This order shall decide the titled petition for leave to appeal filed against the judgment, dated 13.01.2023 passed by the learned High Court, whereby, the writ petition filed by the petitioner, herein, has been dismissed.
2. The facts forming the background of the captioned petition for leave to appeal are that the petitioner, herein, filed a writ petition before the learned High Court, alleging therein, that he was initially appointed as an Overseer (BPS-11), in the office of the Chief Engineer, PWD and was deputed in the Hill Farming Road Muzaffarabad, against the vacant post vide order dated 07.02.1998. In the light of the said appointment order, the service book of the petitioner was prepared by the department, in which his date of birth was entered as 19.09.1963. It was further alleged that in all the service record as well as the seniority list prepared by the department the date of birth of the petitioner is entered as 19.09.1963. Now the petitioner has come to know that Respondent No. 5, has illegally changed the date of birth of the petitioner in salary slip of March, 2021, as 19.09.1961 instead of 19.09.1963. It was further alleged that the respondents created a conflict regarding the date of birth of the petitioner and on the basis of changed date of birth they want to retire him before attaining the Age of superannuation. It was prayed that a direction may be issued to the respondents to correct the date of birth in the salary slip and the petitioner may not be retired before attaining the age of superannuation. The learned High Court dismissed after the writ necessary proceedings petition through the impugned judgment dated 13.01.2023.
3. Ch. Amjid Ali, Advocate, the learned counsel for the petitioner after narration of the necessary facts submitted that the impugned judgment of the learned High Court is against law, rules and the facts of the case. He argued that as per service record the date of birth of the petitioner is 19.09.1963, whereas Respondent No. 5 with mala-fide intention entered the date of birth in salary slip of March 2021 as 19.09.1961. He further argued that the principle of audi aulteram partem has not been followed. The petitioner has not been provided an opportunity of being heard and while relying on the sole document i.e. salary slip the department is going to retire the petitioner. He added that the learned High Court has also failed to consider this important aspect of the case that the respondents are going to retire the petitioner before two years of the age of superannuation without any justification. He lastly argued that some legal questions of law of public importance are involved in the case, therefore, leave may be granted in the interest of justice.
4. Mr Muhammad Asad Khan, Advocate, the learned counsel for the respondents forcefully defended the impugned judgment of the learned High Court and submitted that the same is quite in accordance with law calling for no interference by this Court. He further submitted that the proposition involved in the case has been dealt and resolved intelligently by the High Court by giving cogent reasoning. He further submitted that as per Matriculation Certificate the date of birth of the petitioner is 19.09.1961 and the same has always been considered as conclusive proof of date of birth, hence, the learned High Court has committed no illegality while passing the impugned judgment. He further submitted that the same kind of proposition has already been dealt with and resolved by this Court in a case reported as "Khawaja Aamir Ahmed vs. Azad Govt. and others"
(2021 SCR 58). He further submitted that it is proved from the record that the date of birth of the petitioner is 19.09.1961 and he is being retired accordingly.
He lastly submitted that no legal question of law of public importance is involved in the case, therefore, leave may be refused.
5. I have heard the arguments of the learned counsel for the parties and examined the record made available along with impugned judgment. The controversy involved in the matter is regarding the date of birth of the petitioner. The stance of the learned counsel for the petitioner is that the date of birth of the petitioner has been changed by the respondents with mala-fide intention. The date of birth of the petitioner as per service record is 19.09.1963 but the respondents with mala-fide intention entered the date of birth as 19.09.1961 in salary slip of March, 2021.
Moreover, he has not been given any chance to present his stance before the concerned authority.
I have given my serious thought to the arguments addressed by the learned counsel for the petitioner and perused the record with utmost care. A perusal of the record reveals that the date of birth of the petitioner in the matriculation certificate is 19.09.1961 and now it is well settled by the Courts that the date of birth mentioned in the matriculation certificate will be considered as a conclusive proof of date of birth. The due credence will be given to the Matriculation Certificate and all the subsequent documents including CNIC, salary slips, service book etc. Cannot override the entry of the date of birth recorded in the Matriculation certificate unless the same is corrected by the Board of Intermediate and Secondary Education under the applicable law. In this regard reliance can be placed on the case reported as "Khawoja Aamir Ahmed vs. Azad Govt. & others"
(2021 SCR 58), wherein, it was held as under: .......In our estimation, when there is clear contradiction between the record of service of the private respondent, in view of the aforesaid provisions relating to the maintenance of the service record, the due credence will be given to the Matriculation Certificate and all the subsequent documents including CNIC, salary slip etc., cannot override the entry of the date of birth recorded in the Matriculation Certificate unless the same is corrected by the Board of Intermediate and Secondary Education under the relevant law."
After going through the above reproduced portion of the judgment I am of the view that the arguments addressed by the learned counsel for the petitioner have no substance. The learned High Court has rightly passed the impugned judgment and no illegality has been committed. The learned counsel for the petitioner has failed to substantiate any question of law of public importance, which is pre-requisite for grant of leave. It is settled practice of this Court that leave to appeal is not granted to create false hope in the mind of the litigant. It on one hand prevents the litigant from further expenditures and on other hand saves precious time and resources of the Court, which may be used for better administration of justice in other cases having substantial questions of law and facts.
Resultantly, this petition for leave to appeal along with application for interim relief stands dismissed.