1. DORAB PATEL, J.--The dispute in this petition for leave relates to a house in Lahore. It was originally transferred to the third respondent, who associated the first respondents (to whom we will refer as the respondent) with him and as this respondent eventually surrendered his rights to the respondent, he went out of the picture. Although this transfer was unsuccessfully challenged by one Nikka, on coming to know of it, the petitioner also challenged it on the ground that as a non- claimant displaced person in possession of the house, he had filed a claim for the house, which had not been decided. This plea was accepted and the appeal allowed and for the purpose of this petition it is sufficient to state that the house was transferred to the petitioner by the Deputy Settlement Commissioner II, Lahore by his order dated 13-7-1962, and the Deputy Settlement Commissioner accepted in this order the petitioner's contention that he had "submitted N. C. H.
2. Form on 8-8-1959 which is entered a No. 709 of CSC-11 register, but is missing from the file." As this order wasfully challenged in an appeal by the respondent, the petitioner challenge the Additional Settlement Commissioner's order in a revision which was allowed by the Settlement Commissioner on 28-9-1964. And, it is relevant to observe here that in this order also the Settlement Commissioner accepted the petitioner's contention that be had submitted on N. C. H. Form on 8-8- 1959 "which was entered at No. 709 of CSC-1I register, but is missing from the file." The respondent challenged this order of the Settlement Commissioner in a writ petition in the Lahore High Court and his contentions in this writ petition were two-fold. The first was that the impugned order was bad, because the initial order obtained by the petitioner in his favour had been passed without notice to him and the second was that the petitioner's claim that he had filed an N. C. H. Form bearing No. 709 was false. The writ petition was accepted by a learned Judge of the High Court on 9-4-1971 and even a casual persual of this judgment is sufficient to show that the learned Judge had doubts about the petitioner's claim that he had filed an N. C. H. Form, therefore, by his judgment the learned Judge remanded the case to the Settlement Commissioner with a direction that he should decide whether the petitioner had filed an N. C. H. Form "and then decide the case afresh."
3. On remand, the Settlement Commissioner, who heard the case, merely noted the contention of the petitioner and of the respondent, on the question whether the petitioner had filed an N. C. H. Form.
4. Then without deciding that question, he held, presumably on the basis of the petitioner's possession that he was entitled to the transfer of the house. Therefore, the respondent again filed a writ petition in the Lahore High Court against the Settlement Commissioner's order. This writ petition was allowed by a learned Judge of the High Court on 25-4-1975. Hence this petition for leave.
5. As in allowing the writ petition, the learned Judge had criticised the Settlement Commissioner for going beyond the direction given to him by the High Court in its judgment of 9-4-1971 (in the first round of litigation in the High Court), Sheikh Ghias Muhammad submitted that it was the learned Judge, who had misread the earlier judgment of the High Court. We have, therefore, examined the earlier judgment with the assistance of learned counsel and we are satisfied that the direction given to the Settlement Commissioner in the judgment of 9-4-1971 was that be should first decide whether the petitioner had filed an N C H. Form and if the answer to this question was in the affirmative, then the Settlement Commissioner had been directed to "decide the case afresh". But, as we pointed out the Settlement Commissioner had shirked the real issue and failed to give a decision on the question whether the petitioner had filed an N. C. H. Form, therefore, we are. Unable to accept the learned counsel's submission.
6. Learned counsel then submitted, and this was his main submission, that the question whether the petitioner had filed an N. C. H. Form was a question within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Settlement Authorities, the more so, as the question turned on allegation of fraud.' Therefore, the further submission was that the High Court had usurped jurisdiction by giving a finding of fraud against the petitioner. The submission is fallacious. It is true that the superior Courts are reluctant in writ petitions to set aside findings of fact of tribunal which have been vested with jurisdiction to decide question of fact. But, for example, if a finding of a tribunal is perverse, the High Court has ample power in its constitutional jurisdiction to set aside the tribunal's finding. And, further in the instant case, the Settlement Commissioner had, despite the clean direction given to him by the High Court in its judgment of 9-4-1971 failed t give a finding on the question whether the petitioner had filed an N C H. Form. Therefore, in these circumstances, the High Court was amply justified in giving its own finding instead of remanding the case for the second time to the Settlement Authorities. In these circumstances, the only question for determination is whether there is any error in the finding of the High Court that the petitioner's claim that he filed an N.C.H. Form was false and now turn to this aspect of the case.
