MUHAMMAD NAEEM ANWAR, J.- Khan Wazir alongwith 43 others, the petitioners, through instant petition filed under Article 199 of the Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973 have assailed the office order of Deputy Commissioner, Dir Lower at Timergara (respondent No.5) dated 14.02.2023, whereby their objection/reference dated 22.1.2023 filed u/s 18 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (the Act of 1894) seeking enhancement of the compensation of their acquired land through award No.2515-23/REV/LA/252 dated 14.02.2022, with contention that the market rate of their property is not less than Rs.6,00,000/- per marla of irrigated land, Rs.5,00,000/- per marla of un-irrigated land, and Rs.4,00,000/- per marla for rest of their property, was rejected being time barred.
2. Learned counsel for the petitioners contended that the impugned order of respondent No.5 (District Collector/DC, Dir Lower at Timergara) is unwarranted, alien to law, unjustified, not sustainable, perverse and illegal, because the limitation is a mixed question of law and facts, which requires determination after recording of pro and contra evidence. He maintained that neither the petitioners were associated with the process of acquisition started from issuance of notification uls 4 of the Act of 1894 nor they were ever served with any notice under any provision of the law including section 11 of the Act of 1894 when the award was announced, therefore, on getting the knowledge, the petitioners moved to the Collector for referring the matter to the Referee Court but it was wrongly dismissed by respondent No.5. He, while relying upon the cases of "Hazrat Wali Vs. Land Acquisition Collector, Mardan and 05 others" (2020 CLC 1202, Peshawar), "Muhammad Jan and 04 others Vs. Azad Government of the State of J&K through Chief Secretary Muzafarabad and 07 others" (1996 CLC 1967), requested that on acceptance of the instant petition, respondent No.5 may be directed to refer the objection/ reference of the petitioners to the Referee Court for its determination in accordance with law, on the ground that the law requires adjudication of the matters on merits, rather than on technicalities.
3. The learned A.A.G present before the Court in some other cases accepted the notice of the instant petition and he supported the impugned order.
4. We have heard learned counsel for the petitioners and learned A.A.G for the respondents, and with their able assistance have gone through from the material available on the record.
5. Copy of the acquaintance roll annexed with the instant petition envisages that the petitioners have received the amount of compensation on 25.10.2022 and that too without any protest, therefore, the petitioners if not earlier were in the knowledge of the acquisition of their property then on the date of receipt of the compensation amount, they have got the knowledge, even then they have approached to the Collector through their objections on 22.01.2023, almost after three months of the receipt of the compensation. There are two provisions under the Act of 1894 i.e., sections 18 & 30 providing mechanism for redressal of the owners whose property was acquired or who allege themselves entitled for compensation thereof. Section 30 of the Act of 1894 is in respect of declaration regarding entitlement of the claimant either against the owner, by owner, or by a person who has not been recorded as owner of the property but claims himself to be the owner of the same and as such, is entitled for compensation. It is, in fact, a declaration from the Referee Court and for any such declaration, the legislature has not provided any time in section 30 of the Act of 1894, therefore, any person seeking apportionment of his property or share in acquired land, may file the objection to the collector for onwards transmission to the Referee Court and in such an eventuality, neither the objection could be taken as a hurdle nor the Collector could refuse the objection filed u/s 30 of the Act of 1894. Not only this Court but the apex Court in a number of cases have held that for declaration of apportionment, no limitation has been provided in the Act of 1894, however, section 18 of the Act of 1894 is in respect of the compensation, determination of the market value and potential aspect of the acquired land, for which, the law itself has provided two limitations; one for those who participated in the process commencing from notification section 4 of the Act and endings in the award Ids 11 of the Act of 1894 and secondly, the period of limitation for a person who was neither associated with the process of acquisition nor he has ever objected the process of acquisition or his share in the property, which provides six months limitation from the date of issuance of the award. For convenience, section 18 of the Act of 1894 is reproduced as under: "18. Reference to Court. (1) Any person interested who has not accepted the award may, by written application to the Collector, require that the matter be referred by the Collector for the determination of the Court, whether his objection be to the measurement of the land, the amount of the compensation, the person to whom it is payable, or the apportionment of the compensation among the persons interested.
(2) The application shall state the grounds on which objection to the award is taken: Provided that every such application shall be made,
(a) If the person making it was present or represented before the Collector at the time when he made his award, within six weeks from the date of the Collector's award;
(b) In other cases, within six weeks of the receipt of the notice from the collector under section 12, sub-section (2) or within six months from the date of the Collector's award, whichever period shall first expire."
The afore-referred provision of law is not only self explanatory but it also in ambiguous terms signifies that an aggrieved person may seek his remedy within six months in the second category.
