In an occurrence, which took place at Sangla Hill, in- the District of Sheikhupura, on 27th August 1969; at 3-00 p.m., one Sadiq Hussain is said to have been injured at the hands of the petitioner and his co-accused Muhammad Akram. The petitioner had a stick, whereas, Muhammad Akram was armed with a knife. The petitioner did not use the stick. He is alleged to have caught hold of Sadiq Hussain, when the latter was given knife blows by Muhammad Akram.
2. Report of the occurrence was lodged by the injured person himself, when his statement was recorded by Ghulam Sarwar Khan, Station House Officer, Sangla Hill, in the Civil Dispensary.
3. The injured person died on 30th August 1969.
4. The petitioner and his co-accused have been committed to stand trial in the Court of Session under section 302 read with section 34 of the Pakistan Penal Code.
5. It is contended by the learned counsel for the petitioner that the fatal injury was given to the deceased by Muhammad Akram and not by the petitioner. The latter has been involved on account of enmity. It is also contended that no prima facie case has been made out against the petitioner. His last conten--tion was that the mere existence of an order of commitment for trial cannot be equated with a finding that there appear rea4on--able grounds for believing that the petitioner was guilty of an offence, punishable with death or transportation for life.
6. The first contention that the petitioner. Himself did not give the fatal injury, would raise a question as to what would be his constructive liability and that question can only be decided by the trial Court after According evidence. So far as the next to contentions are concerned, these were raised by the learned counsel presumably on the basis of a judgment of the Supreme Court reported as Muhammad Ayub v. Muhammad Yaqoob and another (PLD 1966 SC 1003) wherein S. A. Rahman, J., as he then was, observed:- "Of course, the mere existence of an order of commitment for trial need not be equated with a finding that there appear reasonable grounds for believing that the respondent was guilty of an offence, punishable with death or transportation for life."
In a recent case, their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Muhammad Shafiq v. Muhammad Hanif and another (1970 SCMR 143) have reviewed the entire case-law relating to the grant of bail to accused persons under section 497 of the Criminal Procedure Code and have come to the conclusion that commitment by itself is sufficient to show that a prima facie case, exists. Their Lord--ships held :- "It seems, therefore, that the subsequent view of this Court is clearly to the effect that where a prima facie case, upon the taking of evidence, is found to exist, that is also ordinarily sufficient for holding that there are reasonable grounds for believing that the, person charged with the offence is guilty."
7. The aforesaid view, according to their Lordships finds support from the language of section 497 of the Criminal Pro--cedure Code. All that is necessary in such matters to see is, whether, "reasonable grounds exist". It was observed :- "Now, 'grounds' are entirely different from `evidence'. 'Grounds' may or may not constitute 'evidence', but, neverthe--less, they can be taken into consideration under section 208, Cr. P. C., however, the Magistrate has to take evidence and under section 210, Cr. P. C., upon such evidence being taken and upon such examination; if any, being made of the accused, as is considered necessary, the Magistrate has to be satisfied that there are sufficient grounds, for committing the accused for trial, before he can frame a charge, declaring with what offence the accused is charged."
In the end, their Lordships observed :- "To arrive at the state of mind required by section 210 of the Criminal Procedure Code one has as of necessity, to go beyond the stage of mere belief as to the existence of 'reasonable grounds'. The Magistrate has to be 'satisfied' that a prima facie case has been made out ... .It is difficult, therefore, to appreciate as to how it can possibly be argued that even though a prima facie case has bean made out there are no reasonable grounds for believing the accused to be guilty."
8. Since the petitioner has been committed to stand trial on a charge of murder to the Court of Session, in view of the decision in Muhammad Shafiq v. Muhammad Hanif and another, I am of the view that he is not entitled to the grant of bail. The petition is dismissed.