This order shall dispose of three applications for cancellation of bail viz. Crl. Misc. Nos. 2133/B of 1982; 2134/B of 1982 and 2292/B of 1982. The respondents in all these three matters are involved as accused in one and the same case arising out of F. I. R. No. 110/82-dated 17th June, 1982 of Police Station Sadar, Jhang.
2. Jahangir, Azam and Muhammad Shah who are respondents in Crl. Misc. No. 2133/B of 1982 were admitted to interim bail before arrest by my learned brother ' Mr. Justice Rustam S. Sidhwa, on 30 June, 1982 and this anticipatory bail was confirmed vide my order dated 10th July, 1982. The learned Addl. Sessions Judge, Jhang, vide his order dated 26th July, 1982 admitted Nasir Shah, Manzoor and Sher Muhammad respondents in Crl. Misc. No. 2134/B of 1982 to bail observing that their case was at par with Jahangir, Azam and Muhammad Shah released on bail by this Court. Ghulam Murtaza, Abdur Rehman, Ghulam, Khuda Bakhsh, Zafar, Allah Bakhsh, Muhammad Siddique. Ghulam Rasul and Muhammad lqbal respondents in Crl. Misc. No. 2292/B of 1982 were admitted to bail on 23rd August, 1982 by my learned brother Mr. Justice Muhammad Zafarullah on the ground that they had been attributed merely simple injuries and their co-accused had already been allowed bail. .
3. Ghulam Qadir, the petitioner in the under consideration three petitions for cancellation of bail is the complainant and the first infor--mant in the case registered vide F. I. R: No. 110 of 17th June, 1982 referred to above.
4. It is contended in Application No. 2133/B of 1982 that bail before arrest has been granted to the respondents in violation of principles laid down by this Court and the honourable Supreme Court of Pakistan in PLD .1274 Lab. 256, PLD 1976 Lab. 21 and 1981 SCMR 1139. It is also contended that on the ground of vicarious liability, the respondents could not be released on bail and the assessment has not been made keeping in view the common course of natural events, human conduct and public and private business.
5. Allegations of conspiracy and misconduct have also been levelled against the Investigating Officer as well as the State counsel and Mr. Muhammad Siddique Girwa, the counsel who represented the complainant when the respondents were allowed anticipatory bail. No material, however, has been produced in support of such wild allegations.
6. As regards the principles governing the grant of anticipatory bail, it may be observed that main conditions governing exercising of jurisdic--tion to allow pre-arrest bail under section 498, Cr. P. C.
Are :-- (a)that there should be a genuine proof of apprehension of immi--nent arrest with the effect of factual restraint on the petitioner ; (b)that the petitioner should physically surrender to the Court ; (a)that on account of ulterior motives particularly on the part of Police there should be apprehension of harassing and undue irreparable humiliation by means of unjustified arrest ; (d)that it should be otherwise a case on merits for exercise of dis--cretion in favour of the petitioner for purposes of bail. In this behalf the provisions contained in section 497 Cr P. C. Are to be kept in mind ; and (e)that unless there is reasonable explanation the petitioner should, have earlier moved the Sessions Court for the same relief under section 498, Cr. P.. C.
7. It is not denied that after the registration of the case under section 307/149, P. P. C. Against the respondents, there was genuine appre--hension of their imminent arrest. They admittedly physically surrendered themselves before this court as they were personally present when their petition for grant of anticipatory bail was considered. It is also not denied that prior to moving this Court for pre-arrest bail they had al-- ready moved the Court of Session in this behalf but their request was declined.
7. According to the learned counsel for the petitioner there was nothing to suggest in- the application submitted by the respondents that on account of ulterior motives on the part of the prosecution, they had apprehension of harassment etc. And that this was otherwise not a fit case on merits for exercise of discretion in favour of the petitioner.
