MUAMMAD FAISAL KAMAL ALAM, J. Both the titled Civil Revisions are filed against the Judgment and Decree dated 08.09.2006 handed down by the learned Appellate Court in Civil Appeals Nos.55 of 2002 and 56 of 2002, preferred by present Respondents Nos.1 to 8 against dismissal of their Suit No.18 of 1996 by the learned Trial Court, while decreeing the Suit No.60 of 1995, instituted by present Respondent No.9 (Mst. Lateefa), present Applicant No.1 and predecessor-in-interest of other Applicants.
2. The controversy mainly revolves around the property No.III-13/59, situated in the Ward No.3, Mehrab-2 Town, Taluka Kandiaro, District Naushero Feroz, admeasuring 276 Square Yards (the "Suit Property"), which was transferred in the name of Ashiq Ali, that is, predecessor-in-interest of present Respondents Nos. 1 to 8, by the then Settlement Authorities through Permanent Transfer Deed ("PTD").
3. Since multiple litigation was filed by the parties against each other, therefore, for the sake of clarity, specific description of parties is necessary.
4. The first case was instituted by present Respondents Nos.1 to 8 in both Civil Revisions) by filing a Suit No: 27 of 1995, for Permanent Injunction, against the present Applicants in respect of the Suit Properly. The present Respondents Nos.1 to 8, are legal heirs (sons, daughter and widow, respectively) of deceased Ashiq Ali, who was undisputedly the owner of the Suit Property, only for the sake of reference, may be referred to as "Owners". However, this suit, admittedly, was later withdrawn with the permission to file a fresh one.
The predecessor-in-interest of present Applicants (in both Civil Revisions) filed a Suit for Specific Performance -- Suit No.60 of 1995 through present Respondent No.9, Mst. Lateefa (in both Civil Revisions) being Plaintiff and mother of Applicant No.1 (Sajjad), Mst. Batooni (grandmother of present Applicant No.1) and mother of Muhammad Ibrahim, Applicant in Civil Revision No.125 of 2006, against present Respondents Nos.1 to 8, in respect of the Suit Property, that the same was agreed to be sold by above named Ashiq Ali to Muhammad Jameel, the father and husband of present Applicant No.1 and Respondent No.9; present Applicants may for the sake of reference only be referred to as "Claimants", whereas, present Respondent No.9 (Mst. Lateefa widow of Muhammad Jameel) may be referred to as the "Objector".
The above Owners subsequently filed a Suit No.18 of 1996 against Muhammad Ibrahim (son of late Mst. Batooni), Respondent No.9 and Mst. Batooni, for inter alia, cancellation of Sale Agreement in question.
5. To appreciate the entire controversy in a complete and effective manner, it is also necessary to mention in brief the stance/pleadings of the contesting parties in this Decision.
6. Suit No.60 of 1995 for Specific Performance was filed by Respondent No. 9 (Mst. Lateefa) and predecessor-in-interest of present Applicants, alleging that an Agreement of Sale dated "14.05.1989 was entered into between Ashiq Ali [predecessor-in-interest of present Respondents Nos.1 to 8 [Owners] and Muhammad Jameel [father of present Applicant No.1 -- Sajjad], son of late Batooni -- who was Plaintiff No.2 and brother of Applicant Mohammed Ibrahim (now deceased) and represented through his legal heirs -- Applicants Nos.2(a)(i) to 2(a)(xiii), for a total sale consideration of Rs.20,000/-, out of which, Rs.16,000/- was paid and remaining Rs.4000 was to be paid at the time of execution of Sale Deed. Original Vendor - Ashiq Ali expired in the year 1990 and Muhammad Jamil, the purported original vendee passed away in the month of April 1993 [as per paragraphs Nos.10 and 11 of the plaint in Suit No.60 of 1995]. Further averred that when present Applicants were served with summons of Suit No.27 of 1995, filed by present Owners, Claimants approached the Owners and upon their refusal, Claimants filed the Lis No.60 of 1995, primarily, seeking Specific Performance and a perpetual injunction against present Respondents Nos.1 to 8 that no third party interest should be created.
