Tersely, the respondent/defendant No.1 namely Muhammad Yasin (deceased) being owner of land measuring 14-Kanals 12-Marlas situated at Behar Sodan, Tehsil Chunian entered into an agreement to sell dated 22.04.2003 with the present petitioner/plaintiff for sale of the said land and received Rs.50,000/- as earnest money, whereas it was settled that the said deceased would transfer the suit property till 30.06.2003 and the remaining consideration amount would be paid at the time of transfer of the suit property in the name of the petitioner; however, allegedly the deceased respondent No.1 with mala fide intention did not fulfill his part of the agreement rather he illegally and unlawfully transferred the suit property and his other land i.e. 19-Kanals in the name of his wife/respondent No.2 through gift mutation No.1811 dated 29.08.2003 by committing fraud with the petitioner. The respondent No.2 further transferred the land measuring 5-Kanals through mutation No.1816 dated 17.10.2003 in the name of respondents No.3 and 4 and she also entered into an agreement to sell dated 11.12.2003 with the defendant No.5 regarding the land measuring 13-Kanals; hence, the petitioner instituted suit challenging the above said gift mutation in favour of respondent No.2 and subsequent mutation in favour of respondents No.3 and 4 as well as agreement to sell with the defendant No.5. The respondents/defendants contested the suit. The respondent No.5, on 29.06.2005, instituted suit for possession through specific performance titled "Sardar Muhammad Sadiq v. Surraya Bibi" on the basis of an agreement to sell dated 11.12.2003 germane to land measuring 13-Kanals. The respondent No.2 herein submitted consenting written statement in the said suit. Both the suits were consolidated by the learned trial Court and consolidated issues were framed. Both the parties produced their oral as well as documentary evidence in support of their respective contentions. On conclusion of trial, the learned trial Court vide impugned consolidated judgment and decree dated 27.02.2023 decreed the suit of the petitioner/plaintiff in the terms that Muhammad Sarwar, the plaintiff is entitled to recover amount of earnest money Rs.50,000/- including present KIBOR bank rate as damages since 22.04.2003 till realization of payment where the suit for specific performance etc. filed by the respondent No.5 Sardar Muhammad Sadiq (deceased) was decreed as prayed for. The petitioner being aggrieved preferred two appeals against the said consolidated judgment and decree. However, the learned appellate Court vide impugned consolidated judgment and decree dated 11.09.2023 dismissed both the appeals; hence, the instant revision petition.
2. Heard.
3. The purported agreement to sell Ex.P1 is time stricken as cut-off date for completion of agreement to sell after payment of remaining sale consideration was fixed as 30.06.2003. The petitioner Muhammad Sarwar (P.W.1) deposed that before the target date he contacted Muhammad Yasin (deceased) and asked him to transfer the land after receiving the remaining sale consideration but the said deceased dilly dallied the matter and sought further time. He further added that on the target date he went to Muhammad Yasin with the remaining consideration amount and asked him to perform his part of the agreement by executing sale deed in his favour. However, the petitioner, in witness box, could not mention the date, time and place regarding the said two transactions when he contacted the deceased defendant Muhammad Yasin. The petitioner did not plead the names of witnesses in plaint nor got them examined on oath. Moreover, after cut-off date, the petitioner did not send any written notice to the deceased respondent Muhammad Yasin showing his readiness to pay the remaining amount and asking him to perform his part of the agreement. Furthermore, the suit was filed by him after nine month of the cut-off date but he did not deposit the remaining sale consideration with the Court by moving an application in this regard, which was necessary to show his bona fide and readiness to perform his part of agreement. In a judgment passed in Civil Appeal No.1121 of 2018 titled "Ijaz Ul Haq v. Mrs. Maroof Begum Ahmed and others" decided on 16.08.2023, the Apex Court of the country has invariably held that: '7. It would be appropriate first to examine how the plaintiff discharged his pleading burden. The law governing this aspect of the matter is provided in Form No.47 and 48 of Appendix-A of the First Schedule to the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. According to para-2 of Form 47, the plaintiff was to state in the plaint that he had applied to the defendants specifically to perform the contract on their part, but the defendants had not done so. Similarly, per para-2 of Form 48, the plaintiff was required to state in his plaint that on such and such date, he tendered an amount to the defendants and demanded a transfer of the property. Thus, in his suit for specific performance, the plaintiff ought to have pleaded and proved his readiness and willingness to perform his obligations under the contract (Ex.P.3). There is no denying that according to contract condition, the plaintiff was to pay the balance of Rs.6,850,000/- to the defendants on or before 18th March, 2023, subject to the registration/completion of property transfer documents by the defendants in his favour. The plaintiff did not pay this amount. The plaintiff's stance was that he had been ready to pay the balance, but, defendant No.1 procrastinated the matter and delayed the completion of the transfer documents, which led him to institute the suit. A perusal of the evidence suggests that the plaintiff could not prove his narrative.'
In the present case, the facts of the case are identical to the above referred judgment of the Apex Court, because in the present case, the petitioner failed to prove his case as well as stance that on the target date he appeared before the Sub-Registrar Chunian and got marked his attendance by submitting written application because he did not produce the said Sub-Registrar or any staff member of his office and even he did not mention in the said application Ex.P2 that he had brought the remaining sale consideration or pay order or draft.
4. Pursuant to above, both the learned Courts have evaluated evidence in true perspective and have reached to a just conclusion, concurrently; as such the concurrent findings, on facts, cannot be disturbed when the same do not suffer from any misreading and non-reading of evidence, howsoever erroneous, in exercise of revisional jurisdiction; reliance is placed on Muhammad Farid Khan v. Muhammad Ibrahim, etc. (2017 SCMR 679), Mst. Zaitoon Begum v. Nazar Hussain and another (2014 SCMR 1469), CANTONMENT BOARD through Executive Officer, Cantt. Board Rawalpindi v. IKHLAQ AHMED and others (2014 SCMR 161), Muhammad Sarwar and others v.
Hashmal Khan and others (PLD 2022 Supreme Court 13) and Mst. Zarsheda v. Nobat Khan (PLD 2022 Supreme Court 21), wherein it has been held:- 'There is a difference between the misreading, non-reading and misappreciation of the evidence therefore, the scope of the appellate and revisional jurisdiction must not be confused and care must be taken for interference in revisional jurisdiction only in the cases in which the order passed or a judgment rendered by a subordinate Court is found perverse or suffering from a jurisdictional error or the defect of misreading or non-reading of evidence and conclusion drawn is contrary to law.'
Further in judgment reported as Salamat Ali and others v. Muhammad Din and others (PLJ 2023 SC 8), it has invariably been held that:- 'Needless to mention that a revisional Court cannot upset a finding of fact of the Court(s) below unless that finding is the result of misreading, non-reading, or perverse or absurd appraisal of some material evidence. The revisional Court cannot substitute the finding of the Court(s) below with its own merely for the reason that it finds its own finding more plausible than that of the Court(s) below.'
However, in the present case, no such occasion has arisen showing any jurisdictional error or defect rather the findings recorded by the learned Courts below are upto the dexterity after minute discussion of the evidence, oral as well as documentary. Thus, the impugned judgments and decrees do not call for any interference in exercise of revisional jurisdiction under section 115, Code of Civil Procedure, 1908.
5. For the foregoing reasons, no illegality and irregularity has been committed, rather vested jurisdiction has aptly and justly been exercised by the learned Courts below; therefore, while placing reliance on the judgments supra the civil revision in hand being devoid of any force and substance stands dismissed in limine.