DR. KHURSHID IQBAL, J. The petitioner (Fida Muhammad) sued respondents (Shah Jehan Badshah, Director/ Principal of Swat College of Science and Technology/SECOMS and Principal Swat College Science and Technology, Saidu Sharif) for recovery Rs. 2.0 million, as damages for mental torture; Rs. 80,000/- from respondents No.1, what he alleged as illegally received admission, tuition and examination fee; Rs. 7.0 million, as fee of lawyer and Rs. 20,000/-, as miscellaneous expenses (total Rs. 2.170 million). He instituted his suit before the Court of learned Senior Civil Judge/A'ala Illaqa Qazi, Swat. Respondent No.2 submitted his written statement, followed by an application for rejection of the plaint. The petitioner responded to that application. The learned trial Judge heard both the parties and allowed the application by her Order passed on 30.03.2018. The petitioner appealed from that Order. The learned Additional District Judge/Izafi Zilla Qazi-II, Swat, dismissed the appeal by his Judgment dated 20.07.2019.
2. The petitioner has called into question the orders of both the learned Courts below by this Revision Petition. Key grounds put up in the petition are that both the impugned judgments and orders are illegal and unlawful, the contents of the plaint to be considered true; there are rulings of the higher Courts that suits are to be decided on merits after recording for against evidence of the parties; and that at the time of granting of admission into PhD program, there was no condition of obtaining 50 marks in GET.
3. Respondent were served with a notice. By an application, they filed certain documents. I have heard arguments of Mr. Murad Akmal Mirkhail Advocate, learned counsel for the petitioner and Mr. Fazal Karim Advocate, learned counsel for the respondents, and perused the record.
4. Facts as recited in the plaint concisely are that petitioner got admission into PhD program, announced by the respondent through an advertisement. He passed two semesters and paid fee for it. In the third semester, the respondent No.1 was pressing him for migration to Preston University and even threatening him to be rusticated. The petitioner also approached to the local Consumer Court against the respondent No. 1. The learned Consumer Court directed that the respondent No.1 was bound to provide migration certificate to the petitioner within a month, in respect of which though he issued an NOC; that respondent No. 1 was running classes in violation of the HEC rules and regulations and provided him fake DMC and migration certificate, in respect of which he reserved his right of registering a criminal case. He further alleged that respondent No.1 has wasted his time and put him in mental agony.
5. The sole question for determination is that whether both the impugned orders suffer with any jurisdictional defect or material irregularity within the meaning of section 115 of the Civil Procedure Code, 1908. In other words, it needs to be seen whether the plaint in the suit in hand is liable to be rejected under Order VII, Rule 11 of the C.P.C.
6. The law on disclosure of cause of action, as one of the four grounds for rejection of plaint, as contained in Order VII, Rule 11, C.P.C., is pretty clear. As I shall discuss shortly in greater details, it is the plaint and the plaint alone that must disclose a cause of action. The phrase 'cause of action' is not defined in the C.P.C. A cause of action constitutes bundle of facts which, if traversed, a plaintiff has to prove them in order to elicit support for a judgment of the Court in his favour.
"The term 'casus of action' refers to every fact which if traversed, it should be necessary for the plaintiff to prove in order to support his right to judgment, and which if not proved, gives the defendant a right to judgment, and for this purpose only the facts stated in the plaint are to be construed to determine whether they constitute a cause of action. Some act of defendant must be its part. It means the whole of the material facts which it is necessary for the plaintiff to allege and prove in order to succeed. It refers to facts and not notional or imaginary assertions. It does not refer to the evidence necessary to prove such facts; but to the facts which it is necessary to prove. [Aamer Raza, The Code of Civil Procedure, 10th edition, 2010, p. 120; foot notes omitted]."
In the case of Haji Abdul Karim and others v. Messrs Florida Builders (Pvt.) Ltd, (PLD 2012 Supreme Court 247), honorable the Supreme Court of Pakistan has discussed rejection of plaint in great details. After considering the ratio decidendi of some of the most important judgments, the honourable Court has formulated the following guidelines: "Firstly, there can be little doubt that primacy, (but not necessarily exclusivity) is to be given to the contents of the plaint. However, this does not mean that the Court is obligated to accept each and every averment contained therein as being true. Indeed, the language of Order VII, Rule 11 contains no such provision that the plaint must be deemed to contain the whole truth and nothing but the truth. On the contrary, it leaves the power of the Court, which is inherent in every Court of justice and equity to decide whether or not a suit is barred by any law for the time being in force completely intact: The only requirement is that the court must examine the statements in the plaint prior to taking a decision.
Secondly, it is also equally clear, by necessary inference, that the contents of the written statement are not to be examined and put in juxtaposition with the plaint in order to determine whether the averments of the plaint are correct or incorrect. In other words, the Court is not to decide whether the plaint is right or the written statement is right. That is an exercise which can only be carried out if a suit is to proceed in the normal course and after the recording of evidence. In Order VII, Rule 11 cases the question is not the credibility of the plaintiff versus the defendant. It is something completely different, namely, does the plaint appear to be barred by law.
Thirdly, and It is important to stress this point, in carrying out an analysis of the averments contained in the plaint the Court Is not denuded of its normal judicial power. It is not obligated to accept as correct any manifestly self-contradictory or wholly absurd statements. The Court has been given wide powers under the relevant provisions of the Qanun-e-Shahadat. It has a judicial discretion and it is also entitled to make the presumptions set out, for example in Article 129 which enable it to presume the existence of certain facts. It follows from the above, therefore, that if an averment contained in the plaint is to be rejected, perhaps on the basis of the documents appended to the plaint, or the admitted documents, or the position which is beyond any doubt, this exercise has to be carried out not on the basis of the denials contained in the written statement which are not relevant, but in exercise of the judicial power of appraisal of the plaint."
7. In view of the above guidelines, I shall straightaway go to the plaint. The dispute mainly is that the petitioner wanted to be migrated to Preston University. The plaint itself reflects that such a NOC was issued to him for the purpose of migration to Preston University. This assertion, if allowed to sustain, the evidence would be that he wanted migration to Preston University, he was issued a NOC for doing so, though with the intervention of the Consumer Court, the suit would be bound to fail. Primarily from the averments of the plaint, all which he may prove would be that he asked for migration and he knocked the door of the local Consumer Court that passed certain advisory order, asking the respondent No.1 to cooperate with the petitioner. He has nowhere avowed in his plaint that the respondent-college has been performing its functions in violation of the HEC rules and regulation. He seeks return of Rs. 80,000/- what he calls his illegal admission, tuition and examination fee. Again, if subjected to evidence, all that he can prove is that he paid the dues after getting enrolled with the respondent-college as a doctoral student. That, too, would not grant success to the petitioner entitling him to a relief including damages for mental agony. The reason obviously is that the petitioner having opted for admission in PhD studies, had nothing to do with mental shock and agony by the respondents. The obvious reason is that pursuant to his admission for doctoral studies, he had to deposit necessary dues as the respondent No.1 could claim according, to its prospectus. Likewise, he has not annexed any documents in respect of the payments he has made. It is here to observe that primacy of the contents of the plaint may accompany the documents, which a plaintiff may rely upon. The petitioner's pleas for recovery of Rs. 7.00 million, as fee of lawyer, an unbelievably exorbitant amount of money and miscellaneous expenses are not supported by any documentary proof. Nor are the details of the damages jotted down in the plaint.
8. I find that the orders of both the learned Courts below are correct and unexceptionable in the revisional jurisdiction of this Court. Resultantly, the instant Revision Petition being devoid of any merit, is hereby dismissed.