmood Akhtar Naqvi v. Federation of Pakistan" (PLD 2012 Supreme Court 1089) in the following manner:- "Sagacious
(i) Skillful in statecraft or management.
(ii) Market by artful prudence expedience and shrewdness.
(iii) Having prompt wisdom.
(iv) A wise leader.
(v) Insightful; foresighted.
Righteous
(i) Morally upright, without guilt or sin.
(ii) Characterized by accepted standard of morality or justice.
(iii) Good: morally admirable.
(iv) Clean handed; guiltless.
(v) Just: Use, especially of what is legally or ethically right of proper or befitting.
(vi) Moral: concerned with right and wrong or conforming to standards of behavior: morally excellent worthy.
(vii) Virtuous; morally excellent worthy.
(viii) Worthy; having worth or merit or value; being Hon'ble or admirable.
(ix) Honest; blameless."
A person who is a proclaimed offender in a criminal case can by no stretch be termed as wise as well as morally admirable, upright, characterized by accepted standard of morality or justice and clean handed. For this reason, a candidate was held disqualified to be a member of Parliament by the Division Bench of this Court in case reported as Muzaffar Abbas v. Maulana Muhammad Ahmad Ludhianvi and 31 others (PLD 2017 Lahore 394) with following observation:- "Furthermore, during the said election, objections were also filed by another proposed candidate namely Sheikh Waqas Akram against the respondent and along with those objections a list of eleven criminal cases was given with details of the FIRs. The detail also include FIR No.409/2012 in which the respondent has been declared as proclaimed offender by adopting proper procedure of law. Hence, it could not be said that respondent was not aware about these cases pending against him because from the available record it is established that most of the cases were mentioned in the objection petition filed by the objectors in general election-2013 for the constituency of NA-89 Jhang. Hence, when he was aware about criminal cases against him, non-mentioning of details thereof and mentioning "Nil" in the relevant column clearly amounts to concealment of facts."
Further reliance is placed upon the cases reported as Mian Shafique Ahmed and another v.
Federation of Pakistan through Secretary Election Commission of Pakistan Islamabad and 5 others (2017 MLD 1975) and Ghulam Mustafa Wassan v. Abdul Salam Taheen and 13 others (PLD 2008 Karachi 60).
8. In reference to the second objection of failure to open exclusive account or to dedicate already existing account for each constituency, it is noted to have some substance. Admittedly, for all the three constituencies, the appellant dedicated his account No.01680981001774018 maintained in Bank Al-Habib Talagang branch. It appears to be in fitness of things to mention here that the requirement of specifying of an exclusive account in the Elections Act-2017 primarily is aimed at creating an impediment in extravagant spending in election campaigns. Section 132(2) provides the limit of election expenditure whereas section 133 lays emphasis to open an exclusive account or to dedicate an existing account for the election expenses. The election expenditure, if exceeds the prescribed limits, such delinquency can culminate in proceedings under section 167(d) of the Elections Act-2017 which can result in conviction under the charge of Corrupt Practices. The legislative intent of opening an exclusive account or dedicating an existing account in terms of section 133 manifests that the same is aimed at keeping an eye over the election expenditures of a candidate and to keep it within the limits provided in section 132(2). A statutory provision, for adjudging the legislative intent can be extracted through four rules of interpretation which are classified as literal rule, golden rule, mischief rule and purposive rule. If the literal interpretation of a provision gives rise to an irrationality and is contrary to the legislative intent then it can be examined through the rule of golden interpretation for giving effect to the intention behind the enactment of the legal provision. This question cropped up before the Supreme Court of Pakistan in an election matter through case reported as "Syed Mahmood Akhtar Naqvi v. Federation of Pakistan through Secretary Law and others" (PLD-2012 Supreme Court 1089) and was addressed in following manners:- "It is a cardinal principle of construction that the words of a statute are first understood in their natural, ordinary or popular sense and phrases and sentences or construed according to their grammatical meaning unless that leads to some absurdity or unless there is something in the context or in the object of the statute to suggest the contrary by necessary implication. The intention of the legislator is primarily to be gathered from the language used, which means that attention should be paid to what has been said and also to what has not been said."
The aforementioned rules of interpretation were discussed in the case reported as Nadeem Sultan and another v. Hamza Shamim and 2 others (PLD 2023 Lahore 334) from which an extract is given hereunder:- "There are four rules of statutory interpretation and first out of them is literal rule, the second golden rule, the third mischief rule and fourth purposive approach. The literal rule enables the Court to interpret the legal provision in its literal and ordinary sense and cannot examine the intent of the Legislature. The golden rule can only be given effect if the literal interpretation gives rise to some irrationality. Under such rule, the Court can look into the legislative intent of a provision or a statute. The third rule of mischief can be used to see the unconstitutionality of the legislation. The purposive rule can be set in motion for ensuring the effectiveness of the law in accordance with the will of Parliament."
