CH. MUHAMMAD MASOOD JAHANGIR, J. This Constitutional Petition arose out of order dated 28.12.2011, whereby learned Member (Board of Revenue) while setting aside concurrent orders of District Collector as well as Executive District Officer (Revenue) eliminated present petitioner and appointed respondent No.2 against the post of Lumberdar.
2. For delivering, this judgment, reference to the pleaded facts in brevity is that Chiragh, caste Ghin Balouch was permanent Lumberdar of Chak No. 231/EB, Tehsil and District Vehari, who died in 2008 and the District Collector ordered for initiation of process so as to fill up said vacancy afresh. Verily, after being invited candidature, their credentials were scrutinized by the District Collector on the basis of reports submitted by the Field Staff and Revenue Officer duly approved by the Assistant Commissioner. Primarily, Safdar Ali present petitioner was appointed as Headman by the District Collector on 15.03.2010. Respondent No.2 and many others challenged said choice by preferring almost six appeals before the Executive District Officer (Revenue), who though via order dated 19.03.2011 dismissed all those while maintaining appointment of present petitioner, yet learned Member (Board of Revenue) through impugned order cited in preceding para set aside concurrent orders of his subordinate Authorities and appointed respondent No.2 against said post. Being aggrieved of his elimination, the petitioner preferred this petition.
2. Arguments heard and record scanned.
3. The question to be resolved in instant petition relates to selection of Lumberdar, which per settled law is purely an administrative seat of its own class. This post neither can be designated as profession nor against any profit, rather the Headman holding an honorary post acts as bridge inter se the Landowners and Revenue Authority, therefore no one can claim his appointment as vested right, which in fact, is the choice of Revenue Authority to appoint a suitable candidate per yardstick set out in rule 17 of the Land Revenue Rules, 1968 for discharging the obligations assigned to him via terms of its rule 22. The object thereof would be that person best suited for said post should be committed to enable the Administration, so that command and control over the State land, Exchequer as well as other affairs could be maintained. See Abdul Wahid v. The Member, Board of Revenue, Punjab, Lahore and another (1971 SCMR 719), Muhammad Shaffi v. Member (Revenue), Board of Revenue, Punjab, Lahore and 2 others (1972 SCMR 253), Abdul Ghafoor v. The Member (Revenue) Board of Revenue and another (1982 SCMR 202) and M. Nazir Ahmed v.
Muhammad Aslam and others (2013 SCMR 363).
4. The features to be considered for appointment of Headman are envisaged by B rule 17 of the Rules ibid, which is reproduced as under:--
(a) The hereditary claims of the candidate;
(b) extent of property in the estate, if there are no subdivisions of the estate, and in case there be sub-divisions of the estate the extent of the property in the subdivision for which appointment is to be made, possessed by the candidate;
(c) services rendered to the Government by him or his family;
(d) his personal influence, character, ability and freedom from indebtedness;
(e) the strength and importance of the community from which selection of a headman is to be made;
(f) his ability to undergo training in Civil Defence in the case of headmen in Tehsils situated along the Border; Syed Muhammad Ali Gillani, ASC worthy counsel for the petitioner while relying upon case law reported as "Maqbool Ahmad Qureshi v. The Islamic Republic of Pakistan" (PLD 1999 SC 484) emphasized with great vehemence that the apex Court had already declared hereditary claim repugnant to Injunctions of Islam, thus learned Member exceeded its jurisdiction to make appointment of respondent per such qualification, is misconceived. The pivotal conclusion to this effect from said esteemed decision is as under:-- The principle deducible from the Injunction of Islam noted above is that appointment against an office, official agency, job or employment has to be made on merit of a person who is honest, trustworthy, bodily strong and possessed of qualities of head and heart and that blood relationship or descent cannot be made basis for claiming preference in the matter of appointment. Thus the provisions contained in sub-rule (2) of Rule 19 of the Rules providing for rule of primogeniture as the basis of appointment of successor, though interpreted by the Supreme Court as directory rule designed to select a most fit person from amongst eligible who is free from any of the disqualifications, is violative of the afore-noted principle deducible from Injunction of Islam. The objection with regard to provision of hereditary claim amongst other factors to be considered in matter of appointment under rule 17 is without merit as this rule Provides the relevant considerations which that Collector is to keep in view while making selection of the most suitable person amongst the candidates. The cause to raise objection in respect of this Rule arose as the officer in the graded hierarchy of the Revenue administration in their judgment came to accord "hereditary claims", overriding effect, as against other considerations of area, tribe, community etc. If "hereditary claim" is taken only as one of the relevant considerations, as contemplated in the rules, in favour of a candidate whose other merits are favourable comparable with other contestants no cause of grievance will arise, rather it will meet the plea of the administration that by appointing a person from amongst the nearest eligible heir or previous Lamberdar continuity in the work and in the liaison created between the land owners and the administration is intended to be achieved. Rule 17 is therefore, not repugnant to any injunction of Islam.
