' This judgment shall dispose of Writ Petitions Nos. 1733 and 1734 of 1976 as both petitions are almost identical. In either case the petitioner is the consumer of electricity while WAPDA is the licsence under the Electricity Act that supplies electricity to either petitioner. Having found at one stage the consumers to be stealing electric energy, the licensee sent them detection bills demanding exorbitant amounts in lieu of the electricity consumed by them but unaccounted for. On the failure of the consumers to pay the bills, the electric supply was disconnected. Hence these writ petitions.
2. The licensee's case is that under clause (vi) of the Schedule to the Electricity Act, the licensee can charge the consumer for unaccounted for electric energy consumed. But under clause (vi), 'it is necessary before discontinuing the supply of energy to give not less than 10 days' notice in writing to the consumer. In fact the detection bill itself having been prepared on the ground that electricity had been stolen, it was necessary on the part of the licensee to afford the consumers an opportunity to meet the charge of theft before billing them for the allegedly stolen electric energy.
3. The learned counsel appearing for WAPDA has candidly conceded that notice was necessary and, as admittedly no such notice was served on either petitioner, the position of the licensee is undefendable.
4. Accordingly I allow both the writ petitions, declare the demands made on the petitioners in the respective detection bills as without lawful authority and of no legal effect. If shall, however, be open to the licensee to proceed against the petitioners afresh in accordance with law. If the electric supply was discontinued in either case only on account of the failure of the petitioner to pay the detection bill it shall be restored forthwith. There shall, however, be no order as to costs.