7. In the Written Statement filed by Owners / Respondents Nos.1 to 8 in the above Lis, it is stated that above named Ashiq Ali never entered into any Sale Agreement with Mohammad Jamil, but the Suit Property was given to Mst. Batooni (the Plaintiff No.3 / Applicant No.2), mother of Muhammad Jameel and above Muhammad Ibrahim on temporary basis, because Muhammad Ibrahim turned them out of his house; since, parties are related to each other; hence, late Ashiq Ali (predecessor- in-interest of Owners) showed sympathy towards Applicants. Further averred that said Ashiq Ali raised katcha construction at the Suit Property. In brief, pleadings of subsequent Suit No.18 of 1996 filed by present Respondents Nos.1 to 8 [Owners] against present Applicants / Claimants and Respondent No.9, is, reiteration of the above. It is specifically stated that the aforereferred Sale Agreement is a forged document [paragraph No.10 of the plaint] and sought its cancellation, besides, handing over of vacant physical possession of the Suit Property. The Written Statement filed by present Applicants is reiteration of their stance as mentioned in their above Suit No.60 of 1995.
8. Precis of the case law cited by Mr. Kalandar Bakhsh M. Phulpoto, learned counsel for the Applicants in support of his arguments is that a party would be bound by his pleadings and would not be permitted to prove beyond pleadings; sale agreement does not require to be registered or necessarily attested by the notary public (learned counsel for the Applicants has cited this case law in support of his arguments, that finding of learned Appellate Court that the subject sale agreement was neither attested on oath nor registered, is an incorrect finding); even a scribe can be treated as a marginal witness if he deposes that executant signed or thumb marked the document in his presence (this case law of single bench of learned Lahore High Court has been cited in support of his arguments, that the subject sale agreement fully complies with the requirement of Articles 17 and 79 of the Evidence Law as it is attested by the above named two witnesses so also even scribe, who deposed as P.W.-1 -- Muhammad Chuttal, endorsed the version of other witnesses produced on behalf of the Claimants). Comparing of signatures of parties by the Executing Court and the First Appellate Court, while the matter was earlier referred to handwriting expert for his opinion, which was not finalized, the procedure adopted by the Courts below was totally contrary to rule laid down by Superior Courts (this case law is cited in support of his arguments, that the learned Appellate Court should not have compared the thumb impression of late Ashiq Ali, by looking at the earlier pleadings of other cases filed by him (late Ashiq Ali), bearing his thumb impression and comparing the same with the alleged thumb impression on the subject Sale Agreement); decree is binding on the parties to the suit and not strangers.
9. Crux of the case law cited by Mr. A. M. Mobeen Khan, learned counsel for the Respondents Nos.1 to 8 is that concession (admission) on the part of an advocate does not absolve the Authority / Courts from examining the question of limitation and deciding the same correctly. The Court is bound to examine the question of limitation whether it is agitated or not in view of Section 3 of the Limitation Act, 1908 [this case law is cited in support of the argument that learned Appellate Court has erred while deciding Issue No.6 that both the above Suits are not time bared, because the counsel for present Respondents Nos.1 to 8 (Owners) conceded to this]; it is a basic and fundamental principle of administration of justice that in case there is a conflict between the judgments of the Trial Court and First Appellate Court, then normally judgment of the First Appellate Court is to be given preference, unless the judgment of the Appellate Court is based on misreading and non-reading of evidence or in violation of the principles laid down by the Superior Courts. In a suit party seeking execution of sale agreement is essentially required to deposit the sale consideration in Court (this recent case law of the Honourable Supreme Court is cited in support of the arguments that till date the present Applicants have not deposited the balance sale consideration to show their bona fide willingness towards enforcement of sale agreement); onus to prove an agreement to sell lies on plaintiff, unless its existence is admitted by defendant and for proving the execution of document requiring attestation of two witnesses, then it is mandatory to examine both witnesses if they are alive; treating testimony of scribe with that of an attesting witness could only defeat the letter and spirit of provision of the Evidence Law. The Scribe can be examined by a party to corroborate the evidence of the attesting witness but not as a substitute therefor [this case law is cited to advance the arguments, that Muhammad Chuttal -- P.W.-1, cannot be considered as an attesting witness, because he was a Scriber of the purported Sale Agreement in question.
