1. SHAFIUR RAHMAN, J.-The petitioner, a convict under section 10 (2) of the Offence of Zina (Enforcement of Hudood) Ordinance, 1979, seeks leave to appeal under Article 203-F (2-B) of the Constitution against the judg--ment of the Federal Shariat Court dated 13-4-1983 whereby his first appeal against conviction was dismissed but the sentence was reduced.
2. The prosecution case started against the petitioner and three others on a case registered by Ishaq Muhammad Qureshi (P, W. 1) on 29th of March, 1980 at New Town Police Station, Karachi followed by a private complaint filed by him on 14-4-1980. Ishaq Muhammad Qureshi was the father-in---law of the petitioner. His grievance in the two reports was that his daughter Mst. Shaheen Bano (P.W. 3) was already married to the petitioner and had children from him. On the 29th of March, 1980 his other daughter Mst. Ghazala Qureshi (P. W. 21 had disappeared and it was suspected by him that the petitioner had abducted her with a view to commit rape on her. The abductee Mst. Ghazala Qureshi was recovered while waiting at a bus stop on 19th April, 1980 at Liaqat Abad Chaurangi, in Karachi. At the trial against the petitioner 7 witnesses were examined including the com--plainant Ishaq Muhammad Qureshi and his two daughters Mst. Shaheen Bano and Mst. Ghazala Qureshi, The plea of the petitioner. Was that he had been black-mailed, duped and that he had orally divorced his wife Shaheen Bano in October, 1979 followed by a written divorce in January, 1980 and that Mst. Ghazala Qureshi had entered into a valid marriage with him subsequently. The trial court exhaustively dealt with all the questions of fact and law raised at the trial and held that Mst.
3. Ghazala had not been abducted but was an adult and had consented to her Nikah and to living as the wife of the petitioner. On this finding the petitioner was held not guilty of the offence of abduction. The oral divorce claimed by the petitioner in October, 1979 was disbelieved, the written divorce given on 17th of January, 1980 was held to be the divorce pronounced and as the Nikah with Ghazala Qureshi had taken place on 29th of March, 1980 it was held to be during the period of Iddat and as no notice of the divorce had been given ever to the Union Council under section 7 of the Muslim Family Laws Ordi--nance, 1960 it was held that the divorce had not become effective and the marriage with Shaheen Bano, another sister of .41st. Ghazala Qureshi subsisted. On account of the subsistence of earlier marriage and m the alternative on account of Iddat period having not expired. The petitioner was found tohave, committed Zina or intercourse with Mst. Ghazala Qureshi.
4. As the marriage was invalid he was held guilty under section 10 (2) of the Hudood Ordinance and sentenced by the trial court to 10 years' R. I. And 30 stripes and a fine of Rs. 10,000 or in default to undergo further rigorous imprisonment for one year. It was ordered that the whipping shall be administered in the Stadium of P. T. B. Colony, Karachi. There were certain other persons also tried with the petitioner as abettors but they were all found not guilty and acquitted. On appeal by the petitioner the Federal Shariat Court affirmed all the find--ings including one that the marriage .With Mst. Ghazala was invalid making the petitioner liable for the intercourse committed with her after the so-called marriage. Reliance for this was placed on another judgment of the Federal Shariat Court reported as Muhammad Arif v. State (PLD 1982 F SC 292). The sentence was how-- ever reduced to 5 years' R. I. And 10 stripes to be executed at a public place. The fine imposed by the trial court was left intact. The petitioner was given the benefit of section 382-B of the Cr. P. C.
5. The learned counsel for the petitioner, Mr. Yusuf Saraf, has taken up threemain grounds for challenging the decision of the Federal Shariat Court. In the first place it has been contended that marriage has been defined in Ordinance No. VII of 1979 as "marriage which is not void according to the personal law of the parties, and married shall be construed accordingly." He has then referred to the personal law applicable to the portion as contained in principles of Muhammad an Law by Mullah, paragraphs 264 to 267. A marriage which is not valid is either void or irregular. It is contended that on the basis of this distinction the marriage with another sister during the subsistence of marriage with the other sister or during the period of Iddat is an irregular marriage and not void marriage. The punishment under the Hudood Ordinance would be attracted only if there is, as defined in the Ordinance, a void marriage and not where the marriage is irregular because the latter will qualify as marriage as defined in the Ordinance. The second contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner is that as observed by the Federal Shariat Court itself in para. 21 of its judgment "the conviction of the appellant is based upon his own statement made by him in court that he had married Mst. Ghazala on 29th March, 1980 and that he had divorced Mst.
6. Shaheen Bano the elder real sister of Mst. Ghazala . Before this marriage." According to the learned counsel for the petitioner it is an established principle of administration of criminal justice that where prosecution evidence is not considered trustworthy and reliance has to be placed only on the statement of the accused, then that state--ment has to be taken in its entirety and incriminating parts cannot be excluded from the exculpatory parts so as to convict the accused.
