' FAKHRUDDIN H. SHAIKH, J.-This is an intra-Court appeal from the order of learned Single Judge of this Court dated 2-6-1982, whereby an injunction application filed by the appellant in Suit No, 75/1982 was dismissed.
2. The case of the appellant in the above suit was that she had agreed to purchase Bungalow No,'
T-7 situated at 15 East Street, Pakistan Defence Services Officers Co-operative Housing Society' Ltd., Karachi from the respondent for Rs, 1,80,000 by a sale agreement dated 29-4-1972 and that in pursuance of the sale agreement Rs, 80,000 were paid to the respondent. Before the sale agreement husband of the appellant, namely Sami Ahmed Jafri was occupying this bungalow as tenant of the respondent. The respondent had filed ejectment application under the West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance against Sami Ahmed Jafri, which was allowed in March, 1972. No appeal was filed against that order. However, warrant of ejectment was issued against Sami Ahmed Jafri. Then he filed appeal before the High Court but it was withdrawn. Thereafter the present suit was filed in the year 1982 for specific performance of the said sale agreement.
Alongwith the above suit the appellant had also filed an application for temporary injunction praying that the respondent may be restrained from-ejecting the appellant from the said bungalow pending disposal of the suit.
3. The respondent filed her counter-affidavit denying that any sale agreement was executed by here in favour of the appellant or that any amount in pursuance of the said agreement was received by her. Her case was that the sale agreement is a forged document and that the suit has been filed simply to frustrate execution proceedings in the ejectment case which was decreed as long back as in 1972.
4. The learned Single Judge after hearing the parties came to the conclusion that the execution of the sale agreement by the respondent in favour of the appellant as weli as payment of Rs, 80,000 as advance by the appellant to the respondent in pursuance of the sale agreement, was doubtful.
He was also of the view that granting of temporary injunction would practically amount to stay of execution of the ejectment order, which was upheld even in appeal, and that interference of the Court to stay judicial proceedings in any other Court would not be justified unless there is apprehension of multiplicity of action.
5. We have heard the counsel for the appellant and are of the view that the learned Single Judge has dismissed the injunction application of the appellant for cogent reason. The sale agreement is alleged to have been executed in April, 1972, whereas the suit for specific performance of the sale agreement was filed in the year 1982. It also transpires from the record that on 13-4-1972 Sami Ahmed Jafri, husband of the appellant, had addressed a letter to the respondent, enclosing a draft of Rs, 3,000 being part payment of the arrears of rent. He had further promised to pay the remaining arrears after some time. The learned Single Judge concluded that if the husband of the appellant was not in a position to pay full arrears of rent on 13-4-1972, when the said letter was addressed to the respondent, then how it was possible for his wife, the appellant, to pay Rs, 80,000 on 29-4-1972 to the respondent as part payment of value of the bungalow. In view of these facts the learned Single Judge rightly came to the conclusion that the appellant had failed to establish a prima facie case. We are of the view that prima facie the object underlying the suit is simply to frustrate the ejectment order which was passed by the Rent Controller as long back as in the year 1972 and which was not challenged in appeal.
6. While dismissing the injunction application of the appellant the learned Single Judge has directed the respondent that:- "if she is able to obtain the possession of the disputed house she will not sell it or in any manner transfer or create charge of any nature nor shall she part with the possession of the said house till further orders."
' This direction would, in our view, adequately safeguard the interest of the appellant in case she is successful in establishing her claim for specific performance. We, therefore, see no substance in this appeal and dismiss it in limine. We may however, state that whatever observations have been made herein are of tentative nature and the suit will be decided on its own merits without taking the same into consideration.