10. At this juncture, I must discuss separately one of the judgments cited by learned counsel for the Applicants, reported as PLD 1956 (W. P.) Lahore page-354 -- Muhammad Rafiq v. Muhammad Zahur Nasir and others. This judgment was referred in support of the arguments, that even testimonies of attesting witness--Muhammad Tufail (P.W.-3) and the above named P.W.-1 (Muhammad Chuttal) are sufficient, who have supported the version of Claimants and the Sale Agreement in question --Exhibit 33-A, stands proved, although the other attesting witness viz. Sher Muhammad (D.W.-I) has refuted the version of the Claimants and denied the fact that above deceased Ashiq Ali and late Muhammad Jameel, executed / signed purported Sale Agreement in his presence. While explaining the Section 68 of the erstwhile Evidence Act (1872) in the above reported decision, learned Court has held that "........ This would show that the provisions of section 68 will apply to those cases only in which the dispute regarding the execution of the document is between the maker of the document and the person in whose favour it purports to have been executed."
After promulgation of present Evidence Law -- Qanun-e-Shahadat Order, 1984, certain provisions have been incorporated to streamline the present Evidence Law with the principles of Islamic jurisprudence. In this context Articles 17 and 79 are inserted, requiring an instrument pertaining to financial obligation, to be attested either by two men or one man and two women. This aspect has been discussed by the Superior Courts in several decisions, including in the case of Mst. Rasheeda Begum and others v. Muhammad Yousaf and others [2002 SCMR page-1089). The judgment relates to a controversy arising out of agreement to sell on the basis of which the suit for Specific Performance was filed. The Honourable Supreme Court has explained that before the promulgation of the Qanun-e-Shahadat Order, 1984, an agreement to sell was not required to be attested by two witnesses; although as a common practice, an agreement to sell was reduced to writing and attested by witnesses; but after promulgation of the present Evidence Law (Qanun-e-Shahadat Order, 1984), execution has to be proved in accordance with Article 79 (by examining the two attesting witnesses). In this judgment, it is also held that statement of petition writer, one who is scriber of an agreement to sell, is not enough to prove the execution of a document in question.
11. In view of the above established legal position, in my considered view, the above reported judgment in Rafiq Case (ibid -- PLD 1956 (WP) Lahore page-354], in the first place, should not have been cited by learned counsel for the Applicants.
12. Since there are conflicting findings of the learned Appellate Court and Trial Court, therefore, evidence of parties has been examined.
13. After consideration of the record of these two Civil Revisions, certain material facts have to be highlighted _ i. It is averred by the present Applicants / Claimants, that the Suit Property was purchased by Muhammad Jameel from the above named Ashiq Ali, who is represented by legal heirs / Respondents Nos.1 to 8 -- the Owners. The Sale Agreement has been exhibited as Exhibit 33/A which is disputed by Owners.
