KAMRAN HAYAT MIANKHEL, J.- By this single judgment, we propose to decide the instant writ petition and Writ Petition # 784-B/2024, as both of them involve identical questions of law and facts. In these petitions, the petitioners have invoked the judicial review power of this Court under Article 199 of the Constitution to challenge administrative actions pertaining to their repatriation to the parent department before the completion of the deputation period. Before delving into the merits, it is imperative to succinctly unveil the facts that led to the filing of these writ petitions.
2. In the instant writ petition (WP # 777-B/2024), it is asserted that the petitioners were working as constables in the Police Department, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, and pursuant to requisitions placed by the Director of Anti-Corruption Establishment (ACE), Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, their services were placed at the disposal of ACE, on deputation basis, for a period of three years by the Central Police Office (CPO), Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, through separate orders dated 19.07.2022, 02.08.2022, and 20.02.2024, respectively. Consequently, the petitioners reported for duties to the ACE, where they were transferred and posted at the Police Station ACE, Bannu by the orders dated 05.08.2022. The petitioners continued to perform their duties with zeal and dedication, when, all of a sudden, without any notice or complaint, and before the completion of their deputation periods, the CPO, pursuant to ACE's letter dated 10.10.2024, repatriated them to their parent department through an order dated 12.11.2024. In its consequence, the petitioners moved this Court by filing this petition with the prayer to declare the aforesaid repatriation letter and orders as coram non judice and void ab initio, and to issue an appropriate writ directing the respondents to retain the petitioners in service until the completion of their respective deputation periods.
3. In the connected writ petition (WP # 784-B/2024), it is asserted that the petitioner was serving as a constable in the Police Department, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, when, by the CPO's order dated 26.09.2024, his services were transferred to the ACE after repatriation of all the subordinate rank officials whose services had earlier been placed at the disposal of ACE, on deputation basis.
However, before the petitioner was allowed to resume duties, the ACE vide its letter dated 10.10.2024, addressed the CPO to repatriate the services of the petitioner on the ground that he could not be adjusted in the ACE. Consequently, the petitioner moved this Court by filing this petition, praying to declare the above said letter as coram non judice and void ab initio, and to issue an appropriate writ directing the ACE to retain the services of the petitioner on the strength of the CPO's orders dated 26.09.2024, with all back benefits.
4. Arguments heard and record perused.
5. In our view, the concept of posting of civil servants and/or government servants on deputation is not novel, rather it has a rich history in service jurisprudence. The jurisprudence with regard to deputation has evolved over time, and judicial interpretations on this branch of jurisprudence provide a detailed understanding of its purpose, limitations, and implications not only for both the lending and borrowing departments and organizations, but also for the deputationists. To fully grasp the essence of deputation, it is imperative to examine as to how it has been defined and interpreted from time to time, and what is its scope and limitations. It is imperative to note that the word 'deputation' has not been defined either by the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Civil Servants Act, 1973, or the rules made thereunder. However, it has been defined umpteen times by the Superior Courts of the country in various pronouncements, which offer valuable insights into its scope and limitations. In the case of Islamic Republic of Pakistan v. Israr-ul-Haq and 23 others (PLD 1981 SC 531), the Supreme Court defined it as under: Hitherto, the term "deputation" has not been formally defined. However, according to the practice in vogue, a Government Servant begins to be regarded as a "deputationist" when he is appointed or transferred, through the process of selection, to a post in a department or service altogether different from the one to which he permanently belongs. He continues to be placed in this category so long as he holds the new post in an officiating or a temporary capacity but ceases to be regarded as such either on confirmation in the new post or on reversion to his substantive post.
6. In Muhammad Zia-Ul-Haq and others v. Government of Punjab and others (1996 PLC (C.S.)
134), it has been defined as follows:
15. The term 'deputation' has not been defined either in the Act of 1974 or Rules framed thereunder.
It is clear from its incidents that it is a specie of transfer. In other words, it is a transfer outside his service, cadre or the functional unit.
7. In Dr. Shaft-ur-Rehman Afridi v. C.D.A., Islamabad through Chairman and others (2010 SCMR 378), it is defined in the following words: Deputation can be defined as an administrative arrangement between borrowing and lending authorities for utilizing the services of an employee in the public interest and exigency of services against a particular post and the deputationist cannot remain on deputation for an indefinite period or stipulated period in accordance with his own whims and wishes.
8. In view of the above quoted definitions, it can be concluded that deputation is a temporary administrative arrangement, where an employee is transferred from one department, service, or organization to a different department, service, or organization to meet specific administrative needs or service exigencies. Although, employees on deputation retain their original status in their parent departments, services, and organizations, however, they are required to perform duties in the borrowing department or organization for a specified period, which is initially three years and may further extend to a maximum of five years. This arrangement is governed by the rules made and policies formulated for the purpose.
9. The scheme and purpose of posting an employee on deputation is not intended as a means to accommodate or favour the employee, nor is it designed to provide personal ease or convenience to the employee. As the public interest is paramount in all cases, deputation is fundamentally an administrative arrangement driven entirely by the exigencies of the borrowing department in the broader public interest. Decisions with regard to deputation are guided solely by service requirements and the operational needs of the departments or organizations involved. It is for this very reason that deputation confers no vested right in the employee to remain in the borrowing department or organization for a specific period, according to his own whims or wishes. Moreover, the concept of a vested right for an employee on deputation is not recognized by any law of the land. Therefore, unless there is a specific provision, deputation is inherently a temporary arrangement, solely at the discretion of the department or organization, driven by the exigencies of service.
