S. M. ATTIQUE SHAH, J.- Appellants have filed the instant appeal under section 39 of the Arbitration Act, 1940 read with section 96 of CPC through the Advocate General, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, Peshawar against the judgments and decrees of learned Civil Judge-XI, Peshawar dated 09.02.2022 and 07.03.2022 respectively, whereby, their objection petition has been dismissed while the respondent's Arbitration Petition u/s 14 of the Arbitration Act, 1940, declaring the Arbitrators'
Award dated 31.12.2020 as a Rule of Court has been accepted.
2. Brief facts of the case are that the respondent entered into an agreement with the appellants for the rehabilitation and improvement work of road leading from Pir Bala to Pir Kala District Peshawar on the strength of acceptance letter dated 10.04.2013 together with a time limit of 18 months for its completion for an amount of rupees 130.74 million, however, respondent could not do so within the prescribed time frame and requested for extension of time through application dated 31.08.2016, which was accepted and accordingly, time period for completion subject work was extended for 680 days through letter dated 19.09.2016, however, the respondent was only allowed the payment upto 19th bill for the work done to the tune of Rs.1,15,19,31,110/- while the balance amount of Rs.66,13,929/- under the 20th Final Bill coupled with security / retention money Rs.68,53,684/- as well as his other claim amounting to Rs.3,35,14,608/- per terms and conditions of the agreement and after completion of proceedings, the Arbitrators passed their Award dated 31.12.2020.
Subsequently, respondent filed a petition u/s 14 of the Arbitration Act, 1940 for declaring the award of Arbitrators as a Rule of Court before the learned Civil Judge-XI, Peshawar which was contested by appellants by filing their objections u/s 30/33 read with section 17 of Arbitration Act 1940 for setting aside the Award. Learned court below, after hearing learned counsel for the parties, dismissed the objections of the appellants vide judgment and order dated 09.02.2022 and consequently, accepted the petition of respondent for making the Award of Arbitrators as Rule of the Court vide judgment and order dated 07.03.2022. Feeling aggrieved, the appellants have preferred the instant appeal before this court.
3. Heard. Record perused.
4. Admittedly, the respondent is a registered government contractor who entered into an agreement with the appellants for the rehabilitation and improvement work of road leading from Pir Bala to Pir Kala, Section-5, District Peshawar through acceptance letter dated 10.04.2013. After completion of work, the respondent requested to the appellants for the payment of outstanding amount for the work done but they failed to pay the same within the stipulated period per terms and conditions of the ibid agreement arrived at between the parties and after extensive correspondence, the matter was entrusted to arbitrators with mutual consent of the parties. It is manifest from the record that the appellants had not raised any objection over the Arbitration proceedings rather fully participated therein by filing their reply to the contractor's claim followed by their request for calling a meeting for clarification of figures pertaining to different payments claimed by the respondent in his claim. Record further shows that the Arbitrators decided the matter between the parties in accordance with law through Award dated 31.12.2020 keeping in view the respective contentions of the parties and the material produced by them during the arbitration proceedings. The respondent filed application before the learned court below for making the Award as a Rule of Court on 03.02.2021. Learned court below issued notice to the appellants on 03.02.2021, which was received by appellant No.1 for 09.03.2021, however, he could not file any objection to the said Award while appellant No.2 was served on 13.04.2021 and filed objections to the Award on 14.06.2021.
5. Article 158 of the First Schedule to the Limitation Act, 1908, provides 30 days for filing objections to the Award from the date of service of notice of filing of the Award. In present case, appellant No.1, despite service, did not turn up before the learned court below and resultantly, placed ex parte while appellant No.2 was served through notice on 13.04.2021 and was required to file objections to the Award within 30 days under the law, however, he failed to perform his legal obligation and filed the objections to the award on 14.06.2021 with a considerable delay of 32 days. Therefore, the learned court below has rightly held that the appellant No.2 has not filed the objections within the prescribed period of limitation.
6. It is settled principle of law that the matters arising out of the Award passed by the Arbitrators are judicial in nature and not ministerial and mere absence of objections to the Award by appellant No.1 does not absolve the court under any circumstances from its responsibility to scrutinize it. 1992 SCMR 65 Messrs Awan Industries Vs. Executive Engineer Lined Channel Division.
