Jahandad son of Ghulam Rasul aged 18 years at trial stage, but 14 years at the time of occurrence, armed with knife, has been convicted under section 302, P. P. C. For the murder of Abdul Nafeh aged 20/21 years and vide judgment, dated 30th April, 1981 of the Additional Sessions Judge.
Gujranwala, was. Sentenced to life imprisonment plus fine of Rs. 3;OOO.Or in default to undergo 2 years' R.
1. With the direction that if the fine is realized, 2/3rd of the same to be paid as compensation to the heirs of the deceased. Two of the co-accused of Jahandad convict namely, Naseer Ahmad his brother, and Ghulam Rasul, his father, both armed with Sotas were given .The benefit of doubt and acquitted. The appeal of the convict Jahandad is being taken up and .
Disposed of along--with Criminal Revision No. 553 of 1981., for enhancement.Of the, sentence awarded to Jahandad appellant to death and against the acquittal of the two acquitted co- accused, by this judgment.
2: The occurrence took place on 3rd May, 1977 at 9-45 p. m. On a road within the area of village Ladhaywala Warraich, at a distance of 6 miles from Police Station, Qila Deedar Singh, District Gujranwala. F.I.R. Exh. P. L. Was lodged by Abdul Latif Khan P. W. 8 father of the decea--sed at I L-0b p. m. On the same day and it was recorded by Malik Tahir Mahmood, S.-I., P. W. 9 at the Police Station.
3. The motive for crime, as stated in the F.I.R, is that the deceased his brother Abdur Rafeh and the appellant were all students at Gujranwala. The appellant, the deceased as well as Abdur Rafeh were not on good terms with- one another. On the day of occurrence at 7-30 p. m. The appellant teased Abdur Rafeh who complained about the same to his brother, the deceased. On this at 9-00 p. m. There was a quarrel between the deceased and his brother on one side and the appellant and his brother Naseer Ahmad, acquitted co-accused on the other. However, they were separated by the people. Later on, at 9-45p.m. While the deceased alongwith his father Abdul Latif Khan P. W.
Was returning from the house of one Shamim Ahmad Khan, the appellant and the acquitted co--- accused armed as described above, who were waiting for them near the house of the complainant-party; launched an attack on them.
4. In the F. I. R. The occurrence is stated to have taken place in the following manner :- The electric light was on the road. The appellant raised a Lalkara to the effect that they would not spare the deceased. Thereafter, the appel--lant gave a knife blow to the deceased which fell on the front of his left thigh. He gave a second blow to him which fell on his right ribs. There--upon Abdul Latif Khan P. W. Advanced forward in order to rescue his son but Ghulam Rasul and Naseer Ahmad, acquitted co-accused, attacked him with their respective Sotas. In the meantime, Abdul Salam P. W. 7, Muhammad Jamshed Khan; Abdullah and Habib-ur-Rehman (although closely related to the deceased, were given up as won over), arrived on the spot. Habib-ur-Rehman and Abdullah caught hold of Naseer Ahmad and Ghulam Rasul, acquitted co-accused. Abdul Salam P.
W. Tried to apprehend Jahandad appellant when the appellant gave knife blow to Abdul Salam P.
W. Which fell on the back of his right shoulder. The deceased fell down on- the ground but the members of the accused party ran away froth the spot. The deceased was taken to the Civil Hospital, Gujranwala, but he died on the way as a result of his injuries. Thereafter, Abdul Latif Khan P.
W. Proceeded to lodge the report with the Police.
5. The prosecution has produced two eye-witnesses of the occurrence namely Abdul Salam P. W. 7 cousin of the deceased who is injured and Abdul Latif Khan P. W. 8, father of the deceased.
Muhammad Jamshed Khan, Abdullah and Habib- ur-Rehman, although cited in the F.
1. R. As eye- witnesses and stated to be closely related to the deceased had been given up as won over.
6. It may be pointed out at this stage that the motive version is being supported by Abdul Latif Khan P. W. And it has been relied upon by the trial Court. Similarly, the ocular testimony has been relied upon by the trial Court in the instant case. Jahandad appellant was arrested alongwith the two acquitted co-accused by Malik Tahir Mahmood S.-I. P. W. 9 on the day following the occurrence i.e. 4th May, 1977. At the instance of the appellant, was recovered blood-stained knife P. 7 which was taken into possession vide memo. Exh. P. K. Dated 4th May. 1977. The attesting witnesses are Habib Ullah P. W. 6 and Abdullah (not produced as won over) and Malik Tahir Mahmood S.-I. P. W. 9.
