KAMRAN HAYAT MIANKHEL, J. Through this revision petition, the petitioner has called in question the judgment dated 19.12.2019 of the learned Additional District Judge, Ghazi, whereby appeal filed by respondent against the order dated 24.07.2019 was accepted.
2. Briefly stated facts of the case are that petitioner filed a suit against the respondent for declaration, possession and permanent injunction in respect of the landed property falling in Khasra No.2808 of Mauza Goigram/Srlkot Tehsil Ghazi District Haripur. Respondent appeared before the learned trial court and filed an application under Order VII,' Rule 11, C.P.C. for rejection of plaint on the ground that the matter has already been decided by the competent court of law. The learned trial court after hearing learned counsel for parties vide order dated 18.04.2016. Not contented with same, the petitioner preferred an appeal before learned Additional District Judge, Ghazi, Haripur which was dismissed vide order dated 24.10.2016. Dissatisfied with the same, the petitioner filed Revision Petition bearing No.352 of 2016, which was also dismissed by this court vide order dated 26.03.2018. Thereafter the respondent filed an execution petition before the learned Civil Judge-I, Ghazi which was dismissed vide order dated 24.07.2019. Against the abovementioned order, the respondent preferred an appeal before learned Additional District Judge, Ghazi Haripur, which was accepted vide judgment dated 19.12.2019, hence, this instant revision petition.
3. I have heard arguments of learned counsel for parties and record perused the record with their valuable assistance.
4. Perusal of the record reveals that respondent filed execution petition before the learned Civil Judge-I, Ghazi on the ground that she is lawful owner of the suit house and a decree exists in his favour in respect of Suit No.46/1 decided on 18.04.2016 by the learned trial court and appeal filed against the same was also dismissed on 24.10.2016. He further alleged that possession of the suit house was taken forcefully by petitioner during pendency of the suit, therefore, she filed execution petition for possession of suit house and cost imposed on the petitioner by the learned Additional District Ghazi.
5. The available record depicts that learned Additional District Judge, Ghazi accepted the appeal of respondent on 19.12.2019. Thereafter petitioner applied for certified copies on 19.03.2020 and obtained the same on the said date. Thereafter he filed revision petition before this court on 21.03.2020. The petition was returned for removal of objection on 21.03.2020 with the direction to re- submit on or before 21.04.2020 but the petitioner re-submitted this petition on 16.07.2020. The original civil revision petition had been filed on 21.03.2020 which was also time barred as it was filed behind (90) days and even petitioner after the return of civil revision for removing objection have not abided by the directions to file it on or before 21.04.2020, which shows the contumacious behavior of the petitioner.
6. In the present case, the revision petition was filed by the petitioner is time barred and as the period of limitation having been specifically prescribed under section 115, C.P.C., thus taking it into the realm of special law as far as limitation is concerned thus the provisions of section 5 of the Act for condonation of any delay are not applicable to revision petitions. Reliance in this regard is placed on the judgment reported as Alladino v. Muhammad Shah (2001 SCMR 286), in which it was held that where a Statute governing the proceedings does not prescribe period of limitation, the proceedings instituted thereunder shall be controlled by the Limitation Act as a Whole. But where the law under which proceedings have been launched prescribes itself a period of limitation like under section 115, C.P.C. then benefit of section 5 of the Limitation Act cannot be availed unless it has been made applicable as per section 29(2) of the Limitation Act and leave to appeal was refused.
7. The contention of learned counsel for the petitioner that the decree passed under Order VII, Rule 11, C.P.C. was a decree which was only meant for appeal and not for an execution. He contended that the same had been inserted through a deeming clause included in the definition of a decree as provided under section 22, C.P.C., only for the purpose of filing an appeal.
Section 2 (ii) defines the decree as under:
(2) "decree" means the formal expression of an adjudication which, so far as regards the court expressing it, conclusively determines the rights of the parties with regard to all or any of the matters in controversy in the suit and may be either preliminary or final. It shall. be deemed to include the rejection of a plaint the determination of any question within section 144, and an order under rule 60, 98, 101 or 103 of Order XXI but shall not include-
(a) any adjudication from which an appeal lies as an appeal from an order, or
(b) any order of dismissal for default.
8. The perusal of the above section 2(ii), C.P.C. postulates that rejection of a plaint is also a decree and thus bringing this case under the meaning of formal expression of adjudication conclusively determining the rights of the parties and is capable of execution. In this respect reliance can be placed on the judgment reported as Noor Rahman v. Muhammad Azeem Bacha (2010 YLR 2469) wherein it was held as under: "In the peculiar circumstances of this case, where there are two judgments of Division Inches of the august Supreme Court on the same matter having variance, if not divergent views, on the issue relating to a "decree" passed in pursuance of a judgment under Order VII, Rule 11, C.P.C., the law of interpretation is that the later in time would prevail over an earlier judgment of the Supreme Court.
In the circumstances, this court is to follow the subsequent dicta of the august Supreme Court in Muhammad Ali's case, whereby a decree passed in pursuance of a judgment under Order VII, Rule 11, C.P.C., would be a "decree" not only appealable but also executable under the provisions of the C.P.C., in cases where it determines rights of the parties.
The legal import of this decision is that in cases where rights are determined by a court and which culminate in, rejection of the plaint, the same attains "finality and enforceability". Hence the decision of the court under Order VII, Rule 11, C.P.C., can be appealed and enforced as a decree. This Court would, therefore, support and follow the rule laid down in Farman Ali Dewan v. Munsur Ali (PLD 1962 Dacca 214)."
9. In view of the aforementioned legal position, there is no need for this Court to invoke its suo mom revisional powers, to condone the delay in finding the present petition, and thus to correct or interfere in the judgment passed by the learned Additional District Judge, Ghazi, dated 19-12-2019.
10. In light of what has been discussed above, the revision petition has been found to be meritless and same is accordingly dismissed.