Interestingly, the litigation for specific performance of this agreement together with other reliefs as mentioned- in Suit No.60 of 1995 was not initiated by the purported original vendee, that is, above named Muhammad Jameel nor any of the litigation is defended or initiated by the original undisputed owner of the Suit Property, above named Ashiq Ali, although it is deposed in the evidence by main witness of Applicants, namely, Muhammad Ibrahim (P.W.-2), that Ashiq Ali died in the year 1990 and said Muhammad Jameel, the purported original vendee died subsequently, after couple of years, from the date of the execution of the alleged Agreement (Exhibit 33-A) on 14.05.1989. ii. The above named Mst. Lateefan, present Respondent No.9, who initially filed the above Suit for Specific Performance (Suit No. 60 of 1995) as Plaintiff No.1, later turned hostile and filed an Application under Order XXXII, Rule 2 of C.P.C., which is available in the record as Exhibit 43, in the Record of Proceeding (R&P) of Civil Appeal No.55 of 2002. It is stated by said Respondent No.9 that the above mentioned Sale Agreement was not a valid agreement and the entire story was concocted by Muhammad Ibrahim, who was real brother of the purported original vendee Muhammad Jameel. This Application was supported by an affidavit. Even though this version was disputed by contesting claimants -- Muhammad Ibrahim, who is now represented through his legal heirs, and her above Application was rejected vide Order dated 08.01.2004, and instead of her, said Muhammad Ibrahim was appointed as guardian-ad-litem for present Applicant No. 1 -- Sajjad Ali (son of the alleged original vendee Muhammad Jameel). iii. The purported Agreement of Sale has been executed on 04.05.1989, whereas, Suit for Specific Performance was filed on 08.10.1995, by present Applicants through Respondent No.9. In terms of Article 113 of the Limitation Act, 1908, a proceeding of the nature is to be brought within a prescribed period of three years, whereas, the above Lis was filed after almost six years.
In this regard, the Issue framed by the Trial Court was not pressed by the Owners in the Civil Appeals (ibid) and it was held that both suits are maintainable; but, this aspect has to be answered in view of the reported decisions cited by the learned counsel for the Owners / present Respondents Nos.1 to 8.
14. Adverting to the testimonies of witnesses. Both the Claimants and Owners have examined three witnesses each.
15. PW-1 is Mohammed Chuttal, who has stated that he 'wrote' the purported agreement on 14.0- 5.1989. Rs. 16,000/- was claimed to be paid to above Ashiq Ali and Rs.4000 was the balance. He further deposed that both (purported original Vendee Muhammad Jameel) and late Ashiq Ali (owner) signed the agreement before the said scribe -- PW-1, Tufail and Mohammad Sharif and Shair Muhammad was the attesting witness In his cross-examination, he has acknowledged that parties were not known to him, that is, the above named PW-1. He has denied the suggestion that said sale agreement was a manipulated document. He has stated that he wrote the Sale Agreement in his office at Mehrabpur, while denying suggestion that parties and witnesses did not sign the said Agreement before PW-1. The purported Sale Agreement has been produced by said PW-1 as Exhibit 33-A and is of 04.05.1989 and not 14.05.1989 as stated by the Claimants in their pleadings and the above named PW-1 in his evidence. English translation of this Agreement has been filed in the present proceeding by the learned counsel for Claimants vide his Statement dated 0I.O2.2021.
16. Second witness is Mohammed Ibrahim, that is, one of the Applicants, who deposed as P.W.-2 and Applicant in Civil Revision No.125 of 2006. He has reiterated the execution of said Sale Agreement and further stated that he was present when possession of the Suit Property was initially given to his brother, the deceased Jameel (purported original Vendee) and is also present when above late Jameel and Ashiq Ali signed the Agreement. He has further testified that Rs.16,000/- was paid in his presence by late Muhammad Jameel at the 'plot'. He has reiterated that above named persons / witnesses were present during the transaction. In his cross-examination he admitted the fact that there was a litigation between said PW-2 -- Mohammed Ibrahim and deceased Ashiq Ali and as a result thereof the said PW-2 had to hand over the possession of a house to Ashiq Ali, whereafter he started living with his brother, late Muhammad Jameel (purported original Vendee). He has admitted the fact that he was not made as one of the witnesses in the Sale Agreement.
17. The above P.W.-1 (Muhammad Chuttal) has named three persons, besides, him, Ashiq Ali (Owner) and Muhammad Jameel (alleged purchaser -- vendee), who were present when above Sale Agreement was executed. Those three persons were Tufail, Muhammad Sharif and Sher Muhammad. The said P.W.-1 did not mention that P.W.-2 -- Muhammad Ibrahim was also present, whereas, the latter (said P.W.-2 -- Muhammad Ibrahim) has deposed that he was present when the parties had gone to Muhammad Chuttal for Sale Agreement. This is a contradiction between the testimonies of both Witnesses of Claimants, which is material.
