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1983 PLC 1018

IMDAD KHAN AND ANOTHER vs MESSRS FERRO FABRICATORS LTD.

Citation1983 PLC 1018
CourtLabour Appellate Tribunal
Case No.Appeals Nos. KAR-405 and 406 of 192
Date1983-01-08
Judge(s)Z. A. Channa
ResultCase remanded

DECISION The two appellants, Muhammad Ilyas and Imdad Khan were employed in the respondent establishment as Accountant and Administra--tive Assistant respectively. It is claimed by appellant Muhammad Illyas that on 20th March, 1982, his services were orally terminated by the respondent establishment without any reasons for the termination being communicated to him.

Similarly appellant Imdad Khan claims that his services were orally terminated by the respondent establishment on 22nd March, 1982 without any reasons for such termination being com-- municated to him. Both the appellants, after serving grievance notices upon the respondent establishment, which brought them no relief, filed separate grievance petitions before the learned Labour Court . Notices of the two grievance petitions were sent by post and through Process-Server to the respondent establishment but in spite of the service of the notices through these two modes t-he respondent establishment remained absent. The two grievance petitions were, accordingly, ordered to proceed ex parte against the respondent establishment. In both the matters, the evidence of the concerned appellant was recorded by the learned Labour Court . The appellants in their evidence before the learned Labour Court reiterated their claims as contained in their grievance petitions. The learned Labour Court , however, has dismissed the two grievance petitions of the appellants on the ground that it 1Jas not established that they are workmen for the purposes of the Standing Orders and entitled to file and maintain grievance petitions against termination of their services. The learned Labour Court was persuaded to come to this view by reason of the fact that though-the appellants had claimed that they were workmen. They had not given evidence as to the nature of their duties: Furthermore the learned Labour Court was of the view that as appellant Muhammad Ilyas was in receipt of emoluments of Its. 2,000 per mensem and was hold--ing the post of an Accountant while appellant Imdad Khan was holding the post of Administrative Assistant and was similarly in receipt of emoluments of Its. 2,000 per mensem they would not be considered to be workmen as defined in the Sind Industrial & Commercial Employment (Standing Orders) Ordinance, 1968. Aggrieved by the said decisions of the learned Labour Court , the two appellants have filed separate appeals to this Tribunal. As common issues are involved in both the appeals they have been beard together.

2. Notices of the appeals were issued to the respondent establishment but in spite of service of the notices the respondents have remained absent. I have, accordingly, heard the appeals ex parse.

3. As already indicated, the learned Labour Court has held that the two appellants are not workmen or at least that they have failed to establish that they are workmen for the purposes of the Standing Orders, firstly, because they have not given details of the nature of their duties, and secondly, each of the two appellants was in receipt of emoluments of Rs. 2,000 per mensem and further they were holding post of Accountant and Administrative Assistant respectively. It may be pointed out that both in their grievance petitions and in their evidence before the learned Labour Court , the two appellants had categorically asserted that they were workmen. If the learned Labour Court was not satisfied that this assertion was correct and wanted details of the nature of their duties in order to determine whether they come within the definition of work--men as given in the Standing Orders, it could and should have questioned the two appellants in this behalf. Since it failed to do so and the respon--dents were absent and ex parte the learned Labour Court ought not, merely by reason of failure of the appellants to detail the nature of their duties, have held that the appellants are not workmen for the purposes of the Standing Orders. As regards the emoluments which the appellants were receiving, and which appears to be one of the factors on which the learned Labour Court has relied upon for holding that the appellants are not workmen, it may be pointed out that the amount of emoluments which the employee is receiving is not the determining factor or even an important factor in holding whether such employee is a workman or not A for the purposes of the Standing Orders. The essential requirement for holding that an employee is a workman for the purposes of the Standing Orders is that he should be employed for hire or reward to do manual or clerical work. The learned Labour Court has also been influenced by the designation of the post held by the two appellants. I has been repeatedly pointed out that the designation of the post held by an employee is not material for determining whether he is a workman for the purposes of the Standing Orders but what has to be considered is the nature of the duties performed by him. It has been held by the Karachi High Court in -the case of Dost Muhammad Cotton Mills Ltd. v. Muhammad Abdul Ghani and others (PLD 1975 Kar.342), that even the Chief Accountant of the mills falls within the definition of workman as given in the Standing Orders. This decision was upheld by their Lordships of the Supreme Court.

4. As the learned Labour Court had dismissed the grievance petitions of the appellants on the sole ground that it has not been established that they are workmen for the purposes of the Standing Orders, without giving its decision on the merits of the case and without requiring the appellants to substantiate their claim that they arc workmen under the Standing Orders, I would set aside the two decisions of the learned Labour Court and would remand both the matters to the learned Labour Court for fresh decision both on the merits of the case as well as on the point whether the two appellants are workmen for the purposes of the Standing Orders, after giving an opportunity to both the parties to lead evidence on all points, including on the point of the nature of the duties of the two appellants.

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