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1983 PLC (C. S.) 741

Hamid Chaudhry, Member MUHAMMAD ARSHAD vs SUPERINTENDENT OF

Citation1983 PLC (C. S.) 741
CourtPunjab Service Tribunal
Judge(s)Sardar Abdul Jabbar Khan, Abdul Hameed Chaudhry
ResultCase remanded

S. ABDUL JABBAR KHAN (CHAIRMAN). -Muhammad Arshad, ex-Head Constable has filed this appeal under section 4 of the Punjab Service Tribunals Act, 1974, in which he has impleaded Superintendent of Police, Faisalabad as respondent. This appeal was later on amended as the appellate authority was not made respondent in this case and vide amended appeal dated 30-12- 1481, appellant has impleaded D.I.-G Police, Sargodha Range, as respondent.

2. By virtue of this appeal he has prayed that original order of S. P. Dated 20-5-1980 as well as order of D.I.-G. Police, Sargodha Range dated 20-9-1981, be also set aside.

3. Brief facts of the case are that the appellant joined as Constable on 3-8-1959 and was promoted as officiating Head Constable from 1-12-1969. He was confirmed as such on 1-12-1976. On 28-4- 1980, the appellant entered into a quarrel over a challan of Wagon No. LEX-3464. For traffic violation,' with the Traffic Police. This quarrel ultimately came to the notice of the competent authority which was pleased to issue a show-cause notice under the Punjab Police E & D Rules, 1975, for major penalty. The appellant did not appear before the competent authority in response to the said notice although it is alleged that notice was pasted in the presence of two witnesses at his doors. The competent authority proceeded ex parte against the appellant and dismissed him from service for the said misconduct. He filed appeal before the D. I.-G Police Range Sargodha and again he did not appear before the said authority which confirmed the punishment of dismissal, so imposed upon him by the competent authority on the ground that again he failed to appear before the appellate authority. Hence this appeal.

4. We have heard the learned counsel for the appellant as well as Mr. Muhammad Sharif, P.S.I., representing the respondents in this case and have perused the record with their assistance.

5. Learned counsel for the appellant has submitted that the first service, which is alleged to have been made against the appellant, was fictitious as the two witnesses so mentioned by the prosecution in this. Case, have filed affidavits in which they have denied their presence at the spot and have further alleged that they were forced to sign the two blank papers by the prosecution. It has been further submitted that there is no evidence on the record which could show that the appellant was present in the office of the D.I.-G. Sargodha Range on the day when be was called upon to attend his appeal. According to the learned counsel the appellant has fallen victim due to the intrigues of his earstwhile enemies and has been condemned without being heard.

6. On the other hand the P.S.I. Appearing on behalf of the respon--dents, has submitted that the appellant was given full opportunity to defend himself, firstly through substituted service, and secondly through personal information but he failed to avail the opportunity and the authority (s) have no alternative but to proceed ex parte. In this matter he has vehemently argued that the appellant has no case and the appeal be dismissed.

7. We have given our anxious thought to the arguments advanced by the parties before us and find that the basic issue in this case was, whether the appellant owned a wagon which was a subject- matter of traffic challan by the Traffic Police, and if it was so, whether he did threatened the Traffic Police on duty with a dire consequence.

8. To our mind this issue should have been resolved by a regular inquiry in this case and dispensation of the same was neither justifiable nor proper. This was a case where evidence has been sifted by the com--petent authority to know whether the allegation levelled against the appellant was true or not. .

9. With regard to the matter of substituted service there are two affidavits of the witnesses who are supposed to have signed that they were never present on the spot and instead they were asked to sign some blank papers. We are also not satisfied with the observation of the D.I.-G. Police that the appellant was present in his office on the date when hi: appeal was heard by him. It was incumbent upon him r'to mention his source of information about this matter, if tie was in any manner informed about the presence of the appellant in his office. Mere presumption would not make the order valid, as nobody can be condemned on presumption and conjectures.

10 The appellant is an old hand in service, who has served the department for full 21 years and was promoted and confirmed, which would show that he had served the department well. In these circumstances, it was all the more fair that the appellant should have been given full chance to defend himself before a regular Enquiry Officer who has to sift the evidence ether in his favour or otherwise. Unless and until it was found that the appellant did own a vehicle which was being lied by him and on that account entered into a quarrel with the Traffic Police, the punish--ment of dismissal would be a very harsh punishment otherwise,

11. In view of the above analysis of the facts of the case as well as of the procedure so laid down under the Police Rules dealing with civil servants with such matters, we set aside both the orders so impugned, and direct, that the appellant be given a chance to defend himself properly and squarely as the matter involved needs full probe by sifting an evidence either way.

12. The appellant be re-instated in service so as to give him the status of a civil servant and a fresh inquiry be conducted against him under the E & D Rules, therefore, we remand the case for further inquiry to the competent authority. Before parting with this case we will direct the competent authority to complete the inquiry within 3 months as this case is already an old one and the appellant in this case, should know his fate one way or the other. The period during which the appellant remained out of service will be considered as extraordinary leave without pay. Parties wilt bear their own costs.

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