According to the report of the Serologist Exh. P. Q., the aforesaid knife was found to be stained with human blood. At the instance of the two acquitted co-accused were recovered and taken into possession Sotas P. 5 and P. 6 but since they were not blood-stained, they were not sent for chemical examination and as recoveries are of no. Consequence. It may be pointed out at this stage that the recovery evidence from the appellant has been believed by the trial Court.
7. The appellant in his statement before the trial Court totally denied having participated in the occurrence. He disowned the recovery of human blood-stained knife P. 7 from him and said that he had been falsely implicated due to enmity and party faction in the village. He pleaded innocence but did, not produce any evidence in defence. The two acquitted co-accused also made identical statements.
8. Dr. Harbans Lal conducted post-mortem examination on the dead body of the deceased at 9-00 a. m. On 4th May, 1977 and found on his person the following two injuries :-
(1) Incised wound --" x --" x 2" on the right side of chest on the lower part.
(2) Incised wound 1--" x --" x 3" on the front of left thigh on the upper part in the inguinal area.
Under this injury No. 2 left inguinal canal was injured and left femoral artery and vein were injured.
In his opinion, the cause of death was due to shock and heamorrhage. Injuries were caused by sharp-edged weapon and were sufficient to cause death with ordinary course of nature parti-- cularly by injury- No. 2.
On 4th May, 1977 at 10.30 a. m. He medically examined Abdul Salam P. W. And found on his person a two contusion marks on the back and left chest. The injuries were caused with a blunt weapon and were simple in nature.
9. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and carefully perused the record.
The prosecution story is being supported by two eye-witnesses of the occurrence who happened to be closely related to the deceased in the instant case, although there is no background of previous enmity between the parties. The ocular testimony is further being corroborated by the recovery evidence particularly recovery made from the appellant and it is being supported by the motive version as well as the medical evidence. Learned counsel for the appellant argued that since the two eye-witnesses of the occurrence are closely related to the deceased then even though there was no background of previous enmity, the possibility could not be ruled out that they might have exaggerated the version from what may--be the actual facts or they might have not seen the occurrence. His theory is that the prosecution version is that the incident took place because the appellant had teased the brother of the deceased but it could have even happened otherwise as suggested to the eye-witnesses in the cross-examination. He has also submitted that it was not a premeditated affairs and that if a quarrel had in fact taken place between the boys who went to school, then it might have taken place on the spur of the moment. The crux of the arguments of learned counsel for the appellant is that the incident took place on the spur of the moment and since the single injury which led to the death of the deceased was caused on a non- vital part, his conviction could at the most be recorded under section 326, P. P. C. And he could be sentenced accordingly if the prosecution version is relied upon.
10. On the other side, learned counsel for the complainant as well as learned counsel for the State argued that there were two injuries on the person of the deceased, one on the ribs and one on the upper part of the thigh which had, according to the medical evidence, cut the left inguinal canal, left femoral artery as well as vein. According to them, since the appellant had repeated his blows, he had formed intention to murder the deceased and that since his case was coveted under section 300, P. P. C. His conviction under section 302, P. P. C. In the circumstances, was quite proper.
Both the sides have cited authorities in support of their arguments which are being considered below. Mr. Aftab Farrukh, learned counsel for the appellant, places reliance on Muhammad Feroze v. Muhammad Arif (1976 SCMR 497). In that case it was observed that an ordinary person was not presumed to know the precise location of the arteries in the human limbs. If a stab with a knife or a dagger aimed at an arm or a leg severs an artery and the injured man dies as a result, it might be quite reasonable to argue that the offence was not one of culpable homicide and that the assailant could only be presumed to have intended to cause hurt or grievous hurt with a dangerous weapon. In that case it was held that the case of the accused fell under section 326, P.