Its study left no room that hereditary claims still holds the field and sine qua non for the Revenue Authorities to consider it along with other relevant features while selecting a suitable candidate.
Verily, not only the father of respondent No.2, but his grandfather remained Lamberdar of the concerned Revenue Estate as well and per rule 17. priority No.1 of the hereditary claim was available to respondent No.2. The District Collector and Executive District Officer (Revenue) while selecting petitioner omitted to consider said aspect, but learned Member rightly exercised its jurisdiction to appreciate such credential, which finds support from judgments of this Court reported as Muhammad Saleem v. Member (Judicial-V) Board of Revenue, Punjab, Lahore and others (2007 MLD 349) and Munawar v. The State (2011 YLR 1185). The relevant conclusion of the former one is as under:- "****Hereditary claim of respondent No.5 could not be considered to have been washed away from Rule 17 and it cannot be ignored completely as it is still part of statutory rule. Hereditary claim and claim upon rule of primogeniture are two different claims, having different effects. Hereditary claim is still one of the qualify in merits and it can work out as ground for the appointment besides others grounds for the appointment of present open post of Lamberdar.
Whereas in latter decision the same view was again reinforced to the following effect:- Although rule of primogeniture is no more an overriding conditions but heredity claim still remains an important consideration for appointment of a fresh Lamberdar. Mr. Abdul Hannan is a young man, owns sufficient land to stand guarantee for performance of functions of Lamberdar and belongs to the majority community of Rajput in the Chak and the is son of deceased Lamberdar.
In view of these considerations, Executive District Officer (Revenue) has rightly appointed him Lamberdar of the Chak. Accordingly, the decision of the Executive District Officer (Revenue) dated 21.02.2007 appointing Abdul Hannan as Lamberdar of Chak No.1/1-L, Tehsil Renala Khurd, District Okara is upheld and the revision petition is dismissed.
Furthermore, via judgment styled as Muhammad Rafique v. Nazir Ahmed and others (2007 SCMR 287), Hon'ble Supreme Court was also of the same view while holding that proximity of relationship with late Lumberdar is proper and valid consideration for making selection. In said case, the nephew of the deceased Lumberdar though was chosen against said post by the District Collector, yet the Commissioner set aside his appointment, which view was even restored by this Court, however finally initial appointment was resuscitated by the apex Court while concluding that District Collector was perfect in tilting his approach towards a candidate having relationship with the outgoing Lumberdar.
5. It is relevant factor that through reports submitted by the Revenue Field Staff, Revenue Officer and Deputy District Officer (Revenue), respondent No.2 was recommended for the said post, but neither the District Collector nor Executive District Officer (Revenue) considered those properly, as such argument of learned counsel for the petitioner that choice of the District Collector was to be given preference is misconceived. Similarly, emphasis of learned counsel for the petitioner that respondent No.2 was not a man of character because he remained illegal encroacher over Lumberdari grant is concerned, admittedly after death of his father, per current policy promulgated via Notification No.812-2010/586-C(V), whereby in place of Clause No.9, new one inserted to the following effect:- "In case of death of a Lambardar, the land shall remain with the legal heirs of deceased Lambardar till the appointment of a new Lambardar under Rule 17(a) to whom it shall be allotted." the said land was to be retained by his family till appointment of new incumbent, thus said approach was violative to the standing instructions. Although the petitioner was having an edge viz-a-viz education and strength of property qua his rivalry, yet neither both these factors are sole criteria to select a Lumberdar nor can be given preference over hereditary claim as well as experience. The respondent No.2 is exclusive owner of 16 Kanals, which is sufficient to meet with zar-e-bharat. There is slight difference of education between the present contestants. The petitioner and respondent got education up till Middle and Primary level respectively. The respondent for more than last thirteen years is performing his affairs and that too without a single complaint. In said situation, learned Member perfectly appreciated requisite qualifications viz-a-viz contestant and did nothing wrong in selecting respondent No.2 as Lumberdar.
6. Although Syed Muhammad Ali Gillani, ASC worthy counsel for the petitioner argued the case to the best of his ability, but failed to persuade that either the impugned order is coram non judice/ultra vires or suffering from any material irregularity/patent illegality, jurisdictional defect rather per history of the case and law on the subject has perfectly been passed while exercising lawful authority by the learned Member (Board of Revenue). The instant Writ Petition having no merit and substance is dismissed.