1995 SCMR 73 Muhammad Tayab Vs. Akhtar Hussain. 2014 SCMR 1268 Qutabuddin Khan Vs. Chief Mill Wala Dredging Co.
7. The contention of worthy AAG that the learned trial court has been influenced by the belated filing of the objections by appellant No 2 is misplaced in the attending circumstances of the case because though it was held that the objections of appellant No 2 are barred by time, however, while deciding the matter, the learned trial court has fully discussed the material available on record and decided the case on merits, therefore, such argument holds no water.
8. Be that as it may, the grounds for setting aside an Award are provided in section 30 of the Arbitration Act, 1940, which is reproduced below for ready reference: Section 30.--Grounds for setting aside award.- An award shall not be set aside except on one or more of the following grounds, namely.
(a) that an arbitrator or umpire has misconducted himself or the proceedings;
(b) that an award has been made after the issue of an order by the Court superseding the arbitration or after arbitration proceedings have become invalid under section 35;
(c) that an award has been improperly procured or is otherwise invalid.
9. The ibid provision of law viz-a-viz with the scope of the judicial review of superior courts qua an award passed by the arbitrators has been comprehensively dealt with by the august Apex Court in National Highway Authority's case reported as 2023 SCMR 1103 in the following manner:- "The arbitrator alone is the judge of the quality as well as the quantity of the evidence. He is the final arbiter of dispute between the parties. He acts in a quasi-judicial manner and his decision is entitled to utmost respect and weight. Court is not supposed to sit as a court of appeal and make a roving inquiry and look for latent errors of law and facts in the Award. The arbitration is a forum of the parties own choice its decision should not be lightly interfered by the court, until a clear and definite case within the purview of the section 30 of the Arbitration Act, 1940 is made out."
"We are also mindful of the fact that there is a limited scope of judicial review of the 'Award' announced by an Arbitrator. An arbitration Award is a final determination of the dispute between the parties. The grounds for challenging an Award are very limited. There are three broad areas on which an arbitration Award is likely to be challenged i.e. firstly, jurisdictional grounds (non- existence of a valid and binding arbitration agreement); secondly, procedural grounds (failure to observe principles of natural justice) and thirdly, substantive grounds (arbitrator made a mistake of law).' The review of an arbitration Award cannot constitute a re-assessment or reappraisal of the evidence by the court. An over-intrusive approach by courts in examination of the arbitral Awards must be avoided.2 The court is not supposed to sit as a court of appeal and must confine itself to the patent illegalities in the Award, if any.3 The jurisdiction of the Court under the Act is supervisory in nature. Where two findings are possible the Court cannot interfere with the Award by adopting its own interpretation. Interference is only possible if there exists any breach of duty or any irregularity of action which is not consistent with general principles of equity and good conscience.4 The arbitrator alone is the judge of the quality as well as the quantity of the evidence. He is the final arbiter of dispute between the parties. He acts in a quasi-judicial manner and his decision is entitled to utmost respect and weight.5 By applying the afore-noted principles of law on the subject and considering the petitioner's objections within the limited scope of court's jurisdiction in testing the validity of Award this court is not supposed to sit as a court of appeal and make a roving inquiry and look for latent errors of law and facts in the Award. The arbitration is a forum of the parties' own choice its decision should not be lightly interfered by the court, until a clear and definite case within the purview of the section 30 of the Act is made out. We do not find any jurisdictional, procedural or substantive error patently floating on the record that could justify interference by this Court."
10. When the case in hand is examined in light of the above provision of law and dicta of the august Apex court, this court has no hesitation in holding that the impugned findings of the learned trial court are based upon proper appreciation of the material available before it, which do not require any interference by this court through instant appeal.
11. So far as the appeal jurisdiction of this court is concerned, certainly this court has a very limited jurisdiction while adjudicating an appeal arising out of the Arbitration Act, 1940 as neither it can reappraise the evidence nor can set aside an award mere on the basis of alleged irregularity committed by the learned trial court, rather for interference with an Award and findings of the lower court there must be a patent illegality which is apparent on the face of award or the arbitrators have misconducted themselves while passing the award which is indeed not the case here.
12. During the course of arguments, when the learned AAG was asked to show any patent illegality or misconduct committed by the worthy Arbitrators while conducting the proceedings or in the award, so passed by them, he could not refer to any such illegality or misconduct, which could form basis for setting aside the Award in question.
13. In view of above legal and factual position of the case, it is concluded that impugned findings of learned court below are the result of proper appreciation of material available on record of the case warranting no interference of this court through the present appeal.
14. Accordingly, this appeal being meritless stands dismissed.