P. C. And not under section 302, P. P. C. Reliance is also placed on Muhammad Asif v. The State (1972 P Cr. L J 1160). In that case more than one injury had been inflicted by the accused but none of the inflicted injuries was on vital part of the body and that the only one injury which proved fatal had been caused on the thigh of the deceased. 1t was held that since it was not a premeditated affair and there was no previous enmity, the offence was punishable under section 326,-P.P.C. And conviction under section 302, P. P. C. Was altered to one under section 326, P.P.C. Reliance was further placed on Feroze Muskhe v. The State (1974 P Cr. L J 567). In that case the accused and the deceased chanced to meet in a lane. There was exchange of abuses and the accused on a spur of moment took out a dagger and inflicted injuries on the deceased's hand and thigh. The accused, how--ever, did- not repeat the attack on the deceased nor harmed complainant, though placed at his mercy. It was, therefore, held that the accused had no intention to cause death of the deceased in the circumstances: The conviction was altered from section 302, P. P. C. To one under section 326, P. P. C. In that case there were two injuries caused to the deceased and the thigh injury had cut vessels nerves and muscles of that region. The other injury was caused on the left little finger. The cause of death was due to stab wound on the back of thigh. Reliance was also placed on Masoodul Hassan v. The State (PLD-1978 Kar. 560). In that case also there was a sudden fight, no previous enmity existed between the parties and that the attack on the deceased was sudden and unpremeditated and preceded by exchange of hot words. The accused inflicted a solitary injury on the deceased's thigh. His conviction under section 302, P. P. C. Was altered to one under section 326, P. P. C. In the circumstances of the case. In the light of these citations learned counsel argues that whether there is a single injury or multiple in--juries caused by an accused person to a victim but in cases where injuries on the thigh cutting important veins had resulted into death, then according to him, if the incident was the result of a sudden flare-up and not a preme--ditated one, invariably the conviction is recorded under section 326, P.P.C. And not under section 302, P. P. C. His argument in the alternative is that if this Court was not inclined to agree to the alteration of the conviction in such a case from section 302, P. P. C. To section 326, P.P.C. Then in the alternative the accused person could at the most be burdened with the knowledge and, therefore, the conviction could be recorded under section 304, Part II, P. P. C. In support of this reasoning learned counsel relies upon Emmanuel Bahadur Joseph v. Paul Jackson and another (1981 SCMR 663). In that case it was held that section 302, P.P.C. Will apply only if it is beyond any doubt established that Paul struck the blow with intent to kill Sardar Masih deceased. If in the circumstances it was more proper to impute to Paul knowledge rather than intention, then the offence would fall under section 304, Part II, P. P. C. And not under section 302 or section 304, Part I, P. P. C. In that case Ahmad and others v. The State (PLD 1971 SC 720) was cited in support of the reasoning to show distinction between offences falling under section 302, P. P. C. And under Parts I and II of section 304, P.P.C. In Ahmad and others v. The State, it was laid down that a case was covered by Part I of section 304, P.P.C. If the offence which was otherwise murder was reduced to culpable homicide not amounting to murder by reason of being covered by any of the Exceptions to section 300, P. P. C. But Part II of section 304, P. P. C. Would apply if the fatal injury inflicted on the deceased was caused to him without any intention on the part of the accused to cause death or such bodily injury as was likely to cause death but about which the accused could be burdened with the knowledge that it was likely to cause his death. In that case the appellant's case was held to be covered by Part II of section 304, P. P. C. And consequently his con--viction was converted from under section 302, P.P.C.
To one under Part II of section 304, P. P.C. Learned counsel also relied on Muhammad Salim v, Muhammad Aslam (1983 SCMR 53). In that case only one injury proved fatal which was caused on the knee and which had resulted in the severance of the femoral artery and consequent loss of blood which led to the death of the deceased. 1t was held that although in the doctor's opinion the said injury in the ordinary course was sufficient to cause death, yet from the physical facts and other inferential conclusions drawn by the Court, the incident was not premeditated but was a sudden affair which involved a grappling and the injury thus being caused on the knee in the heat of the moment which by itself could not saddle him with the knowledge of the precise locale of different arteries and veins in the limbs of human body so as to lead only to the inferential conclusion to kill him. In that case too the conviction was recorded under section 304, Part II, P. P. C.
Read with section 34, P. P. C. On the basis of these citations learned counsel for the appellant argued that in the peculiar circumstances of this case and in the light of the injury which proved fatal, the appellant can, at the most, be convicted either under section 326, P. P. C. Or under section 304, Part 11, P. P. C. And sentenced accordingly and that his conviction and sentence under section 302, P. P. C. Were not in accordance with law.
