SHUJAAT ALI KHAN, J. Shorn of unnecessary details, the facts forming factual canvass of this appeal are that while serving as Junior Clerk in the office of District Manager, Technical Education and Vocational Training Authority ("TEVTA"), Okara, respondent No.1 was proceeded against on the charge of absence from duty. On conclusion of the departmental proceedings, the Competent Authority imposed major penalty of removal from service vide order, dated 03.01.2018 against which he filed an appeal but without any success as the same was dismissed by the Appellate Authority vide order, dated 21.03.2018. Against the orders, passed by the Competent Authority as well as Appellate Authority, respondent No.1 tried his luck by tiling revision petition but without any fruitful result as it was dismissed by the Secretary/Chairman TEVTA, vide order, dated 12.04.2018.
Feeling aggrieved of the order passed by the Departmental Authorities, respondent No.1 filed Writ Petition (bearing No. 206734 of 2018) before this Court which was accepted by the learned Judge- in-Chamber through order, dated 06.03.2019, against which the appellant-TEVTA has filed this Intra Court Appeal.
2. When confronted with the query as to how this appeal is maintainable as the orders impugned in the writ petition were passed by the Appellate as well as Revisional Authority, this Intra Court Appeal is barred in terms of proviso to section 3(2) of the Law Reforms Ordinance, 1972, learned counsel for the appellant states that since the appellant could not challenge the order passed by it or any its functionaries, the embargo contained in the aforesaid provision is not applicable. To fortify his contentions, learned counsel has referred to the judgment of a Division Bench of this Court reported as National Electric Power Regulatory Authority v. Faisalabad Electric Supply Company Limited (PLD 2015 Lahore 661).
3. We have heard the learned counsel for the appellant and have also gone through the case-law cited at the bar.
4. A remedy of Intra Court Appeal has been provided to a person aggrieved of a decision of a learned Single Judge rendered in exercise of civil original jurisdiction. The said provision, for convenience of reference, is reproduced herein-below:- "3. Appeal to High Court in certain cases.---(1) An appeal shall lie to a Bench of two or more Judges of a High Court from a decree passed or final order made by a single Judge of that Court in the exercise of its original civil jurisdiction.
(2) An appeal shall also lie to a Bench of two or more Judges of a High Court from an order made by a Single Judge of that Court under [clause (1) of Article 199 of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan' not being an order made under sub-paragraph (i) of paragraph (b) of that clause: Provided that the appeal referred to in this subsection shall not be available or competent if the application brought before the High Court under Article 199 arises out of any proceedings in which the law applicable provided for at least one appeal [or one revision or one review] to any court, tribunal or authority against the original order.
(3) No appeal shall lie under subsection (1) or subsection (2) from an interlocutory order or an order which does not dispose of the entire case before the Court.
(4) Nothing contained in this Ordinance shall be construed as affecting:-
(a) any appeal under the provisions of the Letters Patent applicable to a High Court or under section 102 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), which was pending immediately before the commencement of this Ordinance; or
(b) any appeal or petition for leave to appeal from a decree, judgment or order of a single Judge of a High Court made to the Supreme Court before the commencement of the Law Reforms (Amendment) Ordinance, 1972."
According to proviso to section 3(2) of the Law Reforms Ordinance, 1972, the remedy of Intra Court Appeal is not available if the constitutional petition filed before this Court in terms of Article 199 of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973, arose out of any proceedings in which the law applicable, provided for at least one appeal or one revision or one review to any Court, Tribunal or Authority against the original order. Insofar as the case in hand is concerned, admittedly respondent No.1 assailed the orders passed by the Competent Authority, Appellate Authority and Revisional Authority in the constitutional petition, hence the bar contained under proviso to section 3(2) of the Law Reforms Ordinance, 1972, comes into play and impede the way of the appellant- TEVTA to maintain this appeal.
5. During the course of arguments, learned counsel for the appellant put much emphasis on the fact that since the Authority could not challenge any order passed by it or any of its functionaries, the embargo contained under proviso to Section 3(2) of the Law Reforms Ordinance, 1972 is not attracted. In this regard, we are of the view that the plain reading of Section 3 of the Law Reforms Ordinance, 1972, quoted supra, does not draw any line of distinction on the point as to whether any authority can file an appeal against the proceedings subject matter of writ petition before the learned Single Bench or not rather the import of law is that whenever a remedy of appeal, review or revision has been provided against an order challenged in constitutional jurisdiction of this Court the remedy of Intra Court Appeal is not available in such matters.
6. It is well entrenched by now that while interpreting a provision C of law its plain meanings are to be taken. The language in which proviso to subsection (2) to Section 3 of the Law Reforms Ordinance, 1972 has been couched clearly demonstrates that remedy of Intra Court Appeal has been barred in the cases where the order impugned in the writ petition is appealable, revisable or reviewable without putting any condition. In this scenario assertion of the learned counsel for the appellant that since appellant-TEVTA could not file appeal against the order passed by itself or by any of its functionaries this appeal is maintainable, carries no weight.
7. Now coming to the case-law referred by learned counsel for the appellant, we are of the view that the same is inapplicable to the facts and circumstances of present case inasmuch as the question regarding maintainability in the said appeal revolved around the fact as to whether the act of National Electric Power Regulatory Authority (NEPRA) deciding the motion for leave to review vide order, dated 16.06.2014, could hinder the way of NEPRA to file the Infra Court Appeal against the order passed by the learned Single Judge. To fortify this fact, reference can be made to the following portion from the referred judgment:- "7. The appellant decided the motion for leave to review vide order dated 16.6.2014 which was impugned before the learned judge in chambers, who set aside the said order, holding that Rule 16 (6) of the Tariff Rules required full strength of the Authority to hear the motion for leave to review. The Authority has impugned the judgment of the learned single judge before us and is not aggrieved of the order issued in the motion for leave to review as the said order was actually the order passed by the Authority itself. The Act read with Tariff Rules cannot possibly contemplate a remedial forum for the Authority where it would challenge its own orders as the Authority itself is the appellate and reviewing authority under the Act and the Tariff Rules. Therefore, section 12A has no applicability to the case of the appellant. The provision of one appeal, review or revision against the original order, under section 3 of the Ordinance must be available to the parties to the dispute in order to question the maintainability of the ICA. No such remedy is available to the appellant under the Act and therefore the appellant cannot be deprived of its right of appeal
(ICA) before us. Any such interpretation would also be against the right to access to justice.
Hence, the preliminary objection, being without any substance is overruled."
A cursory glance over the afore-quoted para of the referred judgment renders it crystal clear that the facts of the referred case were at poles apart from the present case, hence the said case does not come to the rescue to the appellant.
8. The Apex Court of the country, in the cases reported as JS Bank Limited, Karachi and others v.
Province of Punjab through Secretary Food, Lahore and others (2021 SCMR 1617), SME Bank Limited through President Islamabad and others v. Izhar ul Haq (2019 SCMR 939), Messrs Punjab Sugar Mills v. Government of Punjab and others (2011 SCMR 1950) and ECHO West International (Pvt.) Ltd. Lahore v. Government of Punjab through Secretary and 4 others (PLD 2009 SC 406), has held that in the matters wherein remedy of appeal, review and revision has been provided against the order impugned in a petition filed under Article 199 of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973, the Intra Court Appeal against the order passed by a learned Single Judge is not maintainable. In this backdrop, no contrary opinion can be formed.
9. For what has been discussed above, we have no hesitation to hold that the present Intra Court Appeal is not maintainable. Consequently, the same is hereby dismissed with no order as to costs.