ABDUR RASHID (MEMBER), - The appellant was an Auditor in the office of the District Accounts Officer Multan On 29-8-1978 he was served a charge-sheet by the Additional Accountant-General in his capacity as the Authorised officer. The charge-sheet contained a statement of allegations wherein the appellant was alleged to have made fictitious entries and changes in the G. P. Fund accounts of various subscribers with mala fide motives. He was directed to furnish his defence reply within 14 days of the receipt of charge-sheet. He was asked to state whether he wished to be heard in person. Mr. Khurshid Ahmed, District Audit Officer, Muzaffargarh was appointed as the Enquiry Officer.
2. The appellant furnished his defence reply on 8-1-1979 denying the charges.
3. Vide charge-sheet dated 16-4-1979 the appellant was called upon to furnish defence reply in respect of another three charges relating to the tampering of G. .P. Fund accounts. He did so by denying the charges.
4. It may be mentioned that the appellant had been suspended on 8-4-1978 as a result of a preliminary enquiry and more than four months before the service of the first charge-sheet.
5. As a result of the enquiry conducted against him, the Authority viz the A.-G. Punjab removed the appellant from service vide order dated 14-11-1979 which was received by him on 21-11-1979. He preferred a departmental appeal to the Auditor-General through proper channel against the impugned order of removal. Another copy of the same appeal was sent by him direct to the Auditor-General. His appeal bears no date but according to him it was made on 4-12-1979. This appeal was rejected vide A.-G. Punjab letter dated 8-6-1980 which was received by the appellant on 14-6-1980. This letter is reproduced; "Mr. Iqbal Hussain, House No. 1456/H, Inside Haram Gate,'
Multan.
Subject : Appeal against the order of removal dated 14-11-1979 of the Accountant-General, Punjab, Lahore.
Reference your appeal without date, addressed to the Auditor-General of Pakistan, against the orders dated 14-11-1979 of the Accountant---General, Punjab. Lahore.
2. The Auditor-General of Pakistan, after due consideration, has rejected your appeal.
(Authority : -Auditor-General of Pakistan's memo No. 557-NGE. 1/48-79, dated 25-5-1980).
Sd/- Assistant Accounts Officer."
6. After the receipt of Auditor-General's rejection of his appeal on 14-6-1980, the appellant should have come to, the Tribunal by 13-7-1980, Instead on 30-6-1980 he applied to the A.-G. Punjab that a copy of the order passed by the Auditor-General whereby his appeal had been rejected may be supplied to him. This letter is reproduced; "To : The Accountant-General Punjab, Lahore. .
Subject : Appeal against the order of Auditor-General of Pakistan.
Sir, Kindly refer to your memo. No. Discip/CS-2998-3019/862 dated 8-6-1980.
2. I request you to kindly supply me a copy of the order passed by the Auditor-General of Pakistan whereby the appeal of the appellant has been rejected.
Dated 30-6-1980. Yours------..
(Sd.)
Iqbal Hussain"
On 29-7-1980 he received A.-G. Punjab letter dated 21-7-1980, which is reproduced "Mr. Iqbal Hussaiil, House No. 1456 f H, '
Inside. Haram Gate, Multan.'
Subject : Appeal against the order of Auditor-General of Pakistan.
Please refer to your application dated 30-6-1980 on the above subject.
2. A copy of the relevant portion of Auditor-General's memo. No. 557--NGE. 148-79 dated 25-5-1980 is enclosed as desired.
(Sd.)
Assistant Accounts Officer."
Thereafter, he filed his present appeal on 25-8-1980 under section 4 of the Service Tribunals Act, 1973.
7. The learned counsel for the respondents raised the preliminary abjection of limitation. According to the said learned counsel, the appellant should have preferred his appeal before the Tribunal within thirty days after he was in possession of the final order of the appellate authority viz. Auditor- --General. Going by the dates, this should have been done latest on 13,7-1980 but the present appeal filed on 25-8-1980 is time-barred by about six weeks without any application for condonation of delay.
8. The learned counsel for the appellant ably defended his, position. The basis of his argument was that the appellant's appeal against removal was addressed to the Auditor-General and it was he who had rejected the appeal. As a matter of fact the Auditor-General should have addressed the letter of rejection direct to the appellant. Since this was not done, the appellant had a right to acquire this rejection by going back to the Auditor---General, argued the said counsel. Looked at from that point of view the present appeal is not hit by limitation said the counsel. The learned counsel for the respondents arguing against this point of view said that the appeal to the Auditor- General had been made through proper channel and its rejection had also been received through the same channel and conveyed to the appellant by A.-G. Punjab. There was no need for the A.-G.
Punjab to enclose the rejection letter from the Auditor-General because this is the way the administration works.
9. To resolve the issue we shall advert to section 4 (1) of the Service Tribunals Act, 1973 which says; "Any civil servant aggrieved by any final order whether original or appellate, made by a departmental authority in respect of any of the terms and conditions of his service may, within thirty days of the communication of such order to him prefer an appeal to the Tribunal." '
16. "Departmental Authority" as explained in the Act means any authority other than a Tribunal which is competent to make an order in respect of any of the terms and conditions of the civil servants. In this particular case, the Authority who competently passed the order of removal was the Accountant-General, Punjab. Above him was the Auditor-General who was the Appellate Authority. The appeal was made to the Auditor General through Proper Channel as required. .-.
