' This is a second appeal directed against the judgment and decree of the learned District Judge maintaining that of the Rent Controller whereby the eviction application of the respondents was allowed without recording any evidence in the case.
2. The facts in brief are that the landlord and owner of the property was Mst. Fehmeeda Begum wife of Muhammad Jehangir. On her demise, her husband Muhammad Jehangir and daughters Mst.
Rubina Kausar and Mst. Samina Khanam filed an eviction application against Mst. Hafeezan respondent No, 4 and the appellant on the ground of default in payment of rent and sub-letting by Mst. Hafeezan in favour of the present appellant as well as for personal need of the landlords.
3. The learned Rent Controller by his order dated 22nd October, 1971, allowed this application without recording any evidence or framing issues on the basis of the admission made by respondent No,
1. The written statement filed by the present appellant before the lower tribunal was based on the plea that he was also a legal heir of Mst. Fehmeeda Begum being her father who had inheritance share and thus his possession of the house in dispute was as a co-sharer. This plea was thrown out on the main ground that the learned Rent Controller had no jurisdiction to decide such matters and that for that matter, he may have recourse to the civil Court. The matter was then taken up in appeal by the present appellant alone and learned District Judge concurred with the view of the Rent Controller and dismissed the appeal by his order dated 8th June, 1972.
4. I have gone through the written statement filed by the appellant before the rent Controller with the able assistance of the learned counsel. The case set up by the appellant before the Rent Controller in a nutshell is that no doubt Mst. Hafeezan was originally owner of the property in dispute and that through a sale-deed, she had sold away this property to Mst. Fehmeeda Begum.
His case further is that he had been looking after ilfst. Hafeezan and had also spent considerable amount on her treatment as well as in meeting certain liabilities regarding mortgage which she had made. He further challenged the sale deed on the ground that an amount of Rs, 420 spent by him and paid to the mortgagee Muhammad Bashir was designed to be usurped through this dubious sale deed by Mst. Hafeezan in favour of Mst. Fehmeeda. The learned counsel does not deny the rent note which was executed by Mst. Hafeezan in favour of Mst. Fehmeeda after transferring the property in favour of the latter. In this set of circumstances the learned counsel has sought to argue that on the death of Mst. Fehmeeda who got the title from Mst. Hafeezan, a concession was made by Mst.. Hafeezan in favour of Mst. Fehmeeda that she was in default and eviction application be allowed, which could not work to the prejudice of the appellant on the ground that he had in the meanwhile become a successor-in-interest of Mst. Fehmeeda Begum. I am afraid I am unable to subscribe to this submission for the simple reason that if at all the appellant was in occupation with Mst. Hafeezan who was also a relative and was looking after her, then his status must be not that of a tenant but a licensee of Mst. Hafeezan, the admitted tenant.
Thereafter, Mst. Hafeezan, after selling away the property to Mst. Fehmeeda Begum, became a tenant of the property through rent note whose correctness is not in dispute. Thereafter on the demise of Mst. Fehmeeda Begum if he also became a co-sharer in the property that would be of no effect on the eviction of Mst. Hafeezan as a tenant. If a tenant's eviction was ordered then any body else in occupation together with the tenant as a licensee or in permissive occupation pr sub- lettee is automatically liable to eviction on that score. This is not a case where plea raised was that appellant had sub-let the property with the permission of the then landlord Mst. Fehmeeda.
5. The learned counsel further elaborated his argument by submitting that there was a subsequent change in the status of the appellant inasmuch as on the demise of Mst. Fehmeeda Begum, he also became a co-sharer, therefore, his occupation of the premises should have been treated to be a possession of the co-owner and not as a sub-tenant or a licensee for the reason that the rights in favour of the respondents accrued as a result of demise of Mst. Fehmeeda Begum. The argument, in my humble view, is misdirected and it is being over-looked that an eviction application is maintainable by any of the landlords. The application in fact was for the eviction of Mst. Hafeczan on the strength of a rent note which she had executed. The mere fact that the appellant also claimed to be in occupation initially through Mst. Hafeezan would have no effect on the decision of the eviction of Mst. Hafeezan. So far as the grievance of the appellant regarding his becoming a co-sharer in the property is concerned, I do not think that the concurrent orders and decrees of the two Courts below have the effect of depriving him of lawful share in the property.