Without a scintilla of doubt, it can be held that if a candidate is contesting elections from three constituencies without opening of an exclusive account for each of them, he will get leverage of incurring expenditure more than the prescribed limit which for all practical purposes will frustrate the mandate of section 132 and 133 of the Elections Act-2017. Even otherwise, the word "exclusive" used in section 132 and 133 is self-explanatory in nature keeping in view its meaning given in the Black's Law Dictionary tenth Edition as:- "Limited to a particular person, group, entity or thing. Unable to be true if something else is true.
Whole; undivided."
9. In reference to the deficiencies in nomination papers pointed out by the Returning Officers, it is noticed that while doing the needful the provisions of section 60 of the Elections Act-2017 were not complied with. According to section 60(2) every candidate is required to sign the nomination papers and to annex therewith declarations on solemn affirmation, the detail of which is mentioned in the clause (a) and (d) of the foregoing provision. During arguments, learned counsel for the appellant came forward with the stance that after obtaining nomination papers these were taken to Saudi Arabia by Wajid Saeed while boarding a Riyadh bound flight who got it signed from the appellant and returned to Pakistan on the following day. It is intriguing to mention here that the Riyadh bound flight departed from Pakistan on 20.12.2023 at about 5:00 a.m. whereas according to the register of Returning Officers of NA-59 and PP-23, the nomination papers were issued on 20.12.2023 after 2:00 p.m. The question arises that if the nomination papers were issued at 2:00 p.m. then how these were dispatched to Saudi Arabia nine hours prior to that at 5:00 a.m. The learned counsel was confronted with this anomaly but he failed to put forth any explanation in this regard.
In order to address this shortcoming, the Returning Officers as well as this Tribunal directed the appellant to appear in person but he opted not to avail this opportunity.
10. There is yet another aspect which has its own importance upon the fate of nomination papers submitted by the appellant. In accordance with the mandate of section 60(2) of the Elections Act- 2017 and in consonance with the direction given by the Supreme Court of Pakistan in the case titled as "Speaker, National Assembly of Pakistan, Islamabad and others. Vs. Habib Akram and others" (PLD 2018 SC 678), along with nomination papers the appellant had to submit affidavit of his assets and liabilities on solemn affirmation attested by Oath Commissioner. In the instant case, it is noticed that though the declaration of appellant was attested by the Oath Commissioner but on 20.12.2023 at some unknown time and place. Strangely, the oath commissioner attested the document in Pakistan whereas the appellant was in Saudi Arabia on the given date. Such attestation when seen in the context of Chapter 12 of Volume-IV of Rules and Orders of the Lahore High Court, Lahore, has no legal worth. According to Rule 11 if the executant of an affidavit is not known to the officer appointed to administer the oath then he has to be identified by some person known to him and this fact is essentially required to be mentioned at the foot of the affidavit.
Likewise, according to Rule 14 and 15, the executant is personally required to appear before the court, magistrate or officer for an oath or affirmation. In this case, it is already mentioned above that as per admitted facts, the appellant never appeared before the Oath Commissioner due to his presence in Saudi Arabia. It will be advantageous to reproduce an observation of the Division Bench of this Court mentioned in the case reported as "Mian Muhammad Shahbaz Sharif through Attorney vs. Election Commission of Pakistan, Islamabad and 15 others" (PLD 2003 Lahore 646) given in similar background which is as under:- "The Election Tribunal, after having checked the record, has given cogent reasons, noted by us also, in para 4 ibid, for coming to the conclusion that the signatures of the petitioners on their nomination papers were not genuine. The petitioners have throughout the relevant period been in Saudi Arabia, they have failed to establish the sending of the nomination papers to Saudi Arabia, there is nothing on the record to show that the nomination papers duly signed by them came back to Pakistan and the same were presented before the Returning Officer. It was not established that how the affidavits of the petitioners statedly signed by them at Jeddah, filed before the Election Tribunal, were received at Lahore, petitioners" affidavits on Form XIX accompanying their nomination papers show that the same were sworn by the petitioners at Lahore before one Mr.Mushtaq Ahmad Butt, Oath Commissioner, on 24.08.2022, whereas, on the said date, the petitioners were admitted in Jeddah and this fact also establishes that the signatures of the petitioners on their nomination papers are not genuine and that the petitioners never appeared before the Oath Commissioner."
In the given circumstances, it can irresistibly be held that since the nomination papers of the appellant were not filed while adhering to the provisions of section 60 of the Elections Act-2017 and in accordance with the directions of the Supreme Court of Pakistan given in the case of Speaker National Assembly (supra) thus were rightly rejected under section 62(9).
11. So far as the concealment of assets in the Form-B attributed to the appellant is concerned, without dilating in-depth upon the point, it is noticed to be contrary to record.
12. In view of what has been discussed above, the instant appeals are dismissed having no force.