Section 18 of the Act of 1894 leaves no room for further interpretation with reference to the time of six months which shall expire from the date of receipt of the notice u/s 12 (2) of the Act of 1894 or from the date of Collector' award, whichever expires earlier.
6. Insofar as the contention of learned counsel for the petitioners that they were not served with any notice as provided u/s 12 (2) of the Act of 1894 of the ibid Act is concerned, section 12 (2) of the Act of 1894 provides that Collector shall give immediate notice of award to such of the persons interested as are not present personally or by their representatives when the award was made, but since issuance of the award u/s 11 of the Act of 1894 and publication thereof or affixing the same at some conspicuous place is itself a notice for the awareness of the public at large or the owners whose property was acquired but were not present at the time of acquisition of the property. Even otherwise, if a person alleges that he was not associated with the process of acquisition or no such notice was in his knowledge then the period of limitation starts from the date of issuance of the award u/s 11 of the Act of 1894 and it expires on completion of six months. Thus, the arguments of learned counsel for the petitioners that the limitation is a mixed question of law and facts would be decided through recording of evidence and that too before the Referee Court is repellent to the provision of subsection 2 of section 18 of the Act of 1894 as reproduced above. It is significant to mention that the role of the Collector, after issuance of the award, is of worth consideration, irrespective of this fact that he only refers the matter to the Referee Court but when the question of limitation comes before him, it is his primary duty, responsibility and obligation under the law to refuse it/not to send it to the Referee Court because once he refers the matter to the Referee Court then the Referee Court shall decide it within the parameters of reference/objection and not otherwise. In other words, the reference sent to the Referee Court could not be dismissed on the ground of limitation. Thus, the submission of learned counsel for petitioners for recording of evidence and that too regarding the limitation is misconceived. In the cases of acquisition, the definite period of six months or six weeks has been provided by the legislature which by no stretch of imagination could be extended except uls 4 of the Limitation Act, 1908. When section 18 of the Act of 1894 itself provides a limitation then under the provision of section 29 (2) of the Limitation Act, 1908 the provisions of limitation Act shall not applicable. It is by now settled law that when the Statute itself provides limitation then the provisions of law of limitation shall not be applicable to the matter. Reliance in this respect is placed on the cases of "Allah Dino and other v. Muhammad Shah and others" (2001 SCMR 286), "Chairman, District Evacuee Trust Committee, Rawalpindi v.
Shari! Ahmad and others" (PLD 1991 Supreme Court 246), "Rahim Jan v. Securities Exchange Commission of Pakistan and others" (2002 CLD 1464), "City District Government, Lahore through District Coordination Officer. Lahore v. Mian Muhammad Saeed Amin" (2006 SCMR 676), "The State v. Zahid Hussain" (1990 SCMR 164), "Ali Muhammad and another v. Fatal Hussain and others" (1983 SCMR 1239), "Abdul Ghaffar and others v. Mst. Mumtaz" (PLD 1982 Supreme Court 88) and "Ahsan Ali and others v. District Judjie and others" (PLD 1969 Supreme Court 167).
7. Next point for determination is that whether the Referee Court could decide the question of limitation once the reference was sent/referred to it. In the case of "Government of West Pakistan (now Government of NWFP) Vs. Arbab Haii Aimad Ali Jan and others" (PLD 1981 SC 516), wherein one of the questions before the Supreme Court was as to whether the Referee Court could enter into the question of limitation, it was observed that once the Collector sent the reference to the Court, the Court would be incompetent to go behind the reference to see if objection/application before him (the Collector) had been filed within time, as prescribed in proviso to section 18 of the Act of 2018. It was also re-affirmed by the Supreme Court in the case of "Government of West Pakistan and 2 others v. Mst. Asmatun Nisa and 6 others' (PLD 1983 SC 109) that: "So far as the second contention is concerned, there is no difficulty in repelling the same as, while disposing of a similar point, this Court in P L, D 1981 SC 516 held that the Court cannot go into the question' whether the application under section 18 was barred by limitation. The relevant passage from the judgment has already been quoted above. In case the finding of the High Court after reference to the Collector's file under section 18 was that the application was made within proper time and nothing was shown from the record that this conclusion of the High Court was in any manner unwarranted."
Therefore, this question requires no further discussion when it was resolved by the apex Court.
8. Insofar as the case of Hazrat Wali (supra) is concerned, the judgment passed therein by the Single Bench of this Court was in respect of the appeal filed by a private individual against the judgment of the Referee Court as it is reflected from Para No.1 of the judgment where the appeal against the order of the Additional District Judge-VIII/Referee Court, Mardan dated 12.02.2014 was assailed before this Court. In the case (supra), there is a reference of section 30 of the Act of 1894.
