' A preliminary objection has been raised to the maintainability of this appeal on the ground that the appeal is barred by time.
' Mr. Nasrullah Awan pointed out that First Class Suit No, 37 of 1964 was filed by the respondent against the appellant for recovery of Rs, 38,117 in the Court of the First Class Civil Judge at Khairpur.
The suit was decreed by judgment passed on 23rd December, 1966 for Rs, 17,655 with proportionate costs and interest from the date of suit till payment. The decree was signed on 2nd May, 1967.
' Application for copies of the judgment and decree was tiled on 24th December, 1966 and the same were made ready and delivered to the counsel for the appellant on 17th June, 1967. The First Appeal No, 35 of 1967 was thereafter filed before the learned District Judge, Khairpur on 15th July, 1967.
2. Subsequently on realising that in view of the then provisions of section 18 of West Pakistan Civil Courts Ordinance the learned District Judge was not competent to entertain the said appeal (the subject-matter of the suit being more than Rs, 25,000) an application was filed by Mr. Khair Muhammad Sohu, A. G. P. On behalf of the appellant praying for the return of the appeal to be presented to the High Court. The learned lit Appellate Court accordingly ordered the return of the appeal for presentation to the proper Court vide order dated 25th May, 1968. The appeal thus returned, Was presented, in the High Court on 31st Mayo 1968.
3. The learned counsel for the respondent on the above facts, contended that the appeal filed in the High Court on 31st May, 1968 is barred by time and appellants are not entitled to invoke in aid the provisions of section 14 of the Limitation Act.
' I have heard the learned counsel for both the sides and find that the appellants have not acted with due diligence in prosecuting the appeal which they filed in the Court of the learned District Judge at Khairpur. The subject-matter of the suit in which the decree was passed admittedly exceed rupees twenty-five thousand and, therefore, in the face of express provisions of the then section 18 of the Ordinance of 1962, the filing of the appeal in the Court of District Judge was clear case of gross negligence on the part of the appellants. It cannot be argued with any justification that they had acted with due diligence or in good faith.
Reference be made here to the judgment given in First Appeal No, 20/81 (Muhammad Usman and others v. Mst. Miskeen Begum and another) wherein in view of the then provisions of section 18 which required the Sling of the appeal in the High Court where the value of the original suit in which decree was passed exceeded Rs, 25,000 and relying upon the judgment of Honourable Supreme Court in the case of Abdul Ghani v. Ghulam Sarwar, it was held that the filing of the appeal by the Advocate for the appellants in the Court of the District Judge, in the circumstances can neither be cansidered as a sufficient ground within the meaning of section 5 of the Limitation Act for condonation of delay nor as a valid ground to exclude the time of proceedings taken bona fide in a Court without jurisdiction under section 14 of the Limitation Act.
4. Mr. Awan the learned Advocate for the respondent also submitted that even after the return of the memo. Of appeal on 25th May, 1968 by the learned lower appellate Court instead of filing the same without loss of any time, it was presented in the High Court on 31st May, 1968 and that this act of further delay certainly cannot be described as acting with due diligence. The learned counsel for the respondent submitted that this further delay (of a period of six days) taken in presentation of the memo. Of appeal has remained unexplained.
' There is considerable force in the argument of the learned counsel as do not find from the record that this delay has been explained.
The principle is now well-settled, that in cases in which condonation of dely is prayed for, delay of each day beyond the period prescribed by the law of limitation is to be explained by the suitor concerned. In civil matters valuable rights are created in favour of the other side on account of lapse of time of which he cannot be deprived, unless sufficient cause explaining delay of each day is made out. The appellants have failed to make out a case for exclusion of any period under section 14 or condonation of delay under section 5 of the Limitation Act.
5. For the reasons discussed above I find that this appeal is barred by time. The same is accordingly dismissed.
' There shall however be no order as to costs. PLD 1977 SC 102