MALIK ZAWWAR HUSSAIN (MEMBER).-Illyas Masih, ex-Constable No, 876 of Faisalabad District has filed this appeal under section 4 of the Punjab Service Tribunals Act, 1974, in which he has impleaded the .Superintendent of Police, Faisalabad, the Deputy Inspector-General of Police, Sargodha Range, Sargodha and the Inspector-General of Police, Punjab, Lahore as respondents. By virtue of this appeal he has prayed that the impugned orders dated 28-7-1979, 6-7-1981 and 20-7- 1982 passed by the respondents Nos. 1, 2 and 3, respectively be set aside and he be re-instated in service with effect from the date of his dismissal.
2. Brief facts of the case are that a criminal case under section 11 of offence of Zina (Enforcement of Hudood Ordinance), 1979 was registered against one Naveed Masood for the abduction of a minor girl Mst. Shamim Akhtar at Police Station, Factory Area, Faisalabad on 7-5-1979. According to the F.
I. R. Mst. Shamim Akhtar was abducted seven days before the registration of the case. During the investigation' of the case the appellant was arrested and tried by the Court of Additional Sessions Judge, Faisalabad for offence under sections 6 and 11 of the Offence of Zina (Enforcement of Hudood Ordinance), 1979. When the departmental authorities came to know of the involvement of the appellant in this case, the Superintendent of Police, Faisalabad suspended the appellant from service and also issued a notice calling upon him to show cause as towhy he should not be awarded one of the major penalties including dismissal from service, as provided in the Punjab Police (Efficiency, and Discipline) Rules, 1975. The appellant submitted reply to the show-cause notice on 22-5-1979. The Superintendent of Police, heard the appellant in person and also examined the entire record of the case. He was not satisfied with the defence of the appellant and as such he dismissed - him from service with effect from 22-7-1979 vide his order of even date issued on 28-7-1979. It seems that the appellant did not file appeal to the Deputy Inspector--- General of Police at that time ; as he was facing trial before the learned Addl. Sessions Judge, Faisalabad. When the trial concluded the learned Addl. Sessions Judge vide his judgment dated 24-2-1980 acquitted the accused by giving them a benefit of doubt. After obtaining the copy from the said Court on 1-3-1980, the appellant filed the Appeal to the Deputy Inspector-General of Police on 6-3-1980 requesting him that he may be reinstated into service from the date of his dismissal because he has been held .To .Be innocent by the competent Court of Law. The Deputy Inspector- General of Police after examining the judgment of the trial Court and other relevant record was not inclined to accept his appeal and therefore he rejected it vide impugned order dated 6-7-1981.
Then the appellant submitted a revision petition before the Inspector-General of Police, Punjab, Lahore which too was considered and rejected vide order dated 22-7-1982. Hence this appeal.
3. We have heard the parties. It has been argued on behalf of the appellant that he was . Acquitted by the trial Court honourably and the opinion of the Deputy Inspector-General 'of Police that he has been acquitted due to benefit of doubt is incorrect. It has further been submitted that the tone and the tenure of the judgment shows that the appellant has been acquitted honourably on merits and the mere use of words the benefit of doubt so mentioned by the learned Addl. Sessions Judge will not have any bearing on the case. While placing reliance on the judgment of Ghulam Mustafa and others v. D. I.-G. Case No. 380/1221 of 1980, decided on 28-6-1982, it has been concluded that since the acquittal of the appellant was honourable, as such he could not have been dismissed from service. On the other hand the learned District Attorney has argued that the learned Addl. Sessions Judge has acquitted the accused by giving him the benefit of doubt for some technical flaws in the case. He has submitted that the acquittal of the accused is not at all honourable and the impugned orders have rightly been passed against him.
4. We have given our anxious thoughts to the arguments of the parties and have also perused the record carefully. The only issue for determination is whether the appellant was acquitted by the learned Addl. Sessions Judge by giving him- the benefit of doubt and whether that the acquittal can be treated as an honourable acquittal. For that purpose we have perused the judgment carefully. The learned Addl. Sessions Judge while dealing with the case in paras. 11, 12 and 13 of the judgment has held that the prosecution has not been able to prove the case beyond doubt. The learned trial Court has stated in the judgment that Mst. Shamim Akhtar had levelled the allegation of "Zinc" against the appellant, in her statement made under section - 164, Cr. P. C. On 13-5-1979 and that the name of the appellant was not mentioned in the F. I. R. It has further been stated in the judgment that the medical evidence does not corroborate the ocular evidence because the vaginal swa bs were not found to be stained with semen by the Chemical Examiner. The learned trial Court has also held that it was the case of elopement and not that of abduction or "Zinc". It is a fact that Mst. Shamim Akhter had categorically stated that the appellant had committed Zina upon her during the night between 30-4-1979 and 1-5-1979 and that he had joined her in the way when she was going with Naveed Masood. Similarly in her statement at the time of trial she categorically stated that she was subjected to Zina by the appellant. The learned trial Judge is of the view that since the sole testimony of Mst. Shamim Akhter on the point of Zina having been committed with her by the accused does not find corroboration from any piece of evidence so he was inclined to give him benefit of doubt. All these facts, inter alia would prove that the appellant was -not acquitted honourable and was given the benefit of doubt. Keeping in view the findings of the learned trial Judge in paras. 11, 12 and 13 of the judgment, we can safely conclude that the appellant was acquitted by the trial Court only on the benefit of doubt ; although he was specifically attributed the offence of Zina by the prosecution during the investigation, in her statement made under section 164, Cr. P. C. And at the time of trial.
5. In view of the above discussion, we hold' that there are no merits in this appeal which is dismissed. There will be no order as to cost.