The arguments of learned counsel for the State are based on the fact that if the ocular testimony is believed, then the appellant had intention to murder the deceased because be was waiting for him, armed with a knife, alongwith the acquitted co-accused. He is also basing his arguments on the fact that there are two injuries caused to the deceased, in the instant case, one on the upper part of the thigh in the groin region and the other on still higher part of the body, namely, on the right side of chest. The right side of chest injury, according to the medical evidence, measures 3/4" x 1/2" x 2". According to learned counsel for the State, this injury was on a vital part of the body and that even the injury on the upper part of the thigh in the groin region, which proved fatal in. The instant case, according to him, was also not on a non-vital part. He, therefore, is of the view that the conviction of the appellant under section 302, P. P. C. And sentence awarded to him thereunder could not be altered to conviction and sentence to be awarded to him under section 304, Part II or section 326 of the Pakistan Penal Code. In support of his argument he is relying on Javaid v. The State (PLD 1975 Lah. 682). In that case the deceased had an incised wound 1J" x 1/2" x 4-l' deep on upper part of right buttock and the arterial vein was cut. The injury was stated to be sufficient to cause death in the ordinary course of nature and proved fatal. The knife used had a blade over 4" long and the injury caused was 42" deep. In that case it was seriously canvassed that the offence did not fall under section 302, P. P. C. But under section 304. P. P. C. As the appellant could not be attributed with the intention of causing death and that as such, the offence would fall under Part II of section 304, P. P. C. The Court arrived at the conclusion that in the case in hand the facts were that there was premeditation because the appellant who had left the place of occurrence after the quarrel had returned shortly thereafter armed with an open knife and had made a sneak attack from behind. It was, therefore, held that the appellant was guilty of murder under section 302, P. P.
C. Although the extreme penalty was not called for, because the appellant had no motive or malice as against the deceased and that the time which had elapsed between the quarrel and the inflicting of the injury, was not sufficient to have allowed the passions to cool down. He also relied on .The State v. Zahoor etc. (1976 P Cr. L J 574). In that case also injury bad been caused measuring 1" x 1/2" x 5" on the medial side of the lower part of left thigh. It was held that the case of the appellant was covered under section 302, P. P. C. As the intention could be gathered from the injuries and conduct of the assailant. The deceased was given dagger blows on the thigh with maximum force piercing through and through and completely cutting femoral artery anti that the mere fact that the injury was caused on a non-vital part like thigh it was held would not take away offence from purview of section 302, P. P. C. The conviction was altered from section 304, P. P. C. To one under section 302, P. P. C. Learned counsel further relied on Khuda Bakhsh v. The State (1983 SCMR 336). In that case injury was caused measuring 2" x 1" in the left inguinal region about 4" lateral to the left pubic crest on external examination. Under this injury the left femoral artery and veins were injured. The accused had been carrying a knife under his shirt which he took out suddenly and aimed a blow on the deceased's abdomen which, however, fell on his left inguinal region cutting the femoral artery and veins which resulted in his death. It was observed by the Supreme Court that a sudden and unexpected quarrel took place between the accused and the deceased when the accused heard the deceased saying something nasty to him and the accused in a fit of anger gave the solitary blow with his knife taking it out of his shirt and as such although the offence committed by him amounted to murder under section 302, P. P. C., yet in the aforesaid circumstances it did not call for capital sentence.
Learned counsel for the complainant Rana Muhammad Sarwar, opened his arguments emphasising on the point that it is wrongly stated that the fatal injury inflicted by the appellant on the person of the deceased was on the thigh or even on the upper thigh. It was submitted that the fatal injury caused to the deceased at the hands of the appellant was inflicted in the groin region which should be termed as the `belly region' and this was clearly established by the medical evidence. The argument of learned counsel is that when an injury is inflicted in the belly region or groin region, the argument that it might have not been a fatal blow, had it not cut the inguinal canal, femoral artery and vein, was irrelevant because femoral artery, vein etc., proceed further down in the thigh and if the injury is inflicted on the thigh region which had cut femoral artery and vein etc., then the argument to the effect that the 'case of an accused person was covered under section 326, P. P. C. Or under section 304, Part II, P. P. C. May have some force but not otherwise.