When so, it has already been held by this Court that no limitation runs against objection filed by a person before the Court u/s 30 of the Act of 1894. Likewise, the judgment in the case of Muhammad Jan (supra), in view of peculiar circumstances and question of law cannot be applied to the case in hand. In this respect, reliance may also be placed on the cases of "Dr.M. Salah-UdDin Mengal and another Vs. Government Of Balochistan through Board of Revenue and 2 others" (2020 CLC 1916), "Sabol and 9 others Vs. Deputy Commissioner/Collector and 2 others" (2015 CLC 97), "Government of Sindh through Land Acquisition Officer Vs. Naar Muhammad and others" (1996 CLC 412), "Abdul Wakeel Khan and 4 others Vs. Land Acquisition Collector, Nowshera and 10 others" (1995 CLC 548 Peshawar), "Government of West Pakistan (Now N.-W. F. P.) And 2 others Vs. Mst. Asmatun Nisa And 6 Others" (PLD 1983 S.0 109), "Government OF N.-W.F.P. and others Vs. Akbar Shah and others" (2010 SCMR 1408).
9. Another important aspect of the instant matter is the receipt of compensation amount by the petitioners without any protest. When an owner whose property was acquired has received the compensation from the authorities concerned without any protest then in such an eventuality, he could not afterward file a reference u/s 18 of the Act of 1894. In the case of "Government of NWFP Vs. Akbar Shah and others" (2010 SCMR 1408), the Supreme Court has that: "It is established on the record that the respondents/ plaintiffs had received compensation as determined by Land Acquisition Collector through the Award without any protest.
Respondents/plaintiffs had no lawful right even to file reference under section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act read with sections 30 and 31 (2) of the Land Acquisition Act as law laid down by this Court in Ghulam Muhammad's case PLD 1967 SC 191."
10. It is also pertinent that in the case (supra) though the Supreme Court has held that limitation as alleged by the defendants before the Referee Court was required to be adjudicated upon but since the matter was also in respect of determination of the rights under sections 30 & 31 of the Act of 1894, whereas in the instant petition the only question is of the market value qua the potential value of the property and not the case u/s 30 of the Act of 1894, therefore, to this extent the facts are distinguishable from the case discussed above. To the extent of section 30 of the Act of 1894 this Court in W.P No.1205- M/2022 titled Amjad Ali Versus Government of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa through Chief Secretary and eight others decided on 01.11.2022 has held that: "The duty of the Collector is to adjudge when the reference is made/submitted before him for its onward transmission to the Court, however, when it is filed u/s 18 of the Act of 1894 he has to see as to whether it is within time or not and when the matter was referred by the Collector to Referee Court, it shall be deemed that the reference was filed within time, as such, to the extent of section 18 of the Act of 1894, it is his bounden duty to determine the factor of limitation and if it is within time, then to send it to the Referee Court but when reference is u/s 30 of the Act of 1894, the Collector has got no authority either to hold it as time barred or to determine that the question of dispute pertaining to title/ apportionment/ distribution of compensation amount or any portion thereof on the sole analogy that this is power of the Court to which the matter is referred. Whenever any person is claiming his entitlement in any portion of the property alleged by him to have been acquired or possessed by the acquiring agency under the shelter of award and the aggrieved person is seeking his entitlement for compensation of the property so acquired irrespective of this fact that it is properly measured and shown in the award or otherwise. The duty of Collector is only to refer it to the Court."
11. Turning to another material aspect within submissions of learned counsel for the petitioners that the question of limitation was required to be contemplated upon by the learned Referee Court.
Since, the reference is filed before the Collector for its onward transmission/submission to the Referee Court, therefore, the Collector is duty bound to determine the limitation as provided under section 18 of the Act of 1894. If the contention of learned counsel for the petitioners .is deemed correct then the provision of section 18 of the Act of 1894 pertaining specifically to the limitation would have become redundant and same is not the spirit of law. n. More-so, when the law requires that a thing is to be decided in a particular manner, it must be done in that manner and not otherwise. When the law provides the filing of the reference within a specific period then the petitioners were required to approach to the concerned authorities within time and in case of any delay, the petitioners shall have to face the music of his own fault especially, when he is unable to justify the filing of the delayed reference/ objection.
13. Thus, for the reasons discussed above, we hold that: 1) for filing of reference u/s 30 of the Act of 1894 (determination and apportionment), no limitation has been provided by the Act; 2) the reference filed u/s 18 of the Act of 1894 is required to be filed within the period as provided in the law; and the Collector is competent to determine the time limitation of the reference as to whether it is within time or otherwise, and if he finds that the reference was not within time, he would be justified in refusal thereof; and 3) the limitation for the person, who has not participated in the proceedings commencing section 4 till issuance of the award u/s 11 of the Act of 1894, shall expire on the completion of six months from the date of award or from the notice u/s 12 (2) of the Act of 1894, whichever expires earlier.
14. In view of the above, the instant petition, being bereft of merits, stands dismissed in limine.