11. Rule 3 of the Civil Servants (Appeal) Rules, 1977 relevant to this case says .
"3. Every civil servant shall be entitled to appeal, to the appellate authority from an order passed by an authority imposing upon him any penalty :"
Rule 5 (3) of rules ibid lays down : "5 (3) : Every appeal shall be submitted through the Head of the office to which the appellant belongs or belonged, and through the authority from whose order the appeal is preferred."
Rule 6 (3) rules ibid lays down : . . . .
"The authority from whose order an appeal is preferred under these rules shall give- effect to any order made by the appellate authority."
12. Applying the above rules with reference to the context, the appellant had to prefer his appeal to the Auditor-General through the Accountant-General, Punjab because a good deal of file work is involved before the case is finally put up to the Appellate Authority. This was done. There is no provision for sending a copy of the appeal direct to the appellate authority as was done by the appellant because such appeals cannot be attended to and are a sheer waste. Rule 6 (3) clearly lays down that once the Auditor-General had rejected the appeal, then all that the A:-G. Punjab had to do was to give effect to this order of rejection which in plain words meant the communication of the Auditor-General's rejection to the appellant. The manner and method of this communication was left to the A.-G. Punjab. What mattered was that the communication of the Auditor-General's rejection of appeal was given effect to by the A.-G. Punjab, by informing the appellant that his appeal to the Auditor-General had been rejected. The rules, nowhere, lay down that the exact words or the original order of rejection of the appellate authority would have to be communicated to make the rejection "legal" so to say. Viewed in this back drop, therefore, the arguments of the learned counsel for the appellant appear to have no force whatever.
13. The rejection was received through the A.-G. Punjab. On 14-6-1980, the appellant, by his own admission, was in possession of the final appellate order made by the Auditor-General. For him there was no option except to come to the Tribunal within thirty days of the said order. This fell due on 13-7-1980. If he went back to the A.-G. Punjab to acquire the rejection letter of the Auditor- General, there was no basis for him to do so under the law, and if he did so it was at his own risk and cost. And if the A.-G. Punjab provided him the copy of rejection letter dated 25-5-1980 of the Auditor-General which the appellant received on 29-7-1980, it can give him no advantage in the condonation of delay, for under no law I or the stretch of imagination can the limitation run from 29-7-1980 as is pleaded by the learned counsel for the appellant for the simple reason that this very rejection had been received by him as far back as 14-6-1980.
14. We shall advert to the arguments of the learned counsel for the appellant whereby he would have us believe that the Auditor-General's rejection should have been conveyed direct to the appellant. In this connection, all we would say is that if someone in the Auditor-General's office had sent a copy of the rejection letter direct to the appellant, we would hold nothing for or against it. .
But to demand such rejection letters directly, as of right, is not sustainable in law. Also, even a rudimentary knowledge of how the hierarchical structure of our administration operates, should leave in no doubt that official acts are deemed to have been performed correctly (which is, usually, the case) and hence it has come about as a settled principle. Again, the copy of the Auditor- General's rejection letter was asked for and received through the A.-G. Punjab but was accepted by the appellant. If we were to go by the arguments of the learned counsel for the appellant, the element of trust would disappear from among our lives and our administration would be that much the worse without it.
15. There would have been merit in the arguments of the learned counsel for the appellant if he had not received the rejection of his appeal on 14-6-1980 and his request dated 30-6-1980 had been crowned with a copy of Auditor-General's letter of rejection dated 25-5-1980 sent to him on 21-7- 1980 and received by him on 29-7-1980. But this is not so. The rejection of his appeal (dated 4-12- 1979) had been received by him on 14-6-1980 and all that he had to do was to come to the Tribunal within 30 days therefrom. Actually, the rules lay down that from the date of making a- departmental appeal an appellant should wait for 90 days and then come to the Tribunal within the next 30 days. If the appellant had followed this rule, which he should have, then his present appeal to be within time should have been filed on or about 4-4-1980. 1f the A -G. Punjab had not communicated the Auditor-General's rejection which was received by the appellant on 14-6-1980 then the appeal would have been time-barred anyway. But by replying to the appellant, nearly six months after his appeal, and this could leave been very well n6t done, the Auditor-General as well as the A.-G.. Punjab provided the appellant a new lease of life of coming to the Tribunal which he threw away by his request dated 30-6-1980 asking for a copy of Auditor-General's rejection letter which was absolutely unnecessary or uncalled for. Despite valiant efforts of the learned counsel for the appellant to convince us that the present appeal was in time, we are not convinced. However, we did hear the learned counsel for the appellant on merits as well and we do find that certain technical errors have been made here and there by the depart--ment but we also know that the appellant has not come to the Tribunal with clean hands. Since, however, the present appeal is hit by limitation, we shall dismiss it on this ground alone with costs fixed at Rs 100.
16. Parties be informed.