The learned counsel next argues that this amounts to eviction of one landlord by another landlord.
In my view this is not so for the reason that in such like cases the initial induction into the property of a tenant is to be looked at. Mst. Hafeezan who was admittedly the sole tenant, and it would indeed, amount to blessing a dubious device if any successor of the deceased despite admitted tenancy of a third party was to be allowed to claim protection under Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance to pin exclusive possession of the property to the detriment of the others. This is neither sanctioned by law nor by equity. The appellant could not be allowed to achieve indirectly what he could not achieve directly under the law. The proposition is so well- settled that I need not quote any authority.
6. The learned counsel's next grievance is that the learned Rent Controller did not apply his conscious mind in width and depth as was required of him.
7. I have gone through the order of the Rent Controller and I find that the appellant had admitted before him that Mst. Hafeezan was original owner and that she had sold away the house in favour of Mst. "Fehmeeda Begum for a consideration of Rs, 3,000. The execution of the rent note dated 27th October, 1961 was also admitted by him. In this set of circumstances the Rent Controller came to the conclusion that in view of these admissions. Mst. Hafeezan was admittedly a tenant of the property in dispute. It was further found by him as a fact that she had inducted the present appellant into the property without the consent of Mst. Fehmeeda Begum who was originally the landlord and owner. So it cannot be said that Rent Controller failed to apply his mind to all the relevant aspects.
8. The eviction application was filed on 10th September, 1969 and was allowed on 21st October, 1971.
I have asked the learned counsel to state when he came into occupation of this property. He submits that the claim set up by the appellant was that he was in occupation of this property since before the creation of Pakistan. This means before 1947. The property was sold by Mst. Hafeezan in favour of Mst. Fehmeeda Begum in the year 1961 and also the rent note was executed on 27th October, 1961. He is unable to say when Mst. Fehmeeda died because according to him there is nothing in the application of the landlord or in his own written statement regarding this material fact.
9. I feel that the real anxiety of the appellant is to continue to be in occupation of his property by taking advantage of the fact that Mst. Fehmeeda Begum had died at a point of time which is still shrouded in mystery. The eviction order is in fact directed against the real tenant Mst. Hafeezan which fact is not in dispute. So whether as a sub-tenant or as a licensee the appellant would disappear from the premises in dispute together with the lessee through whom he claimed to be in occupation. The Rent Controller has been conferred with a summary jurisdiction and has based the decision on appreciation of overall circumstances of the case and the conclusions drawn by him are such as could have been arrived at.
10. The learned counsel for the appellant at this juncture submits that in view of the peculiar position of the case, this Court should make an observation in so far as the title of the property is concerned that nothing said in the orders of the two tribunals below will affect appellant adversely.
The request is reasonable and is otherwise in accordance with law. The learned Rent Controller in his order has already stated that in so far as the succession or title dispute is concerned, he should have recourse to the civil Court. As a rule of abundant caution I have no hesitation in reiterating the legal principle that an adjudication given by a Rent Controller who is tribunal of limited jurisdiction is only confined to matters pertaining to eviction and relationship of landlord and tenant under the West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance. He is not a Court of general jurisdiction, therefore, any observation given or finding recorded would not in any manner prejudice the appellant in establishing his right or title or in obtaining any other relief from a civil Court to which he may be found entitled. In this view of the matter, I dismiss this second appeal. However, in view of the fair stand taken by the learned counsel for the appellant I would not make any order as to costs.
11. The learned counsel at this stage prays that keeping in view the advanced age of the appellant, he may be given some reasonable time to hand over peaceful vacant possession to the respondent. The maximum time which can be allowed in such cases is four months and I would allow the same to the present appellant.