1. M, R. KHAN, J.-This Petition for special leave to appeal is directed against the judgment and order of the Lahore High Court dismissing the petitioner's Letters Patent Appeal.
2. Muhammad Ishaq, the predecessor-in-interest of the respondents, made an application under section 13 of the West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance for ejectment of the petitioner from shop No. P-23/B, situated in Aminpur Bazar, Lyalipur. The Rent Controller directed the petitioner to deposit arrear rent and also future rent. As this direction was not complied with by the petitioner, the landlord made an application to strike off the petitioner's defence. This prayer of the landlord was refused whereupon an appeal was taken by the landlord to the District Judge, Lyallpur. The learned District Judge held that the petitioner had defaulted in depositing rent as directed by the Rent Controller, and, accordingly, ordered the defence of the petitioner to be struck off. The petitioner then preferred a second appeal which was heard and disposed of by a learned Single Judge of the High Court. During the pendency of the second appeal, Muhammad Ishaq, the original landlord died on the 19th June 1967. The petitioner made an application on the 9th October 1967 for substituting the legal representatives of r` Muhammad Ishaq. In that application, an explanation was given as to the reason of delay in making the prayer for substitu--tion. The learned Single Judge held that the legal representatives of Muhammad Ishaq not having been substituted within the statutory period of limitation the second appeal had abated and that no sufficient ground was made out for setting aside the abatement. The second appeal was, accordingly, dismissed as having abated. The petitioner then preferred a Letters Patent Appeal, but it was dismissed. The petitioner now seeks special leave to appeal.
3. Before the learned Single Judge and in the Letters Patent Appeal, it was contended on behalf of the petitioner that there was no legal provision whereunder the second appeal could have abated for non-substitution of the legal representatives of late Muhammad Ishaq. This contention was, however, repelled by the learned Judges of the High Court. Having regard to the Explanation to subsection (4) of section 15 of the West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance, 1959 (hereinafter called 'the Ordinance'), it was held by them that the relevant provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure with regard to substitution of legal representatives and abatement of suits apply to proceedings under the Ordinance and that the second appeal abated under these provisions.
4. Mr. Maqbul Ahmad, learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the view taken by the learned Judges of the High Court with regard to the applicability of the Code of Civil Procedure in proceedings under the Rent Restriction Ordinance is erroneous.
5. Section 15 of tile Ordinance provides for appeal against orders passed by the Rent Controller. An appeal against the Rent Controller's order lies under subsection (1) of section 15 to the appellate authorities named therein, but under sub--section (4) of that section an appeal lies to the High Court against the order of the appellate authority. If, however, no appellate authority has been appointed in respect of any area, an appeal lies to the High Court direct from an order of the Rent Controller. An Explanation has been added to subsection (4) of section 15 laying down the manner in which an appeal to the High Court is to be regulated. This Explanation offers an answer to the point raised by the learned counsel. It runs thus: "Explanation.-An appeal under the subsection shall be heard and determined as an appeal from an original decree under section 96 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, if it is from an order of the Controller and as an appeal from the appellate order under section 100 of the said Code if it is from an order of the appellate authority and the provisions of Part VII and of the First Schedule to the said Code relating to appeals shall, with such modifications as the context may, require, apply to such proceedings."
6. This explanation is a statutory provision and must be given effect to. Unless the Explanation is held to be applicable to appeals to the High Court under the Ordinance, it will become redundant. But no statutory provision can be held to be superfluous and meaningless. The addition of the Explanation to subsection (4) of section 15 is a legislation by reference. In--stead of repeating in the Ordinance the relevant provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure regulating appeals from decrees or orders, those provisions of the Code have been made applicable to appeals to the High Court under the Ordinance. This legislation by reference is only an art of drafting and is not peculiar to this case. A similar legislation by reference is to be found in other statutes as well. For example, subject to certain conditions, the third subsection of section 76 of the Trade Marks Act, 1940 has made the Code of Civil Procedure applicable to appeals to the High Court under the said Act. The Explanation to subsection (4) of section 15 of the Ordinance has clearly made the Code of Civil Procedure applicable to appeals to the High Court under the Ordinance subject to such modifications as the context requires. An appeal under the Code abates unless the legal representatives of the deceased appellant or respondent are substituted within the period of 90 days of his death as prescribed by Article 176 of the Limitation Act. In view of the Explanation as aforesaid, the same provision applies to an appeal to the High Court under the Ordinance with the result that such appeal shall abate unless the legal representatives of the deceased appellant or respondent are made parties to the appeal within the prescribed period of limitation. In the instant case, the legal representatives of the respondent of the second appeal in the High Court were not impleaded in the appeal within the prescribed time-limit. Accordingly the second appeal was rightly held to have abated.
7. It is contended by the learned counsel that Order XXII, rule 4 of the Code of Civil Procedure applies to suits and that an appeal being a continuation of the suit, the provisions of the said rule 4 is applicable to appeals under the Code, but does not apply to appeals to the High Court under the Ordinance, such appeals not having arisen out of suits. There is no substance in this contention for the simple reason that the provisions of Part VII of the Code and of its First Schedule are to be applied to appeals to the High Court under the Ordinance with such modifications, that is, adaptations as to context may require.
8. It is lastly submitted that the penal provisions of the Code were not intended to be applicable to appeals to the High Court under the Ordinance. In other words, the contention is that even if substitution of legal representatives of a party to an appeal to the High Court under the Ordinance is necessary in view of the Explanation to subsection (4) of section 15, the failure to implead the legal representatives shall not result in abatement of the appeal. This contention is equally without any substance. When the provisions of Part VII of the Code of Civil Procedure and those of its First Schedule have been made applicable to appeals to the High Court under the Ordinance, it is futile to contend that the provision with regard to abatement, as contained in the First Schedule shall not apply.
9. There is no merit in this petition. The petition is, accordingly, dismissed.