ABDUL HAMID CHAUDHRY (MEMBER). - Gulzar Ahmed, ex-Constable No. 3523. Has filed this appeal under section 4 of the Punjab Service Tribunals Act, 1974, in which he has implea--ded the Superintendent of Police, Headquarters, Lahore, the Deputy Inspector-General of Police, Lahore Range, Lahore and the Inspector---General of Police, Punjab, Lahore as respondents. By virtue of this appeal he has prayed that the impugned orders dated 22-10-1979 and 25-10-1980 passed by the respondents Nos.1 and 3 respectively be set aside and he be re-instated into service with all back benefits.
2. Brief facts of the case are that while the appellant was posted in Accounts branch of the Office of the Deputy Inspector-General of Police, Lahore Range, Lahore he was served with a show-cause notice dated 29-8-1979, whereby he was called upon to show-cause as to why one or more of the major penalties as defined in rule 4 of the Punjab Police (Efficiency and Discipline) Rules, 1975 be not imposed upon him, on the allegation that he had accepted illegal gratification @ Rs. 30 and 35 p. m. From the employees of the' Additional Force, had been paying them house rent and conveyance allowance without prior application or sanction from the competent authority and that on that account a criminal case under section 409/420, P.P.C. Read with section 5 (2) (xlvii) of the Prevention of Corruption Act was registered at Police Station new Anarkali, Lahore and he was arrested on 20-8-1979. The appellant submitted his reply to show-cause notice on 4-9-1979. Ibis reply was considered by the Superintendent of Police, Headquarters, Lahore and he was also heard in person. The Superintendent of Police being dissatisfied with his defence, dismissed him from service vide order dated 22-10-1979. The appellant filed an appeal to the Deputy Inspector-General of Police, Lahore Range, Lahore which was rejected on 28-5-1980. The appellant submitted a revision petition to the Inspector-General of Police, Punjab, Lahore which was also rejected vide order dated 25-10-1980. Hence this appeal.
3. We have heard the parties. It has been argued on behalf of the appellant that Messrs Muhammad Tufail, Muhammad Latif and Mohammad Mansha were also issued a show-cause notice on these very allegations and they were also dismissed, from service. On their appeals, this Tribunal had accepted their appeals and declared the orders under appeal of no legal effect. Thus, he has submitted that the impugned orders be set aside on the basis of those judgments.
Anticipat--ing the arguments of their respondents he has submitted that the delay in filing the appeal be condoned as the impugned orders are void ab initio. On the other hand the learned District Attorney has seriously raised a preliminary objection regarding the limitation and has submitted that according to the appellant himself, the final order was passed by the Inspector- General of Police, Punjab, Lahore on 25-10-1980, which was conveyed to him at that very time. He has submitted that the appeal having been filed on 21-2-1982 is hopelessly barred by time and is liable to be rejected.
4. We have given cure anxious thoughts to the arguments of the parties and have perused the record carefully. Since an important objection regarding limitation has been raised on behalf of the respondent so we have decided to deal it first. It is a common case between the parties that the Additional Inspector-General of Police had dismissed the revision petition and the orders were conveyed to the appellant vide endst: dated 25-10-1980, while the appeal has been filed before us on 21-L-1982. This is a pretty long time and an inordinate delay in filing the appeal which was to be explained by the appellant to our entire satisfaction. We have perused the application under section 5 of the Limitation Act filed by the appellant for the condonation of delay and have also heard the learned counsel in support of the contention mentioned therein The only important ground urged is that the impugned orders are 'void ab initio and Limitation Act does not apply to the void orders. The learned counsel has not been able to satisfy us as to how the order passed by the competent authorities in exercise of the jurisdiction vested in them by statutory Rules is void.
We hold that the Superintendent of Police and other respondents were fully competent to pass the impugned orders and as such we do no see any plausible ground for the condonation of this delay running over many months. Thus, we hold that the appeal is barred by time.
5. In view of the above analysis, it is not necessary to examine the other submissions of the appellant and the appeal is dismissed as barred by time. There will be no order as to costs.