18. The third witness from the side of Applicants (Claimants) is Mohammad Tufail -- PW-3, who is one of the attesting witnesses (as claimed) of the subject Sale Agreement. The said witness -- P.W.-3 reiterated the examination in chief of earlier two witnesses. In his cross-examination he has denied the suggestion that deceased Ashiq Ali did not put his left thumb impression on the Sale Agreement nor the same was signed by Mohammed Jameel and that said P.W-3, manipulated the Sale Agreement with the help of above P.W.-2 (Muhammad Ibrahim).
19. The first witness from the Owners' side (Respondents Nos.1 to 8) is Sher Mohammad -- DW-1, who according to the witnesses of Applicants was present when the said agreement was signed / executed and is one of the attesting witnesses. The said DW-1/Sher Muhammad has completely denied the factum of any Sale Agreement, or payment made in pursuance thereof. He has also testified that possession of the Suit Property was never handed over in his presence by the said Ashiq Ali to purported original Vendee -- Muhammad Jameel. He has acknowledged the fact that the Sale Agreement (Exhibit 33-A) bears his left thumb impression but the contents of the same were never read over to him. He states that said Ibrahim (PW-2) asked the said DW-1 to put his left thumb impression as an attesting witness, as the said Ibrahim (P.W.-2) had sold a property to one person, namely, Fajra. In his cross examination the said D.W.-1, could not be contradicted nor his credibility was impeached. When questioned, he has denied that at the time of execution of above Exhibit 33-A, that is, purported Sale Agreement, the original Vendee -- Muhammad Jameel was alive. He has also denied the suggestion that another attesting witness -- Tufail put his left thumb impression in presence of DW-1. No question was put to the above D.W.-1, the attesting witness, about his assertion in the examination-in-chief, that he put his left thumb impression on the purported Sale Agreement -- Exhibit 33-A, because he was asked to do so by Muhammad Ibrahim (P.W.-2), who told the said D.W.-1 -- Sher Muhammad, that the said Exhibit 33-A is in respect of some land sold by said Muhammad Ibrahim -- P.W.-2 (as mentioned above). This was material assertion in the testimony of D.W.-1, who basically explained the reason for his putting left thumb impression on Exhibit 33-A, which was never challenged or questioned in cross-examination, which means that this version has been admitted by the Applicants / Owners. It is a settled rule of evidence that if a material assertion is not questioned in the cross-examination, then it is deemed to be admitted by the opponent party. A well-known judgment handed down in the case of Mst.
Noor Jehan Begum v. Syed Mujtaba Ali Naqvi, reported as 1991 SCMR page-2300, is relevant here.
Main witness of Respondents Nos.1 to 8, viz. Abdul Hameed has led an extensive evidence and produced number of documents including the PTD (Permanent Transfer Deed) which is a title document for the Suit Property (in favour of late Ashiq Ali); record of litigation that took place between his father, the above named Ashiq Ali [Late] and afore-mentioned Muhammad Ibrahim, to show that the latter [said Mohammed Ibrahim] was evicted from the property that was let out to him by the deceased father of Abdul Hameed [present Respondent No. 1/owner] and out of vengeance the said Muhammad Ibrahim initiated the litigation. He has reiterated his stance as mentioned in the pleadings that the said Sale Agreement -- Exhibit 33-A is a forged document as his father (late Ashiq Ali) never executed any such document. He has also produced original NIC bearing number 532-31-084085 showing the left thumb impression and stated that incorrect NIC (National Identity Card) number is mentioned on the above alleged Sale Agreement. He has also mentioned in the examination in chief that after the death of his father, since Applicants tried to demolish the house / Suit Property, which compelled the Respondents Nos.1 to 8 to initiate above referred litigation -- the first Suit No.27 of 1995. In his cross-examination the said DW-2 (Respondent No.1) could not be shaken; his testimony is considered and no fatal contradiction can be found and he was not falsified with regard to non-execution of the alleged Sale Agreement and that any amount in pursuance thereof was paid to his deceased father (Ashiq Ali). He has deposed that he cannot recognize the left thumb impression of his deceased father out of 5 to 6 impressions if placed before him. Learned Advocate for the Applicants has argued that this portion of his cross- examination has belied his overall testimony. This aspect will be discussed in the following paragraphs of this Decision.