7. At the outset, we have to observe that the learned Judge has exa--mined with great care and in great detail the evidence on the question whether the petitioner had filed an N.C.H. Form, but we would only refer to some of his observations on the question and we would first recall here that the claim of the petitioner before the Settlement Authorities in the first round of litigation was that the number of his N.C.H. Form was No. 709 and that it had been filed in Centre-11, Lahore. Further, in support of this plea, reliance had been placed on a certificate obtained by the petitioner from the Deputy Settlement Commissioner, Centre-I1, Lahore, but as we pointed out in the first round of litigation in the High Court, the learned Judge bad in his judgment of 9-4-1971 expressed his misgiving about the petitioner's case. Therefore, the position taken by the petitioner before the learned Judge in 1975 was that his application had been filed in Centre-V, and, therefore, Sheikh Ghias Muhammad submitted that noting turned on the fact the petitioner had filed his N.C.H. Form at the wrong Centre. On the footing that nothing turned on the question whether an N.C.H. Form had not been filed before the Deputy Settlement Commissioner concerned, the real question was that in the earlier round of litigation, the petitioner had repeatedly taken the position that he had filed his N.C.H. Form in Centre No. If. Therefore, his volte face in the second round of litigation in the High Court cast doubt on his claim that he had filed an N.C.H. Form. Therefore, after noting this circumstance, which re-acted against the petitioner's honesty, the, learned Judge proceeded to make his observations on other circumstances which invited suspicion and he observed :- "It may by pointed out at this stage that although. This document does show that N.C.H. Form No. 709 was filed at Centre V, yet this certificate also mentions of an entry of N.C.H. Form No. 709-A in the name of Mehtab Din son of Choghata of village Sidhoo P. -S. Ichhra which stood scored out."
8. Now, although the certificate referred to stated that Mehtab Din's N.C. H. Form had been given No. 709-A, it is clear from the copy of this form, which has been filed by the caveator, that the number of Mehtab Din's form was 709 (see page 64 of the Paper Book). Although Mr. Ghias Muhammad's attention was drawn to this discrepancy he was not able to explain it, and this is yet another circumstance which cast great doubt on the petitioner's claim, and this apart from the fact that the entries relied upon by him in the C. S. Register are in pencil.
9. Another circumstance to which we were referred by Mr. Maqbool Sadiq was that the petitioner claimed to have filed his form in August, 1959, but admittedly the petitioner was not an allottee and as he was not an allottee, he based his claim only on the fact of his possession. But, this claim could only have been advanced by him after the amendment of the definition of ."possession" in subsection. (6) of section 2 of the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1958.
10. However, as admittedly this definition was enlarged after the petitioner bad filed his N.C.H. Form, it is difficult to believe that he could have filed this form when he was not entitled to file a claim on the basis of his possession, and as rightly submitted by Mr. Maqbool Sadiq, on almost identical facts that was the view taken by Hamoodur Rehman, C. J., in Faizul Khan v. Abdul Hamid (1976 SCMR 429). Nor was Mr. Ghias Muhammad able to explain how the petitioner could have filed a form on the basis of his possession before the amendment of the definition of possession under the aforesaid subsection on the 13th of October, 1959. Therefore, this circumstance together with the other circumstances set out by the learned Judge in the impugned judg--ment irresistibly lead to the inference that the petitioner had not filed a form and nothing turns on the fact that he had been prosecuting a claim for the house in dispute.
11. Mr. Ghias Muhammad's only other submission was that the petitioner was in possession of the house, in dispute, therefore, even if he did not file an N.C.H. Form, this did not relieve the Deputy Settlement Commis--sioner of his obligation to examine the petitioner's entitlement which had to be allowed, because he was in possession. As submitted by learned counsel this plea is supported by the obiter dicta in a judgment of the Lahore High Court in W. P. No. 2260-R of 1963 (Muhammad Ibrahim v. Bassa and another). But, as submitted by Mr. Maqbool Sadiq, it is contrary to a judgment of the Sind High Court in Hirjina & Co. (Pak) Ltd. v. Settlement Commissioner, Karachi and two others (PLD 1976 Kar. 1110), Mr. Ghias Muhammad then submitted that his plea was supported by this Court's judgment in Allah Bakhsh v. Nizam Din and two others (1975 SCMR 182), whilst Mr. Maqbool Sadiq submitted that this plea had been rejected by this Court in Matiullah, v. Kafiel Ahmad Shah (1969 SCMR 979).
12. We have, therefore, examined these judgments and Allah Bakhsh's case does not support Mr. Ghias Muhammad's submission, because as correctly stated in the head note of the case, the duty of the Settlement Department is to consider "claims of all persons, who may have applied for the tran9-- fer of the house in their possession." But,, as in the instant case, the petitioner has made a false claim to have filed a form, we do not see bow this judgment can support his case. On the other hand, there is force in Mr. Maqbool Sadiq's submission that this Court's order in Matiullah's case is inconsistent with Mr. Ghias Muhammad's submission. '