These are five appeals, which I propose to dispose of by a common order, as the point involved in all the appeals is the same. The appeals are directed against an order dated 25th September 1970 of the learned Chairman of the Second Labour Court, Karachi, whereby he dismissed the application of the appellant, Messrs Ahmed Food Industries Limited, Karachi, for review of the order passed on 14th January 1970. The facts giving rise to the present appeals, briefly put are these.
2. The five respondents gave a strike notice on 10th April 1967, to the appellant. It is the case of the respondents that they were refused woo by the appellant on 12th April 1967. They were called upon, by the appellant to withdraw the strike notice, but as they refused to comply with the order of the appellant, they were refused to enter the premises of the appellant-Company. The conciliation proceedings commenced on, 10th April. 1967. The Failure Certificate was issued on 15th May 1967, and an application under section 5(5) of the Industrial Disputes Ordinance, 1959 (hereinafter called the Ordinance of 1959), was made on 17th May 1967. It was disposed of on 10th December 1968, whereby the Court accepted some of the demands of the respondents:
3. An application under section 38 of the West Pakistan Industrial Disputes Ordinance, 1968 (hereinafter called the repealed Ordinance), was made on 29th October 1968, by the respondents.
Their case, in short was, that they had been refused work by the appellant without being given any show---cause notice. The respondents were re-instated by an order dated 14th January 1970.
4. The appellant did not file any appeal against the order, re-instating the respondents, dated 14th January 1970. On the other hand, according to Mr. Naseem Farooqi, the learned Advocate for the appellant, the appellant made an application under Order XLVII, rule 1, of the Civil Procedure Code, on 12th February 1970. While, according to Mr. A. Majeed, the learned Representative for the five respondents, the application for review was made on 21st March 1970. I would like to decide at once the question when the application for review was made. The Seal of the Court on the application is dated 21st March 1970. On the face of it, therefore, it appears that the application was made, according to the Seal of the Court, on 21st March 1970. There is another date on the application in the handwriting of the Court Clerk, which is dated 12th February 1970. It would appear that "21" had been erased and in its place "12" had been put. I looked as the erased spot from a Magnifying Glass.
The figure "2", though it had been erased, is still clear and so is "1". In other words, the date "21" is still there. There is an endorsement on the third page of the application. The paper bearing the date on the endorsement has been torn away. It appears to me that advantage has been sought to be taken by someone of the fact that the typed application bears "12-2-70" This is hand--written. I am clearly of the view that the application is dated 21-3-70, as would appear from the Seal of the Court. 'Flee interpolation, it seems to me, had been made with the object to prove that the application for review was made within the limitation period prescribed for filing an appeal. In the order---sheet also there is interpolation. The date 21-3-70, has: been 'changed to 12-2-70. I would order that the learned Chairman would kindly hold an enquiry against the person responsible for this fabrication in the- record of the Court and take such action as he may consider necessary.
5. The short point that requires consideration is these appeals is as to whether an appeal would be against the order dismis--sing the application for review. The appeals had been filed under section 17 of the repealed Ordinance, read with section 37 of the Industrial Relations Ordinance 1969 (hereinafter called the Ordinance of 1969). It may be mentioned at once that section 17 of the repealed Ordinance makes Provision regarding too powers and procedure of the Appellate Tribunal Section 16 of the repealed Ordinance, makes appeal against the award of the Industrial Court. The relevant provision of subsection (2) of section 16 of the repealed Ordinance, which requires examination, reads as under :-- "An award under subsection (5) of section 15, and any decision of the Court other than an award or a decision under section 26 or section 37, shall be final and shall not be questioned in any manner by or before any judicial authority, including the High Court:"
6. On the face of it, the order on an application under Order XLVII, rule 1 of the C. P. C; is not an award under sub---section (5) of section 15, of the repealed Ordinance, or section 26 or section 37 of the repealed Ordinance. Mr. Farooqi the learned Advocate for the appellant, however, contended that this is an award within the meaning of subsection (1) (b) of section 15 of the repealed Ordinance and, therefore, an appeal lies there from. On a careful examination of the provisions of the repealed Ordinance, it would appear that an order on an application under Order XLVII, rule 1, C.
P. C. cannot be said to be an award. Award is defined under the repealed Ordinance to mean, "the determination by an Industrial Court of any industrial dispute or any matter relating thereto, or any matter referred to it under cause (b) of subsection (1) of section 11, and includes an interim award."
For the purposes of these appeals all that I am required to construe is whether the impugned order can be -said to mean, the determination of an industrial dispute or any matter relating thereto.
Industrial dispute has been defined to mean, "any dispute or difference between employers and employers, or between employers and workmen, or between workmen and workmen, which is connected with the employment or non-employment or the terms of employment or with the conditions of work of any person." An order on an application for review cannot be said to relate to any dispute or difference between employers and workmen. An application for review is an application to the Court to review ins order, if any of the conditions laid down under Order XLVII, rule 1, C. P. C., are made out. Mr. Farooqi, however, contended that "any matter relating thereto," should be given a liberal meaning so as to include an application for review. 1n other words, his submission is that the application for review, if decided in his favour, would ultimately relate to, industrial dispute. I do not think that such an extended meaning can be given to "any matter relating thereto. The phrase "any matter relating thereto" was the subject-matter of interpretation before the Supreme Court of Pakistan. Sajjad Ahmad; J, who delivered the judgment of the Court, came to the conclusion that, "The phrase "any matter relating thereto" in section 2(b), Industrial Disputes Ordinance, 1959, is to be read `ejusdem generic' with the words, `industrial dispute' read cover only controversies' with regard to the employment or non-employment or the terms of employment or the condi--tions of work of any person under subsection (5) of section 12 of the Ordinance."
It is not necessary to consider the provision of section 37 of the Ordinance of 1969, in any detail. It is sufficient to state that unless the decision on an application under order XLVII rule 1, C. P. C. can be held to be an award, no appeal can lie against the same. Under section 37 of the Ordinance of 1969, clear distinction has been made between decision and an award. Finality had been conferred under subsection (4) of section 37 of the Ordinance of 1969, on decisions except awards. An order on an application under Order XLVI, rule 1. C. P. C. is only a decision and not an award. Moreover, under Rule 7, of Order XLVII, C. P. C. no appeal lies against an order rejecting an application for review. I would dismiss the appeals on the ground that no appeal lies against a decision on an application under Order XLVII, rule 1, C. P. C. Applications for stay are also accordingly dismissed.