20. The third witness from the Respondent side was Fazuldin, being DW-3. He reiterated the main stance of Respondent / Owners, that Suit Property was given to late Mohammed Jameel for his temporary residence. In cross-examination, he has denied the suggestion that he deposed what was told to him by the DW-2, viz. Abdul Hameed.
21. Record of present proceeding also shows that vide order dated 10.03.1997, learned Trial Court has sent the document bearing left thumb impression of late Ashiq All to an expert for his opinion, but no conclusive opinion was given by the expert.
Exhibit 33-A, the alleged Sale Agreement in respect of the sale of the Suit Property for consideration of Rs.20,000/-, has been perused. DW-1 -- Muhammad Chuttal is the scribe, whereas, this document has been purportedly witnessed by two persons, namely Sher Muhammad (D.W.-2) and Muhammad Tufail, who was examined as PW-3.
Evaluation of above testimonies of witnesses particularly attesting witnesses, who have clearly contradicted each other's version, instead of corroboration, leads to the conclusion that execution of alleged Sale Agreement and payment of sale consideration in pursuance thereof, has not been proved. Rather, claim of Applicants in support of their above Suit No.60 of 1995, for Specific Performance, has been disproved.
22. Onus is on Applicants to prove the sale transaction in respect of the Suit Property, which in view of the above discussion, they have failed to prove. The arguments of learned counsel for Applicants, that Muhammad Chuttal -- PW-1, being a scribe is also a witness to the entire transaction, has no force, in view of the case law/rule laid down by the Honourable Supreme Court in the cases of Farid and Rasheeda Begum (2015 SCMR page-1044 and 2002 SCMR page-1089, respectively). The mandatory requirement as envisaged in the Articles 17 and 79 of the Evidence Law has not been complied with. Consequently, no sale consideration was given, as claimed by the Owners, has also been proved, thus, disproving the claim of the Applicants.
23: Consequently, the arguments of learned counsel for the Applicants, that since D.W.-2 -- Abdul Hameed, in his cross-examination has stated that he cannot recognize left thumb impression of his deceased father (Ashiq Ali), if several thumb impressions are shown to him, is not a fatal contradiction to the claim of present Respondents Nos.1 to 8 -- Owners, in view of the above discussion.
24. The other significant aspect of this controversy is, that the unrebutted documentary evidence produced by DW-2 -Respondent No.1, about the past litigation between said Mohammed Ibrahim -- PW-2 and late Ashiq Ali (father of Respondent No.1), after the evaluation of testimonies, leads to this conclusion that the present litigation was started at the instigation of said Mohammad Ibrahim (now deceased). This stance of Respondents Nos.1 to 8 / Owners is further fortified by the fact, as highlighted in the foregoing paragraphs, that it is one of the unique cases, where the original vendor and purported vendee (above named Ashiq Ali and Muhammad Jameel) did not raise any dispute about sale of the Suit Property during their life time, but it has been initiated by the above named Muhammad Ibrahim, through Respondent No.9 Mst. Lateefan, who later filed the above Application, contradicting the stance of present Applicants.
25. Although, to this extent, argument of learned counsel for the Applicant, is correct that there is erroneous finding by the learned Appellate Court that the alleged Agreement of Sale should have been registered. An Agreement to Sell is not required to be compulsorily registered, but it is to be executed and attested in the manner already discussed hereinabove. Despite the fact that learned Appellate Court has erred in holding that an Agreement to Sell should have been registered, since does not have any adverse impact on the merits of the case, therefore, such illegality in the impugned judgment is not a material irregularity / illegality, which can justify interference in this revisional jurisdiction. '
26. Considering the case law on the point of limitation vis--vis concession of Advocate for a party, contention of learned Advocate for Respondents Nos.1 to 8, appears to be correct in view of the reported decisions relied upon by him, particularly, that of Ahsan Case [supra -- PLD 1984 (Karachi) page-195)] handed down by the learned Division Bench of this Court. It is held that "....... the alleged concession on the part of the then learned counsel for the petitioner did not absolve respondent No.2 from its statutory duty to examine the question of limitation in proper perspective and to decide the same correctly and not on the basis of any alleged admission........ " The Appellate Court has erred while deciding Issue No.6, concerning the limitation and maintaining the finding of learned Trial Court.