10. Whether or not to retain an employee to continue to work on deputation for the prescribed or stipulated period is a question that entirely depends upon the exigencies of service, and it is a matter between the borrowing and lending departments and organizations. Needless to mention that employees have no role to play in such matters, as they are paid for the duties. It follows that the department or organization enjoys sole discretion to post employees on deputation or repatriate them to their parent departments or organizations, as and when warranted by the departmental or organizational needs. This is why an employee posted on deputation enjoys neither a vested right, nor any cause or locus standi to challenge orders pertaining to their repatriation, as such actions fall entirely within the discretion of the departments and organizations based on service exigencies and needs. In such circumstances, serving prior notice upon an employee proposed to be repatriated does not arise, especially when the law has never mandated such a requirement. Therefore, the argument that the principles of natural justice have been violated or that the petitioners have been condemned unheard prior to their repatriation is found to be devoid of any substance.
11. Furthermore, the law laid down by the Supreme Court on the subject is quite clear. The latest being the case of Ghansham Das v. Government of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa through Chief Secretary, etc. (2024 SCMR 188) is worthy of being referred. In this case, the Supreme Court authoritatively ruled:
11. We may mention here that the deputationist by no stretch of the imagination and in the absence of any specific provision of law can ask to serve the total period of deputation and he can be repatriated being a deputationist by the Competent Authority in the interest of exigency of service as and when so desired and such order of the competent authority cannot be questioned. The Civil Servants Act, 1973 and the rules made there-under as well as ESTACODE are silent about the fact that a deputationist must serve his entire period of deputation and this omission seems deliberate enabling the Competent Authority to utilize the service of an employee in the manner as it may deem fit and proper. The period of deputation can at best be equated to that of an expression of the maximum period which can be curtailed or extended by the Competent Authority and no legal or vested rights whatsoever are available to a deputationist to serve his entire period of deputation in the borrowing Department. In this regard, we are fortified by the dictum laid down by this Court in the cases reported as Zain Yar Khan v. Chief Engineer (1998 SCMR 2419); Aslam Warraich v. Secretary, Planning and Development Division (1991 SCMR 2330); Pakistan v. Fazal- ur-Rehman (PLD 1959 SC (Pak.) 82); Ashraf Khan Niazi v. Chairman Board of Governors Allama Iqbal Medical College (2003 PLC (C.S.) 243); Dr. Shafi-ur-Rehman Afridi v. C.D.A (2010 SCMR 378) and S. Masood Abbas Rizvi v. Federation of Pakistan (2014 SCMR 799).
(Underline is ours for emphasis)
12. Similarly, in the case of Chairman Board of Governors, MTI, LRH, Peshawar and others v. Syed Roidar Shah, Clinical Technician (Pharmacy), MTI, LRH, Peshawar and others (2021 SCMR 867), the Supreme Court held:
7. It is established law that a deputationist has no right to continue in an employment as a deputationist and the employer, where the deputationist is employed, is competent to terminate the deputation and relieve the deputationist from its employment for reporting to his parent department.
13. In Dr. Shafi-ur-Rehman Afridi's case (supra), the Supreme Court unequivocally held:
9. It is worth mentioning that a deputationist could not be treated as an aggrieved person provided he had been placed in the same grade and status in borrowing cadre which he was enjoying before his status of deputationist. It may not be out of place to mention here that a deputationist has no vested right to remain on a post as deputationist forever or for a stipulated period as mentioned in the notification and can be repatriated at any time. In this regard reference can be made the case titled Muhammad Rafique v. Secretary, Wafaqi Mohtasib's Secretariat, Islamabad and 2 others 1998 SCMR 2631.
[.. .]
12. On the touchstone of the criterion as discussed hereinabove the case of petitioner has been examined and we are of the considered opinion that petitioner has no legal right whatsoever and therefore, the question of its recognition or enforcement does not arise. We have no hesitation in our mind to hold that deputation can be defined as an administrative arrangement between borrowing and lending Authorities for utilizing the services of an employee in the public interest and exigency of services against a particular post and the deputationist cannot remain on deputation for an indefinite period or stipulated period in accordance with his own whims and wishes.
(Underlines added for emphasis)
14. For the reasons we have set out above and the law laid down by the Supreme Court in the judgments (supra), we, with unanimity, hold that posting the petitioners on deputation basis was purely a temporary administrative arrangement between their parent department, as the lending department, and the ACE, as the borrowing department, based on the service exigencies of the latter. This arrangement did not create any vested right in the petitioners, as deputationists, to continue to serve in the borrowing department, and they could competently be repatriated to their parent department even prior to the completion of their respective deputation periods. Even otherwise, the question of whether or not to retain a particular deputationist until the stipulated period requires a subjective assessm ent, which can at best be determined by the department itself based on its needs and the deputationist's performance. The department has the absolute right to make decisions in such matters, and the Court, while exercising its extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 199 of the Constitution, would refrain from interfering in those matters. In this backdrop, we are not persuaded to proceed with either of these petitions, especially when the learned counsel for the petitioners remained unable to show what fundamental or vested right of the petitioners was infringed by their repatriation.
15. In these circumstances, both the petitions are dismissed in limine. revisions by the competent authorities. Therefore, it is advisable to consult the official sources or legal professionals for the most up-to-date and accurate information.