8. In their petition for anticipatory bail (Crl. Misc. No. 1633/13182) it is alleged, in paragraph 2 that Ghulam Qadir who lodged the report implicated as many as 19 persons including the present respondents more out of spite and ill will than for furtherance of justice. In paragraph 3 of the petition it is alleged that the respondents have been falsely implicated in this case in collusion with the local Police and that the Police was all out to harass the respondents. These assertions in the petition for bail clearly indicate that element of ulterior motives particularly on the part of the prosecution/Police is not wanting in the under consideration case. As far the merits are concerned, it was conceded at the time of hearing of bail petition by the Investigating Officer as well as by the learned counsel for the State in the presence of the learned counsel for the com--plainant that in the F. I. R. No incriminating role was ascribed to Jahangir petitioner and that Azam and Muhammad Shah petitioners were alleged to have simply fired in the air ineffectively. It was further considered that such an act on their part could not form basis for holding them to be vicariously liable for the commission of the offence.
The petitioner's plea based on PLD 1976 SC 256, PLD 1978 C 236 and PLD 1967 SC 34Q that in matters of bail the Court has to o by its own assessment of the common course of natural events, human and public and private business in their relations to the facts of conduct a particular case and that in view of vicarious liability under section 149, P. P. C, the petitioners prayer for pre-arrest bail should not have been allowed is absolutely devoid of substance.
10. As already observed, question of vicarious liability was considered and the Investigating Officer as-also the learned counsel for the State conceded that in the circumstances of the case, the respondents were not even vicariously liable. Moreover, so far as vicarious liability is concerned, it is a question requiring further enquiry and on this score alone bail could not be refused.
11. For the foregoing reasons, there is no merit in Crl. Misc. No. 2133/13 of 1982.
12. As regards Crl. Misc. No. 2134113/1982, as already stated, the bail in this case was allowed by the learned Addl. Sessions Judge and the petitioner should have moved that learned Court for cancellation of bail in the first instance. In Hirza Khan v. Lal Khan and another (1976 P Cr. L. J 324) it was held that the petitioner should have first approached the learned Court which granted the bail in view of the wording of section 497 (5), Cr. P. C. The bail to the respondents in this case has been allowed by the learned Addl. Sessions Judge on the ground that their case was at par with those whose bail application had been granted by this Court and the injuries attributed to the respondents were simple in nature and the injured persons had been discharged from the hospital.
13. Similarly, in case of Crl. Misc. No. 2292/13 of 1982, the reason--dents were allowed bail by my learned Mr. Justice Muhammad Zafarullah on the ground that the respondents had been attributed simple injuries and their co-accused had been allowed bail.
14. As already observed, question of vicarious liability being of further enquiry, the respondents who were liable for merely simple injuries were allowed bail. In Muhammad Altaf v. Nazir Ahmad and an--other (PLD 1975 Lab. 568) it was held that cases in which although maximum sentence may be imprisonment for life or 10 years' R. I., but where, in view of the nature of the allegations and the circumstances in which the offence was committed it was well-settled that the maximum sentence was not to be awarded, in such cases it would not be proper to refuse bail to the accused persons merely on 'the ground that the maximum sentence pro--vided for offences is imprisonment for life or 10 years' R. I.
15. In the circumstances of the under consideration cases, there is no justification for cancelling the bail of the respondents against whom there are allegations of simple injuries only and who are not alleged to have abused at all the concessions of bail. In Nazar Muhammad v. The State and another (1977 P Cr. L J 277) it has been ruled that provisions regarding cancel--lation of bail are not available to private parties to satisfy their grudge or to use as a means of wreaking their vengeance.
16, It has also been noticed that the investigation having been com--pleted in this case, the challan has already been submitted and the case is fixed for trial for 14th November, 1982: It is, therefore, not an appropriate stage to pass any order regarding bail or cancellation of bail.
17. In the light of what has been said above, all the three under consideration applications for cancellation of bail are held to be without merit and are accordingly dismissed.