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1983 P Cr. L J 643

GHULAM MUHAMMAD CHAHAL vs Rao MUHAMMAD AMIR KHAN AND OHERSs

Citation1983 P Cr. L J 643
CourtLahore High Court
Case No.Criminal Revision No. 168 of 1982
Date1982-11-13
Judge(s)Kamal Mustafa Bokhari
ResultPetition dismissed

This is a petition under section 439, Cr. P. C. For revision of the order, dated 9th March, 1982, passed by Sheikh Ijaz Ahmad, Senior Special Judge, Anti-Corruption, Lahore whereby respondents Nos. 1, 2, 4 and 5 were not summoned as accused.

2. Petitioner filed a private complaint for prosecution of the res--pondents for offence under section 161/167/342/500/506/149, P. P. C. Read with section 5 (2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947. The learned Senior Special Judge, Anti-Corruption, Punjab, Lahore addressed a letter, dated 5th November, 1981, to the Chairman, Anti-Corruption Com--mittee No. 3 (Deputy Commissioner), Lahore to sanction prosecution of respondents Nos. 1, 2, 4 and 5. When the case came up for hearing on 23rd January, 1982 it was brought to the notice of the learned Special Judge that necessary papers for sanction of prosecution of aforementioned respondents had been ordered to be put up before the Committee No. 3, Lahore in its next meeting due to which the case was adjourned to 14th February, 1982 to await necessary sanction. The argument of learned counsel for the complainant that sixty days having expired the grant of sanction be presumed, was repelled by the learned Special Judge for the reason that the competent authority had yet to decide the question of sanction. On. 20th March, 1982, the learned Special Judge found that necessary sanction for prosecution of respondents Nos. 1, 2, 4 and 5 had been refused by the concerned authority vide letter, dated 18th February, 1982 and ordered that no further action could be taken against them. Petitioner has assailed both the aforementioned orders, dated 23rd January, 1982 and 20th March, 1982 in this revision.

3. It has been argued by the petitioner that letter of the learned Special Judge for necessary sanction was received by the Chairman, Com--mittee No. 3. Lahore, on 9th November, 1981 and calculating the period from that date sixty days expired on 7th January, 1982. He submits that law contained in proviso to section 6 (5) of the Pakistan Criminal Law (Amendment) Act. 1958 provides that if the required sanction is neither received nor refused within sixty days of the receipt of the letter by the appropriate Government such sanction shall be deemed to have been duly accorded.

Petitioner has urged that since the sanction was neither received nor refused up to 7th January, 1982 the refusal communicated after the expiry of the specified period could not take away jurisdiction of learned Special Judge who erred in adjourning the case on 23rd January, 1982 to await the sanction and further erred in treating the sanction to have been refused.

4. There is no dispute with regard to the facts arising in the case. The learned Special Judge did not receive the sanction or refusal but was informed that it was under consideration of the competent authority and eventually when the competent authority refused to grant sanction the same was intimated to the learned Special Judge. I do not agree with the petitioner that time was essence for toe sanction and find that the delay in the circumstances of this case did not take away power of learned Special Judge to await sanction. Even otherwise, if sanction is presumed in law on the expiry of sixty days it can be recalled particularly before the trial Court has taken congizance of the offence. In the instant case the learned A Special Judge was fully justified in adjourning the case to await necessary sanction when he had been informed that the matter was under considera--tion.

It was not incumbent on the learned trial Judge to summon the accused at that stage which action was rightly postponed to await accord--ing to law. I do not find any ground to interfere with the orders under revision. This petition has no force. It is dismissed.

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