7. Accord--ing to the learned counsel his statement that he had orally divorced Mst. Shaheen in October. 1979 should have been accepted and made the basis for finding in his favour. As regards compliance with section 7 of the Muslim Family Laws Ordinance, it is contended on the basis of finding of the High Court in the case of Ghulam Fatima which came to this Court in Mst. Ghulam Fatima v. Abdul Qayyum and others (PLD 1981 SC 460) that where the husband and wife by an agreement subscribed to by both dissolve the marriage no notice under section 7 is at all necessary nor the effect of such a dissolution could be postponed to a date till the expiry of 90 days after the service of the notice. Hence a compromise dissolving marriage becomes effective forthwith and it cannot be defeated, postponed or nullified on the basis of provisions of Muslim Family. Laws Ordinance. Finally, the learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that keeping in view the antecedent of the petitioner, his educational qualification and service background, his status in the society and the families that he had to support and look after, the sentence awarded was on the harsher side and there were miti--gating circumstances particularly in the conduct of the complainant and his two daughters and a more lenient view could be taken note of and sentence reduced further.
8. We have attended to all aspects of the case and find that none of the grounds is tenable. No doubt marriage has been defined in the Ordi--nance as marriage which is not void according to the personal law of the parties and the word `married' has to be construed accordingly. In section 4 while defining Zina the word 'marriage' has been qualified by another word "validly", while in section 5 Zina liable to hadd the word `marriage' is used without such qualification. A valid marriage has been defined as "marriage contracted and solemnized in accordance with Shariah with all its constituents and conditions, without any legal impediment (Dr. Tanzilur Rahman). A Code of Muslim Personal Law). Even Mulla's' Mohammedan Law recognizes the distinction of valid and invalid marriage and it, the category of invalid marriages are placed the irregular marriages and void marriages. So the moment the learned counsel accepts that it was an irregular marriage, it ceases to be a valid marriage. On no prin--ciple of interpretation of statutes can this significant qualifying word "validly" be ignored, treated as redundant or a surplusage. It has to be given a meaning and full effect. So an irregular marriage affords no pro--tection where the law requires as in section 4, a valid marriage.
9. For his second submission the learned counsel for the petitioner has placed reliance on a portion of the observation of the Federal Shariat Court which is not complete, without reading the other part of the same observation. The whole of it as an integrated ground is reproduced here--under "But in fact the conviction of the appellant is based upon his own statement made by him in court that he had married Mst. Ghazala on 29-3-1980 and that he had divorced Mst. Shaheen the elder real sister of Mst. Ghazala before this marriage. The only controversy in respect of the divorce of Mst. Shaheen is that the appellant claims to have divorced Mst. Shaheen in October, 1979 as stated by him in his written statement filed by him at the time of his statement under section 342, Cr. P. C.
10. But the divorce of October, 1979 is not established by the appellant by any other evidence not corro--borated from any other source. This suggestion was not even put to Mst. Shaheen in her cross-examination. The same is also contra--dicted by the divorce deed Exh. 20 which is produced by the appellant himself and which bears the date of 17-1-1980. In this divorce deed there is a clear recital in the present tense that the appellant has divorced Mst. Shaheen on 17-1-1980. It is therefore clear that the maximum that the appellant has been able to establish is that he divorced Mst.
11. Shaheen on 17-1-1980, although Mst. Shaheen has denied having been divorced in January, 1980.
12. But since her sig--nature on Exh. 20 is admitted by her and this document bears the date of 17-1- 1980, therefore, it would be safer to conclude that the appellant divorced Mst. Shaheen, the real sister of Mst. Ghazala on 17-1-1980."
13. It is clear that not the entire prosecution evidence was disbelieved and rejected and the only material utilized for convicting the appellant was leis own statement. The other evidence of the prosecution while being rejected on one particular point namely lack of consent of Ghazala was considered! Reliable enough in respect of the date of divorce and indulgence in the' sexual intercourse of the petitioner and Ghazala. The defence pleaded bye the petitioner was considered along-with or in juxtaposition with the pro--secution case and was rejected. It was, therefore, clearly not one of those cases where the only material found worthy of reliance was the statement of the accused. There was no legal error or impropriety in so evaluating the entire case as set out by the prosecution at the trial along-with the plea of the accused-petitioner.
14. We notice that the learned counsel for the petitioner has taken it is a ground for the first time that the divorce pronounced orally in October, 1979 or in writing in January, 1980 was such as to fall outside the pro--visions of sections 7 and 8 of the Family Laws Ordinance. Not even they divorce document has been placed on record to make out this ground. What we find is that the two courts dealing with the question have recorded a finding that the divorce was pronounced by the petitioner on 17th of January, 1980, that it was a divorce as envisaged under section 7 of the Muslim Family Laws Ordinance and it required notice and did not become effective till 90 days expired after such notice. Reading sections 7and 8 together we find no such distinction as is sought to be made out by the learned counsel for the petitioner.
15. As regards the sentence awarded to the petitioner, we find that the Federal Sharial Court has not only attended to this aspect of the case of the petitioner and has suitably reduced his sentence as awarded by the trial court, but has also adopted the principle of consistency and unifor--mity in the matter of sentence by referring to and relying upon the deci--sion of the same court in Muhammad Arif's case. A legal sentence hav--ing been awarded no particular reason is available for interfering with it. The petition has no merit and leave to appeal is refused.