Evidence led by the parties in support and against the Exhibit 33-A, the purported Agreement to Sell dated 14.05.1989, leads to the conclusion that even for the sake of arguments, the said document was a valid one, even then a timely Suit for Specific Performance should have been filed by the present Applicants for its enforcement, in terms of Article 113 of the Limitation Act, 1908, that is, within the period of three years from the date of its execution, that is, 04.05.1989, but admittedly Lis (Suit No,60 of 1995) was filed after six years and no plausible reason has been given by the Applicants and their witnesses in this regard. Conversely, Applicants witnesses have admitted that the alleged original vendee -- Muhammad Jameel passed away after three years of the execution of the Agreement to Sell in question. Therefore, claim of present Applicants, which was filed through Respondent No.9 (Mst. Lateefa) was also time barred. Suit No.60 of 1995 should have been dismissed by the learned Trial Court.
27. The upshot of the above discussion is that Suit No.60 of 1995 instituted by present Applicants for Specific Performance was a frivolous litigation and was also barred by limitation. Consequently, no material irregularity and illegality exist in the impugned judgment of learned Appellate Court, which requires interference in this revisional jurisdiction. Accordingly tenth Civil Revisions are dismissed while maintaining the impugned judgments and decree passed by the learned Appellate Court.
28. Parties to bear their own costs.
Case law cited by the Applicant's counsel.
1. 2019 CLC page-1046 [Sikandar Ali and 2 others v. Baddar-u-Din and 4 others]
2. 2016 MLD page-594 [Muhammad Bashir v. Muhammad Sarwar and 2 others]
3. 2014 CLC page-1745 [Muhammad Sher v. Maula Bakhsh]
4. PLD 1956 (W.P.) Lahore page-354 [Muhammad Rafiq v. Muhammad Zahur Nasir and others] -- Rafiq Case
5. 2011 MLD page-736 [Muhammad Sharif and another v. Malik Abdul Razzaq and others]
6. PLD 1989 Karachipage-102 [Dr. Major Abdul Ahad Khan through his Legal Representatives v.
Muhammad lqbal through his Legal Representatives] Case law relied upon by Respondents counsel.
1. PLD 1984 Karachi page-195 [Miss. Shama Ahsan v. Province of Sindh and 6 others] - Ahsan Case
2. 2010 SCMR page-1408 [Government of N.W.F.P. and others v. Akbar Shah and others]
3. 2007 SCMR page-621 [Muhammad Sami v. Additional District Judge, Sargodha and 2 others]
4. 2015 SCMR page-1044 [Farid Bakhsh v. Jind Wadda and others] - Farid Case
5. PLD 2015 Supreme Court page-187 [Farzand Ali and another v. Khuda Bakhsh and others]
6. 2020 SCMR page-171 [Messrs Kuwait National Real Estate Company (Pvt.) Ltd. and others v.
Messrs Educational Excellence Ltd. and another]
7. PLD 1986 SC page-497 [Muhammad Yaqub v. Muhammad Nasrullah Khan and others]
8. 2002 SCMR page-1089 [Mst. Rasheeda Begum and others v. Muhammad Yousaf and others] - Rasheed Begum Case
9. 2007 SCMR page-870 [Hakim-ud-Din through LRs and others v. Faiz Bakhsh and others] Law under discussion:-
(1) Specific Relief Act, 1877 ("SRA")
(2) Limitation Act, 1908.
(3) The Qanun-e-Shahadat Order, 1984 [the Evidence Law].
(4) Civil Procedure Code, 1908 ("C.P.C.")