Learned counsel argued that he was advancing this argument in order to show that even if it was an occurrence which resulted from a sudden flare-up, there was intention to murder formed on the spot so far as the appellant is concerned. It was also pointed out that if the ocular testimony is to be relied upon to the effect that the appellant armed with knife was already waiting for the deceased, then the act would become premeditated. He further argued that the sketch of the knife used for the commission of crime indicates that it was a kamanidar knife with a blade of 4--" size.
The use of such a weapon of offence on the part of the appellant also indicated that he had intention to murder the deceased. It was emphasised that it was not a pen-knife or just an ordinary knife but a kamanidar knife. It was next submitted that the appellant did not only inflict one injury which could be said to have fallen by chance in the groin region. He repeated the blow and the second blow which fell on lower chest was on a vital part, which likewise indicated that there was intention to kill. If the first injury was inflicted in the groin region which proved fatal, the second injury was inflicted on the lower chest which cut the pleura although it did not penetrate any further. Pleura, it was submitted was the outer sheath of the lungs. His second injury may have not proved fatal or even if it may not be considered as grievous but since it was inflicted on a vital part with a sharp-edged weapon, it certainly was an indicative as to what the intention was of the assailant. On the basis of these arguments learned counsel attempted to show that there was intention on the part of the appellant to murder the deceased and it was in the background of this intention that two blows were inflicted by him on the deceased with a kamanidar knife of a blade of 41"-first in the groin region which proved fatal and the second in the chest region, which did not prove fatal. It was thus argued that in such circumstances it is irrelevant to produce authorities in support of the argument that the appellant could, at the most, be convicted under section 326, P. P.
C. Or under section 304, Part II, P. P. C. And sentenced thereunder. Learned counsel for the complainant submitted that the trial Judge convicted the appellant under section 302, P. P. C. But awarded lesser penalty to him of life imprisonment for the reason that the appellant was a young by who might have been a minor at the time of commission of crime. Learned counsel submitted that a medical certificate was produced (Exh. D. E.) to show that the appellant was 18 years old at the time of recording his statement by the trial Court in 1981. It was from this certificate that inference was drawn that at the time of the commission of crime which took place in 1977, he was or might have been 14 years old. But it was argued that the said medical certificate in respect of the age of the appellant was neither admissible under the Evidence Act nor was it proved in any manner. Learned counsel produced electoral roll of the area in which the age of the appellant on 1st January, 1974 is shown as 21 years. The occurrence took place in 1977 and that according to learned counsel if the electoral roll is to be relied upon, then age of the appellant at the time of occurrence would be 24 years. Consequently the appellant was not a minor at the time of the commission of crime and that if he was to be convicted under section 302, P. P. C., then there was no question of awarding lesser penalty to him. There was no reason it has submitted, why capital sentence was not awarded in a case of this nature. The reasoning of learned counsel is that the appellant was a full grownud--man at the time of the commission of crime. He used a kamanidar knife and inflicted two injuries on the vital parts of the body of the deceased with the intention to commit his murder and that in a case of this nature if the conviction was to be recorded under section 302, P. P. C. By the trial Judge, then the sentence awarded should have been capital and not lesser penalty. Learned counsel for the complainant belatedly produced an extract from the Register of Births in regard to the appellant which indicated that he was born on 23rd September, 1956 and on the day of occurrence in 1977 he was more than 20 years old. Learned counsel also pointed out that in most of the authorities cited by the other side there was only a single blow on thigh/knee and if there was an additional injury, it was on a non-vital part. Therefore, those cases were distinguishable from the facts of the present case.
