NADEEM AKHTAR, J. Rent Case No.266/2014 filed by the petitioner / landlady against respondent No.1 / tenant for his eviction on the grounds of personal need and default in payment of the monthly rent was dismissed by the Rent Controller vide order dated 14.04.2017. The petitioner filed First Rent Appeal No.123 of 2017 against such dismissal, but his said appeal was dismissed by the appellate Court vide impugned order dated 25.01.2019 as being barred by limitation.
2. Learned counsel for the petitioner concedes that the, petitioner's appeal was barred by time. He, however, contends that as the petitioner had filed an application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1908, for condoning the delay in filing the appeal, the said application ought to have been considered and the delay ought to have been condoned by the appellate Court. It is well-settled that the provisions of Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1908, do not apply to the appeals filed under the special Rent Laws which, in the present case, was The Sindh Rented Premises Ordinance, 1979, ('the Ordinance') wherein the limitation for filing the appeal has been specifically prescribed in Section 21. Thus, the aforesaid application, being misconceived and not maintainable, could not be entertained or considered by the appellate Court.
3. It is contended by learned counsel for the petitioner that if the above application for condoning the delay was not maintainable, even then the delay could be condoned by the appellate Court under its inherent powers. In support of this contention, he has placed reliance on Mst. Rehana Begum v. Mst. Shagufta, 1995 SCMR 323, wherein the delay of 27 days was condoned by the Hon'ble Supreme Court mainly on the ground that the appellant therein was a widow and was maintaining herself and her children from the earnings from the rented shop. The delay was condoned in the cited case on an application filed by the appellant therein under Order XXXII, Rule 6 read with Order XIII, Rule 1 of The Supreme Court Rules, 1980. Order XXXIII, ibid deals with the inherent powers of the Hon'ble Supreme Court, and Rule 6 thereof provides that nothing in the said Rules shall be deemed to limit or otherwise affect the inherent powers of the Hon'ble Supreme Court to make such orders as may be necessary for the ends of justice or to prevent abuse of the process of the Hon'ble Supreme Court.
4. It may be noted that in the above-cited case, the limitation had expired during vacations of the Hon'ble Supreme Court; whereas in the present case, the limitation for filing the appeal did not expire during the vacations of the appellate Court. It may also be noted that in the cited case the appeal filed before the Hon'ble Supreme Court under Article 185 of The Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973, was barred by time and the application for condoning the delay was filed under the Supreme Court Rules, 1980 as the proceedings before the Hon'ble Supreme Court are governed by the said Rules. Whereas, the appeal in the present case was a statutory appeal under the Ordinance which is a special law wherein the limitation for filing the appeal has been specifically prescribed in Section 21 as noted above. Needless "to say, any decision rendered on a question of law or enunciation of principle of law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court is binding on all other Courts in pakistan under Article 189 of the Constitution. However, it may be observed that the delay in the cited case was condoned only in view of the peculiar circumstances / situation of the appellant therein and the question of condoning the delay in filing a statutory appeal was not before the Hon'ble Supreme Court. Thus, the above-cited case cannot be applied to the case at hand.
5. Regarding the principle enunciated by the Hon'ble Supreme Court on the question of condoning the delay, I may refer to Imtiaz Ali v. Atta Muhammad and another, PLD 2008 SC 462, wherein it was held that the appeal, having been filed after one day of the prescribed period of limitation, had created valuable right in favour of the respondents, and no. sufficient cause was found for filing the appeal beyond the period of limitation. The delay of only one day was not condoned by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the aforesaid case. In Government of Pakistan through Ministry of Works and another v. Messrs Mathrow Builders, Contractor, Sialkot 2006 SCMR 1248, the Hon'ble Supreme Court was pleased to hold that the question of limitation being not mere a technicality cannot be taken lightly and the rights accrued to the other party due to limitation cannot be snatched away without sufficient cause and lawful justification. In Allah Dino v. Haji Ahmed through Legal Heirs and 3 others, PLD 2006 Karachi 148, the medical certificate filed with the application for condonation of delay was not accepted by this Court as it did not state that the party concerned was bedridden for the entire period and he was unable to move or even communicate the instructions to his counsel to prefer an appeal.
6. In the above circumstances, the impugned order does not suffer from any illegality or infirmity and as such does not require any interference by this Court in its constitutional jurisdiction.
Accordingly, the petition is dismissed with no order as to costs.