I have carefully examined the arguments advanced by both the sides. It is evident that the question, which requires determination in the instant case, is as to whether the case of the appellant was not covered by section 302, P. P. C. And that it was instead covered either by section 326, P. P. C. Or by section 304, Part II, P. P. C. Needless to say that on facts the case of the prosecution is being supported by the ocular testimony corroborated by the recovery affected from the appellant and further supported by the immediate cause of the occurrence as well as medical evidence. Factually the position is that according to the ocular testimony the appellant armed with knife was waiting for the deceased alongwith the acquitted co-accused. The other fact which cannot be denied is that there are two incised injuries on the person of the deceased-one on the upper part of the thigh on the groin region called as "belly region" by learned counsel for the complainant, and the other on the right side of chest: The right side of chest is a vital part of the body and it can be categorically stated that the injury caused in the groin region or "belly region" which in fact proved fatal, was also not on a non-vital part but on a vital part. When an injury is inflicted in the "belly region" or groin region, then it cannot be said that the injury inflicted was on the upper part of thigh. I am, there--fore, in agreement with learned counsel for the complainant that even if the occurrence had resulted from a sudden flare-up there was inten--tion to murder formed on the spot by the appellant and that it was not relevant if by the fatal injury femorol artery, vein etc. Were cut. It must not be forgotten that the appellant repeated the blow and in the second blow the chest was aimed at and consequently the second blow fell on the right chest cutting pleura. In other words, it was lucky on the part of the deceased that the second injury did not penetrate further or deeper than cutting the outer sheath of the lungs Nevertheless the injury was on a vital part indicating as to what could possibly be the intention of the appellant. It should also be noted that according to the sketch of the knife used for the commission of crime it was a kamanidar knife with a blade 4--" size. In other words it was not merely a pen-knife or just an ordinary knife. Thus, the appellant inflicted the first injury to the deceased in the groin region which proved fatal and then he inflicted the second injury on the lower chest of the deceased which cut the pleura although it did not penetrate any further. The nature of the injuries definitely indicated that the intention on the part of the appellant was to cause the murder of the deceased although the said intention had been formed on the spot. In that view of the matter I am of the considered opinion that the case of the appellant is not covered by section 326, P. P. C. Or under section 304, Part 11, P. P. C. The result is that in the circumstances when the prosecution had been successful in establishing its case as against the appellant beyond any shadow of doubt, relying on the authorities cited by learned counsel for the State and for the complainant, the conviction as well as sentence awarded to the appellant under section 302, P. P. C. Are quite proper and they are accordingly maintained. The appeal of the appellant is hereby dismissed. However, the Jail authorities are directed to grant to the appellant the benefit of the provisions of section 382-B of the Code of Criminal Procedure at the time of computation of his sentence of imprisonment for life.
As for Cr. R. No. 553 of 1981 it was argued that the sentence awarded to the appellant under section 302, P. P. C. Should be enhanced from imprisonment for life to death because the trial Judge awarded him lesser penalty only for the reason that he was a young by and student. It was argued that being a student was no ground for awarding lesser penalty and that furthermore there was no cogent evidence placed on the record about the minority of the appellant. Be that as it may, in my view the incident took place .In the form of a sudden flare-up and that admittedly the appellant as well as the deceased were studying in the same school. It is, therefore, reasonably probable that the trial Judge adopted a lenient view at the time of the awarding of lesser penalty because he thought that the appellant was of school going age. Learned counsel produced a copy of C extract of birth entry of the appellant but at a belated stage and, therefore, I ignored it. In the light of the finding of the trial Judge on the point, I do not find an y substance in this prayer of the aforesaid criminal revision. There is also a prayer in the said criminal revision that the acquittal of the two acquitted co-accused, in the instant case, be set aside. The acquitted co-accused have not caused any injury to the deceased in the instant case. The recoveries of solas made from them were of no consequence. The prosecution version is that when Abdul Latif Khan P. W. Advanced forward in order to rescue the deceased, then the acquitted co-accused attacked him with their respective solas. Thereafter, the prosecution version is that Abdul Salam P. W. Tried to apprehend the appellant who gave a knife blow to him which fell on the back of his right shoulder. But so far as the part ascribed to the acquitted co-accused is concerned and also to the appellant for having caused knife injury to Abdul Salam P. W., the ocular account was not being corroborated in regard to all the material particulars with medical evidence. Abdul Salam P. W. Was medically examined but he only had two simple injuries caused with blunt weapon. Obviously these could not have been inflicted by the appellant. So far as the acquitted co-accused are concerned, they are stated to have caused injuries only to Abdul Latif Khan P. W. Who was not medically examined. They did not inflict any injuries to the deceased. Ghulam Rasul, acquitted co-accused, father of the present appellant, was 80 years old and was even unable to stand on his own legs and Naseer Ahmad, acquitted co-accused, was probably involved, in the instant case, because he happened to be brother of the appellant. I am, therefore, of the considered view that since the prosecution did not succeed in proving its case as against the two acquitted pro co-accused, they were rightly given the benefit of doubt and acquitted. The result is that I also do not find any substance in this prayer of Cr. R. No. 553 of 1981 against the acquittal of the two acquitted co-accused. In the light of the above discussion, the aforesaid criminal revision is hereby dismissed in limine.